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ABSTRACT
Seeking Medical Care for a Breast Cancer Symptom: Predicting
Intentions to Engage in Prompt or Delay Behavior
September 1984
Christine Timko, B.A., University of Pennsylvania
M.S., Ph.D, University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
This study examined the cognitive structures underlying women's
intentions to delay or not delay seeking medical care for a breast
cancer symptom. Middle-aged women completed a questionnaire that first
asked them to imagine that they had just discovered a particular change
in their breast. Assessed were the variables specified by Ajzen and
Fishbein's Theory of Reasoned Action (i.e., intention, attitude and its
determinants, and subjective norm and its determinants) with respect to
immediately calling the doctor (i.e., prompt behavior) and monitoring
the breast change on one's own (i.e., delay behavior). Also assessed
were variables external to the theory that were drawn from research on
cancer delay, medical sociology, and cognitive social psychology. Re-
sults showed that intentions to engage in delay rather than prompt be-
havior were accurately predicted from corresponding attitude and subjec-
tive norm measures. Intentions to delay were positively associated with
having favorable attitudes toward delay and perceived social pressure to
delay; however, the attitudinal factor was a more influential determi-
nant of intentions than the social factor. Underlying favorable
vi
attitudes toward delay were beliefs that delay would be likely to resul
in a variety of positive outcomes, but would be unlikely to result in
various negative consequences. Three external variables were found to
directly and indirectly contribute to intentions to delay: having
little anxiety upon discovering the breast change, making non-cancer
attributions for the change, and having a habit of delaying medical cai
for physical symptoms. The bases on which respondents made cancer or
non-cancer attributions for the breast change, and the determinants of
the extent to which respondents perceived themselves as vulnerable to
getting breast cancer were also explored.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The research presented here examined the cognitive structures that
underlie women's intentions to obtain or not obtain medical care upon
the discovery of a breast cancer symptom. The methods used to assess
women's cognitive structures in regard to this situation drew on proce-
dures developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) to
apply their "theory of reasoned action" to the prediction and under-
standing of particular behaviors. According to the theory of reasoned
action, the performance of a behavior is preceded by the intention to
perform that behavior. This intention is in turn a function of two
factors: the attitude toward the behavior (i.e., the degree to which
the individual has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of the behav-
ior), and the subjective norm concerning the behavior (i.e., the indi-
vidual's perceived social pressure to perform the behavior). Attitude
toward the behavior is the result of salient beliefs concerning the
consequences of performing the behavior, termed behavioral beliefs . The
subjective norm is determined by normative bel iefs ; that is, by the per-
ceived prescriptions of relevant referent persons or groups. Ajzen and
Fishbein have demonstrated that close examination of the behavioral and
normative beliefs concerning a particular behavior enables the research-
er to gain a good understanding of the factors that ultimately determine
people's decisions to perform or not perform that behavior. They have
1
2also demonstrated that "external variables," such as general attitudes
towards institutions, people, or other targets, personality traits, or
demographic characteristics, may influence intentions indirectly by
affecting behavioral or normative beliefs people hold concerning a
behavior, or by determining the relative importance attached to attitu-
dinal and normative considerations. Thus a demonstration of the impact
of external variables on beliefs underlying a given behavior can add to
the understanding of that behavior.
In the study presented here, a sample of middle-aged women was
given a questionnaire to complete that first asked them to imagine that
they had just discovered a specific change in their breast. The vari-
ables specified by Ajzen and Fishbein were then assessed regarding the
behaviors of immediately presenting the symptom to a physician and of
delaying presentation of the symptom. Additional variables that were
hypothesized to influence these behaviors were also assessed; these
variables were drawn from past research in the areas of delay in obtain-
ing a diagnosis of cancer symptoms, medical sociology, and cognitive
social psychology. Basically, the sample was divided into those women
who intended to immediately present their breast symptom to a physician
and those who intended to delay presentation. The difference in inten-
tions was then explained by examining patterns of differences in the
other variables measured. The general purpose of the study was to gain
a greater understanding of the decision to seek or not seek medical care
for cancer symptoms.
3Introduction
Presently, very few types of cancer are considered to be prevent-
able by means of avoiding or eliminating their causes. Because primary
prevention of most cancers is not yet possible, the focus of educational
campaigns concerning cancer has been on early detection of the disease.
Current evidence suggests that early case detection, along with adequate
diagnosis and treatment, have value in controlling cancer and extending
survival, although the value may differ with cancer of various sites.
In the case of breast cancer, the American Cancer Society (Note 1)
states that the value of early detection is well documented; the five
year survival rate for localized breast cancer is 87%, but if the cancer
has spread by the time of diagnosis and treatment the survival rate is
only 47%. Unfortunately, delay in seeking medical attention for cancer
symptoms is a severe problem. The American Cancer Society (Note 1)
estimated that of the 430,000 people who were expected to die of cancer
in 1982, 139,000 (32%) might have lived longer with earlier diagnosis
and prompt treatment. It is not possible to arrive at a very precise
generalization as to the extent of delay in seeking care for cancer
symptoms, but there is a great deal of research that documents the very
considerable delay which commonly occurs (for reviews, see Antonovsky &
Hartman, 1974; Blackwell, 1963).
Although delay in seeking treatment for symptoms is well recog-
nized as a major problem in controlling cancer, investigations of the
problem have generally failed to provide a theoretical basis from which
4to explain this behavior. Due to methodological problems and equivocal
data, studies of delay are relatively uninformati ve as to the psycholo-
gical processes involved in the decision to obtain or not obtain medical
care for cancer symptoms. The present paper first briefly reviews the
available literature on seeking care for symptoms of cancer, including
the limitations of this research and the conclusions it offers. It then
presents a broader approach to the problem of delay than that generally
taken by researchers in this area. Specifically, information is pre-
sented that is aimed at providing answers to the following interrelated
questions: (1) Under what conditions are physical symptoms noticed and
attended to? (2) Once bodily symptoms are perceived, how are they
interpreted; how does a symptom come to be defined as signifying an
illness? (3) Once symptoms are interpreted as indicative of illness,
what behavioral responses follow from this interpretation? Theory and
research relevant to these questions have come mainly from medical
sociologists, although psychologists have recently also begun to inves-
tigate health-relevant behavior. After these questions are discussed
the Ajzen and Fishbein model of attitude-behavior relationships is
presented. Finally, the differing research perspectives are integrated
into the present study of the decision to seek professional medical care
for a physical symptom suggesting breast cancer.
5Studies of Delay in Seeking Diagnosis
of Cancer Symptoms
Methodological Issues
Typically, studies of delay compare two groups of patients: those
who sought treatment promptly for cancer symptoms, and those who delayed
seeking treatment. Three major methodological problems run throughout
this body of research. These problems concern the definition of delay,
the methods used to determine the extent of delay, and the fact that the
majority of the studies are retrospective.
The concept of patient delay (as distinguished from physician
delay) refers to the time elapsing between the recognition of a symptom
and the first presentation to a physician. The most frequently used
definition of delay was initially provided by Pack and Gallo (1938), and
specifies that delay occurs when the patient waits more than three
months from the onset of symptoms before consulting a doctor. In
studies of factors related to delay, this three month period has been
used to differentiate delaying patients from prompt patients.
The consistent use of Pack and Gallo's definition of delay consti-
tutes the only basis for comparison among studies in this area. Unfor-
tunately, this definition is problematic. First of all, as Kutner and
Gordan (1961) have stated, if three months is considered to be a reason-
able time in which to seek medical care, this implies that no signifi-
cant changes in health status occur during that interval; however, no
such guarantees appear warranted. Secondly, cancer is actually a group
of diseases, and the biological nature and rate of growth of different
6cer
types of neoplasms may vary, as may the resistance of the host. There-
fore, a certain time period of delay may be deleterious delay for can
of one site, but not delay at all for cancer of another site (Blackwell,
1963).
In response to the problem of defining delay, Makover (1963) sug-
gested that delay should ideally be defined in terms of knowledge of
specific pathogeneses of specific cancers, rather than using a broad,
arbitrary unit of time which does not account for varying growth rates
and danger periods for different cancers. The limitations of current
knowledge, however, make such an ideal appear unattainable in the fore-
seeable future. Kutner and Gordan (1961) argue that promptness and
delay should both be defined in terms of deviations from the norm of
medical help seeking for a particular symptom in a particular sample.
In this approach, delaying and prompt patients are defined in relation
to the population from which they are sampled, and in relation to the
specific symptom they did or did not neglect. If the goal of research
is to compare delayers to nondelayers, Kutner and Gordan 's method of
empirically defining delay and nondelay, instead of relying on an arbi-
trary time criterion, seems preferable.
Antonovsky and Hartman (1974) have raised a second methodological
problem that is present in studies of delay. They point out that inves-
tigators rarely state explicitly what question was asked of patients in
order to determine the extent of delay. It is likely that the same
individual would provide different answers concerning the extent of
delay, depending on whether s/he was asked about a pain episode, a
7persistent pain, an unusual physical sensation, or a physical symptom,
and so on. The effects of particular questions on patients' self-
reports of extent of delay can be determined only through further re-
search. Until such research becomes available, investigators should
provide the specific questions asked of respondents, along with the
rationale underlying the choice of questions.
A less easily solved methodological problem concerns the retro-
spective nature of delay research. Most delay studies are based on the
recollections of patients who have sought diagnosis and treatment for
cancer symptoms. Although prospective studies of delay would be diffi-
cult to carry out, at the very least an attempt should be made to exam-
ine the reliability and validity of respondents' retrospective accounts.
Findings of Delay Research
Basically, studies of delay ask why people delay seeking care for
cancer symptoms, and compare delaying patients and prompt patients on a
variety of characteristics. Delay research has tended to be descriptive
rather than explanatory. People who do or do not delay are described in
terms of demographic and personality factors; their relationships with
medical practitioners and their attitudes toward the health care system;
their anxiety, knowledge, and previous experience in relation to cancer;
and their habits of medical care seeking. There have been few attempts
to specify in any detail the various processes-- the stages and types of
decisions--that enter into the seeking of professional medical care for
cancer symptoms.
8One of the first approaches taken in the study of why people delay
was to compare delayers and nondelayers on demographic variables such as
age, gender, occupation, income, and education. A consistent finding is
that lower socioeconomic status and lower educational achievement tend
to be associated with delay. Age is the third most powerful variable in
predicting delay behavior, in that delayers tend to be older. Beyond
these tendencies, no firm generalizations can be made regarding the
relationship between demographic variables and delay. For instance,
Marshall, Gregorio, and Walsh (1982) found that gender differences in
care seeking among individuals with cancer were negligible. These find-
ings were based on assessments of both the stage of disease at which
patients reported for treatment and the duration of delay between their
reported first notice of symptoms and the diagnosis. There is only one
situation in which background characteristics might directly explain
delay: when the procurement of medical care necessarily requires finan-
cial outlay, low socioeconomic status would possibly account for delay
behavior. In all other cases, demographic variables can be operative
solely through other variables. For example, it may be that older
people delay more because they are overrepresented in groups of lower
socioeconomic status. For reviews of research examining the relation-
ship between general background factors and delay, see Antonovsky and
Hartman (1974); Kasl and Cobb (1966); and Rosenstock and Kirscht (1979).
A second approach taken in the study of delay behavior has been to
compare patients who delayed seeking care for cancer symptoms with
prompt patients on their responses to personality tests and/or
9psychological or psychiatric interviews. These investigations focus on
four major issues: general emotional health (e.g., Cameron & Hinton,
1968; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Worden &
Weisman, 1975), intellectual capacity (e.g., Aitken-Swan & Paterson,
1955), hypochondria and body image (e.g.. Fisher, 1967; Gold, 1964;
Hammerschlag, Fisher, DeCosse & Kaplan, 1964; Henderson, 1966; Hender-
son, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Sugar & Watkins, 1961), and styles of
coping with fear (e.g., Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Cobb, Clark,
McGuire & Howe, 1954; Hammerschlag et al
. , 1964; Henderson, Wittkower &
Lougheed, 1958; Shands
,
Finesinger, Cobb & Abrams, 1951). There is very
little consistency in the findings regarding these issues; for a review
of this literature, see Antonovsky and Hartman (1974).
Studies of delay in seeking a cancer diagnosis have further exam-
ined the attitudinal and behavioral relationship of individuals to their
doctors and to the medical care system. Findings regarding the influ-
ence of patients' perceptions of their relationship with doctors on med-
ical help-seeking are equivocal. Some researchers have suggested that
"good" doctor-patient relationships, or at least having a doctor one
considers to be one's family physician, facilitates prompt help-seeking
for cancer symptoms. The same investigators have reported that delayers
tend to be unable to form satisfactory relationships with doctors, and
to feel uncomfortable in these relationships (Cobb et al., 1954; Hen-
derson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; King & Leach,
1950). On the other hand, subsequent studies have found no meaningful
differences between delayers and non-delayers in terms of their
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attitudes toward their doctors (Clements & Wakefield, 1972; Greer,
1974). The lack of consistency among studies as to how attitudes toward
doctors are measured contributes greatly to the ambiguity surrounding
this issue. Investigations of people's relationships to the health care
system have focused on variables such as the expense of the health care
facility, travel distance to the facility, and the type of health insur-
ance coverage carried by respondents. In several studies, reasons given
by delayers for why they delayed obtaining treatment for cancer symptoms
did involve inadequate financial resources and lack of transportation to
the doctor (Cobb et al
. , 1954; Gold, 1964; Henderson, Wittkower &
Lougheed, 1958; Lynch & Krush, 1969). However, no attempts have been
made to determine the extent to which these factors affect delay.
One of the most prevalent approaches taken in the study of delay
has been to examine the variables of affective reactions to cancer,
knowledge about cancer and cancer symptoms, and previous experience with
cancer in oneself, relatives, and friends. Fear is by far the most
frequently cited reason for delay in obtaining a diagnosis of cancer
symptoms. Delay is attributed not only to fear of cancer itself— of its
diagnosis, treatment, pain, incurability, and stigma— but also to fear
of doctors, physical exams, hospitals, surgery, anesthesia, disfigure-
ment, leaving home, losing one's job, dependency, embarrassment upon
seeking care for a trivial symptom, and many other related factors
(Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Burdick & Chanatry, 1954; Cameron &
Hinton, 1968; Clements & Wakefield, 1972; Cobb et al
. ,
1954; Gold, 1964;
nGreer, 1974; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958;
Lynch & Krush, 1968, 1969; Roberts, 1965).
Researchers investigating coping mechanisms in patients with can-
cer commonly state that if excessive fear is aroused by the discovery of
cancer symptoms, the patient reacts by denying or avoiding the symptoms
(Bard & Sutherland, 1955; Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Shands et al
. , 1951).
These defensive reactions are thought to function to reduce anxiety, but
also to delay medical care seeking. In this view, delay is due largely
to the patient's unwillingness or inability to experience the distress
aroused by the suspicion of cancer. Data from studies of delay are
interpreted as supporting this view, in that delayers are often reported
to have employed the repressive mechanisms of denial, avoidance, or
fatalism (Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Cobb et al
. , 1954; Eardley,
1974; Greer, 1974; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed,
1958; Lynch & Krush, 1969; Worden & Weisman, 1975).
The absence of fear upon discovering symptoms of cancer is also
believed by some researchers to deter early action in obtaining medical
treatment for those symptoms. In almost all studies in which patients
were interviewed about why they had delayed seeking care, a high percen-
tage mentioned that they did not consider their symptoms to be serious,
unusual, abnormal, or significant. Prompt patients, on the other hand,
appeared to have a greater awareness that their symptoms were indeed
serious (e.g., Cobb et al., 1954; Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Henderson,
1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Worden & Weisman, 1975).
Furthermore, studies by Cameron and Hinton (1968) and Sugar and Watkins
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(1961) of women with breast cancer symptoms both suggested that concern
or anxiety is a healthy response to the discovery of cancer symptoms,
since these affective reactions were associated with early help seeking
in their samples. Cameron and Hinton found that delayers were less
likely than nondelayers to have been worried when they discovered a lump
in their breast. Patients in the Sugar and Watkins study who sought
care promptly reported feeling anxious about the possibility of having
an operation; delayers, however, reported feeling depressed about the
possibility of mastectomy. In this case, depression, rather than
anxiety, was thought to promote delay through the avoidance or denial of
symptoms
.
In reviewing the literature on the relationship between anxiety
and delay in procuring medical care for cancer symptoms, Antonovsky and
Hartman (1974) and Kasl and Cobb (1966) have suggested that although it
is not clear how anxiety influences delay, the true relationship may be
curvilinear. A moderate degree of fear regarding the consequences of
cancer may be conducive to nondelay, whereas both little and great fear
may encourage delay. The suggestion of a curvilinear relation is said
to follow from Janis' (1967; Janis & Feshbach, 1953) model of the
extent to which fear arousing communications about the dangers of non-
compliance to a particular course of action are effective in persuading
people to adopt the recommended behavior. In fact, however, delay
researchers have greatly oversimplified Janis' model in attempting to
provide post-hoc explanations for findings concerning the relationship
between anxiety and delay. Furthermore, the model Janis actually
13
proposed has been criticized on a number of grounds by Leventhal (1970),
who concluded that its predictions are largely unsupported by empirical'
evi dence.
The possession of knowledge relating to cancer has been viewed as
particularly important with respect to the ability to define a given
deviation as a possible symptom of cancer. It is often assumed that in
order to seek care promptly for a cancer symptom, one must be knowledge-
able enough about cancer to recognize the meaning of the abnormality.
Part of the confusion surrounding studies of the relationship between
knowledge and delay arises from the failure of investigators to expli-
citly distinguish knowledge about cancer symptoms in general from know-
ledge about cancer symptoms in relation to oneself. An individual may
be familiar with the warning signs of cancer, and yet not "know" that
his or her own symptom is a symptom of cancer. These different types of
knowledge may differentially affect delay.
Knowledge of cancer in general— the ability to recognize the seven
warning signals of cancer, or having been informed about cancer through
the mass media— is believed by some researchers to be necessary but not
sufficient to prevent delay in securing care for symptoms. For example,
since both the delaying and nondelaying groups in the Henderson (1966;
Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958) and Sugar and Watkins (1961)
studies were familiar with the seven warning signs, the authors con-
cluded that knowledge of cancer symptoms fails to induce some patients
to seek early medical assistance. Similarly, Hackett, Cassem and Raker
(1973) found that patients who appeared to be fully informed about the
14
signs and symptoms of cancer still did not respond to their own symptoms
with appropriate promptness.
Available evidence suggests that many patients think of cancer
when they first notice symptoms of the disease, but there is no consis-
tency among studies as to the proportion who do so. Several studies in-
dicate that relating one's knowledge about cancer symptoms in general to
one's own symptoms facilitates speedier help seeking. King and Leach
(1950) stated that the aspect in which their delay patients differed
most from nondelay patients was the interpretation of first symptoms of
cancer. Nondelay patients most frequently interpreted their first symp-
toms as a cancerous or precancerous condition, or else had no specific
idea as to what the symptoms might mean and "just realized that some-
thing was wrong." Delay patients tended to interpret their symptoms as
a recurrence of a previous illness or as a common illness. Thus, in
those cases in which the possibility of cancer was considered in rela-
tion to one's symptoms, this by itself was a reason for seeing a doctor
promptly. In a similar way, Cameron and Hinton (1968), Eardley (1974),
and Sugar and Watkins (1961) have all suggested that those patients who
openly acknowledge that their symptoms may indicate cancer usually
report to the physician early.
On the other hand, Aitken-Swan and Paterson (1955) speculated
that, in general, there are two clear-cut groups of delayers: those who
"know" they might have cancer, and those who are genuinely ignorant of
the possible significance of their symptoms. In their sample, the
average length of delay was higher among the "knowers" than the
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"nonknowers," which suggested to the authors that the "knowers" were too
fearful to seek a diagnosis. The authors concluded that two distinct
processes of fear and ignorance operate to cause delay. Burdick and
Chanatry (1954) also stated that fear and ignorance are the most common
reasons for delay in securing care for cancer symptoms. Ignorance was
ruled out by Greer (1974) as a possible explanation for the finding that
the majority of delayers in his sample initially regarded their symptoms
as "definitely not serious." Rather, the tendency for delayers to
defend against stressful life events with denial was given in explana-
tion for this finding. How one might go about distinguishing the
defensive denial of cancer symptoms from genuine ignorance as to the
meaning of symptoms is obviously problematic.
Currently, it is generally accepted that the relationship between
knowledge about cancer-about cancer symptoms in general or in relation
to oneself--and delay is not a simple one. Rather, it appears that
knowledge interacts with affective orientations toward cancer, resulting
in differential behavior outcomes. Goldsen, Gerhardt and Handy (1957)
found, for example, that anxiety about cancer (i.e., worrying that one's
symptoms signify cancer) did not increase the tendency to delay, nor was
knowledge about cancer (i.e., the ability to recognize cancer warning
signals) related to delay. However, "cancer worrying" and knowledge in
combination did serve to increase delay. The authors concluded that in-
dividuals who recognize the danger signals of cancer will be most likely
to seek early diagnosis of symptoms if they feel no general anxiety
16
about cancer. If people do feel such general anxiety, knowledge my
increase the tendency to delay.
King and Leach (1950) distinguished two types of anxiety in rela-
tion to cancer symptoms that differentiated the nondelayers and delayers
in their study. Prompt patients expressed great concern over the effect
of their condition on themselves if neglected. In contrast, a typical
reaction among delayers was fear of finding out the nature of their ill-
ness or fear of the effects of surgery or other treatments. In other
words, nondelayers tended to feel anxious about the implications of not
treating their symptoms, while delaying patients were anxious about the
implications of treatment. Kutner and Gordan (1961) reported that delay
in seeking care for symptoms of cancer was least for those patients hav-
ing maximal knowledge regarding cancer symptoms, but greatest for those
having minimal knowledge about cancer. However, the authors also
suggested that in the maximal knowledge group, fear of the consequences
of delay promoted prompt action, whereas in the minimal knowledge group,
fear of the possible significance of their symptoms promoted delayed
action.
These studies concerning the interaction of knowledge and anxiety
in relation to cancer suggest that knowledge of cancer warning signals
or knowledge that one's own symptoms may signify cancer are not the only
types of knowledge that influence taking action to seek care. While
one's ability to define a given symptom as a symptom of cancer most
likely does play an important role in help seeking behavior, one's
knowledge and beliefs concerning the risk factors, various treatments.
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survival rates, and so on, for different types of cancer, are also like-
ly to be important. Cobb et al
. (1954) examined the relation between
knowledge and delay, but looked at patients' knowledge concerning treat-
ments for cancer and the desirability of early treatment, in addition to
their knowledge of cancer symptoms per se. It was found that when
knowledge was operational i zed this way, the possession of knowledge was
a trigger to prompt action. Similarly, Eardley (1974) reported that one
of the main factors distinguishing delaying and prompt patients in her
sample was that delayers were unconvinced of the value of early medical
attention in contributing to survival from cancer. Research on the
relationships among the variables of knowledge and affective and behav-
ioral responses to symptoms of cancer would be more informative if
knowledge were conceptualized more broadly than as the simple recogni-
tion of cancer symptoms.
There is a lack of consistency in the results of studies that have
investigated the effect of prior experience with cancer on delay behav-
ior. In several cases, previous contact with cancer, i.e., knowing a
family member, friend, or acquaintance who had or died of the disease,
was found to be unrelated to the time elapsed between the onset of symp-
toms and the first medical visit (Abrams & Finesinger, 1953; Cameron &
Hinton, 1968; Greer, 1974; Hackett, Cassem & Raker, 1973; Worden &
Weisman, 1975). Previous experience with others who died of cancer was,
however, given as a reason for delayed action in the Henderson (1966;
Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958) studies. Aitken-Swan and Pater-
son (1955) stated that knowing a friend or relative who died of cancer
18
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increased delay, although knowing a cancer victiin with a successful
outcome did not decrease delay. Cobb et al. (1954) found that having a
prior cancer history in one's family was a motivational force toward
delay, if the relative's outcome was poor; if the other's outcome was
successful, this experience encouraged prompt behavior. It would seem
reasonable to include the perception of the quality of others' outcomes
from cancer as a variable in investigations of the influence of previo
experience with the disease on obtaining a diagnosis of symptoms.
The final approach to be discussed that has been taken in studies
of delay involves behavioral dispositions toward medical care. This ap-
proach asks if behavior that facilitates the early detection of cancer
follows the same pattern that characterizes other medical habits of an
individual. The literature concerning this question seems to indicate
that the answer is yes.
King and Leach (1950) stated that the cancer patients in their
sample responded to symptoms of cancer in very much the same way they
had managed symptoms of past illnesses. Patients who had previously had
a habit of seeing doctors only when in extreme discomfort or in emergen-
cies delayed in securing care for cancer symptoms. Much less delay oc-
curred among cancer patients who gave a history of consulting physicians
for anything unusual or that they did not understand, regardless of
severity or discomfort. The authors concluded that delay or nondelay in
seeking care for cancer symptoms depends largely on the nature of reac-
tions to illness that patients have previously established. Similarly,
Goldsen, Gerhardt, and Handy (1957) suggested that delay is much less
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related to the emergence of a specific symptom and its possible implica-
tions than to the cluster of long standing orientations to medical
problems that people have built up during the course of a lifetime.
Their respondents appeared to seek a prompt diagnosis of cancer symptoms
to the extent that they would do so for any major or minor symptom.
Clements and Wakefield (1972) also indicated that patients reporting
promptly for cancer symptoms are more disposed than delaying patients to
seek medical care for any symptom of illness. A greater proportion of
nondelayers than delayers "had made a habit of consulting a doctor regu-
larly" in the Henderson, Wittkower and Lougheed (1958) study, and
Hackett, Cassem and Raker (1973) found a high positive correlation
between responses to "do you tend to put off seeing your doctor" and
"did you put it off this time."
The findings of Cameron and Hinton (1968) run counter to the re-
sults of studies on habits of medical care already cited, for in their
sample, those patients who considered themselves generally slow to
consult a doctor did not delay more for cancer symptoms. There is
limited evidence that delay in seeking care for cancer symptoms is
greater than that for seeking care for general medical symptoms. Kutner
and Gordan (1961) compared delay in the presence of the seven danger
signals of cancer to delay when other symptoms were reported, and found
that a higher frequency of longer delays occurred in the presence of
cancer symptoms. Aside from the latter two studies, the bulk of the
evidence would seem to indicate that delay in seeking a diagnosis of
possible cancer symptoms reflects a general pattern of medical delay.
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Summary
Although a great number of studies have attempted to answer the
question of why people delay obtaining treatment for symptoms of cancer,
the research yields few definitive responses to the question. In terns
of demographic factors, delayers tend to be of lower socioeconomic sta-
tus, to have fewer years of fonnal education, and to be older. It may
be that people's behavioral reactions to cancer symptoms are similar to
their behavioral reactions to previously experienced physical symptoms,
suggesting that people develop general habits in relation to medical
help seeking. There is a growing acceptance of the idea that the rela-
tionship between anxiety regarding cancer symptoms and delay in seeking
care for symptoms is curvilinear, but that knowledge of cancer interacts
with anxiety to influence help seeking behavior. Evidence concerning
the effects on delay of personality factors, attitudes toward doctors
and the health care system, and previous experience with cancer is
inconclusive at this time.
Perceiving, Interpreting, and Responding
to Symptoms
The relative failure of research to provide answers to the ques-
tion of why people delay seeing a doctor about cancer symptoms may stem
from the fact that theoretical frameworks in which to explore delay have
been absent from studies of the problem. The descriptive nature of
delay research has not allowed investigators to get at the decision
making processes people go through before they arrive at the doctor's
office. Medical sociologists have approached the general issue of
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people's responses to physical symptoms through the concept of illness
behavior (cf. Kasl & Cobb, 1966; Mechanic, 1962a). According to Kasl
and Cobb (1966), "the basic problem of illness behavior is: in the
presence of symptoms, what will the individual do and why will he do
it?" (p. 255). Although people's responses to symptoms of cancer in
particular have not been a central focus of illness behavior research,
this research does contribute theoretical bases from which to examine
help-seeking for cancer symptoms. Several medical sociologists have
suggested that people make decisions about physical symptoms through a
series of stages (cf. Freidson, 1961; McKinlay, 1975; Suchman, 1965).
Although different researchers specify different stages in regard to
illness behavior, the stages fall into three broad categories: the
perception of symptoms, the evaluation of symptoms, and acting (or not
acting) upon symptoms. These categories are clearly interrelated and
overlapping, and this creates some difficulty in separating the stages
for purposes of discussion. In the discussion that follows, theory and
empirical data from the field of medical sociology that bear on each of
these stages will be examined. In addition, social psychological
theories of motivation and cognition will be examined in light of their
implications for the way people perceive, interpret, and respond to
physical symptoms.
The Perception of Symptoms
Evidence indicates that physical symptoms of illness are commonly
experienced by most people, although only a small proportion of physical
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complaints is brought to a doctor's attention (Mechanic, 1972; Penne-
baker & Skelton, 1978; Zola, 1973). Stoekle, Zola, and Davidson (1963)
suggested that "so widespread, in fact, is the prevalence of both symp-
toms and signs of disease that these circumstances may, in fact, be
regarded as the normal condition of the population. The absence of com-
plaints and signs of disease may be exceptional even for the 'healthy'
members of the population who do not attend the doctor" (p. 976).
Robinson (1971) similarly stated that "the classification of symptoms
and defining of behavior as either relevant or not relevant for report-
ing to professional medical authorities are facts of everyday life for
most families" (p. 26). According to Mechanic (1972), many symptoms
occur so commonly throughout life that they become part of ordinary
expectations and so are experienced as normal variations or are regarded
as trivial. People begin to notice bodily sensations only when they de-
part from more ordinary feelings. In the following section, an attempt
will be made to outline the conditions under which physical symptoms are
noticed and attended to. Factors that influence the perception of
symptoms include demographic characteristics of the symptom-experiencer
and the symptoms themselves.
Demographic Variables
Researchers in the area of health and illness have suggested that
several demographic variables affect whether physical symptoms are no-
ticed or not. One of these variables is social class. Koos (1954), for
example, repeatedly interviewed families concerning their health, and
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found that famines of lower soc1oeconc„.1c status showed a
.arted indif-
ference to .ost symptoms, in direct contrast to respondents of higher
social class. In a sugary of results of national surveys on symptom
reporting and its relation to demographic variables, Pennebaker (1982)
stated that socioeconomic class, as indicated by income and education,
is inversely related to number of symptom
.^ports. In addition, racial
differences in symptom reporting show that blacks report symptoms to a
higher degree than do whites. Ethnicity has been found to be related to
individuals' responses to pain (Zborowski. 1952). as well as decisions
concerning when to seek medical aid (Zola. 1973). Age and gender are
also believed to influence the perception of bodily states (Kasl s Cobb.
1965; Kosa & Robertson, 1975; Mechanic. 1968). Older individuals report
more symptoms than younger people, and females experience more symptoms
than males (cf. Pennebaker, 1982). Pennebaker suggests that females are
more attentive to their internal states, and are also more likely to
seek medical attention based on their perception of symptoms. National
surveys summarized by Pennebaker further show that unmarried persons,
especially formerly married persons, report more symptoms than those who
are married. Individuals living with one, two or three other people re-
port fewer symptoms than those living alone or with four or more others.
Finally, employed individuals report a fewer number of symptoms than
people who are not in the labor force.
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The Symptoms
Little empirical data exists concerning how characteristics of
symptoms affect the perception of symptoms. Pennebaker and Skelton
(1978) have demonstrated that active involvement in the external
ronment decreases attenti veness to one's body, while reductions in
situational demands permit somatic states to be monitored. These
authors have also found that merely attending to bodily states often
increases the salience of symptoms. Mechanic (1968) has suggested that
symptoms that are perceptually salient are more readily perceived. Thus
the more visible (to oneself and others) and painful the symptoms, the
more likely it is that they will be noticed by the individual experienc-
ing them. Suchman (1965) has also pointed out that people tend to
trivialize symptoms that are not painful. More attention will be given
to greater numbers of symptoms that appear more frequently and persist
for longer periods of time than to few symptoms that rarely appear and
last for a short duration. Freidson (1961) speculated that the duration
of a symptom may be more influential in responses to it than the physi-
cal effects. When a symptom does not disappear shortly it becomes
something to which special attention is directed. Finally, symptoms
that were previously ignored by an individual may be noticed when they
change in character.
Aside from perceptual salience, a second factor affecting the
perception of symptoms is the extent to which they are incapacitating.
Symptoms that entail physical and social disability by disrupting work,
family, and other social activities are apt to be noticed (McKinlay,
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1975; Mechanic, 1968; Zola. 1973). Such.an (1965) emphasized that sy.p.
toms are recognized in terms of their interference with normal function-
ing; people disregard symptoms that are not incapacitating. Further-
more, Twaddle (1972) has suggested that the greater the importance
attached to an activity that is inhibited by a symptom, the more likely
it is that the biological change will be attended to.
In the case of cancer, symptom characteristics vary depending on
the site and type of cancer. No data are available concerning the
extent to which various cancer symptoms are more readily noticed than
others because of their perceptual salience or interference with activi-
ties. However, it is generally assumed that some cancer warning signals
are more easily detected because they are more apparent and observable.
For example, the American Cancer Society (Note 1) indicates that lung
cancer and leukemia are difficult to detect early, while breast and
uterine cancers are relatively easy to detect. Some studies of delay in
seeking a diagnosis of cancer symptoms have examined delay in relation
to cancer site, in accordance with the assumption that cancers of some
sites are more easily observed than cancers of other sites. Robbins,
MacDonald and Pack (1953) found that delay was greater for "superficial"
cancers (i.e., cancers that can be detected by a superficial physical
examination) than for "thorough" and "special" cancers (i.e., cancers
that can be detected only by knowledge of the patient's medical history
and/or by specialized physical exams and tests). On the other hand,
Henderson, Wittkower and Lougheed (1958) found less delay in patients
suffering a superficial cancer (i.e., breast cancer) than in those
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suffering an Internal cancer (I.e., cancer of the cervix or large
bowel). Furthennore. Cobb et al. (1954) stated that classifying sub-
jects according to whether their cancers were external or Internal did
not help to differentiate delayers from nondelayers. Goldsen. Gerhardt
and Handy (1957) asked respondents If they felt their cancer sy.pton,s
were noticeable to other people. The extent to which symptoms are
observable to others Involves Impression management, and thus this
variable could potentially exert an Important influence on the decision
to seek treatment for physical symptoms. Contrary to what might be
expected, Goldsen et al. found that delay was greater for patients who
had cancer symptoms that were noticeable to other people than for those
who believed their symptoms were not apparent to others. These studies
of the association between cancer site and delay do not allow any con-
clusions to be drawn as to the conditions under which cancer symptoms
are perceived. At best they suggest that there is no direct relation-
ship between the ease with which cancer symptoms are detected or ob-
served and promptness in seeking a diagnosis.
The Interpretation of Symptoms
Symptoms reflect not only the perception of a bodily state, but an
interpretation of that state. Pennebaker and Skelton (1978) view the
experience of a symptom as having two components: one of sensation and
one of Interpretation. In this view, an individual perceives sensory
stimulation from a bodily site that is then evaluated and encoded in
some way. The interpretive component serves to explain and give meaning
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to the symptom, and also to determine action. While symptoms are typi-
cally regarded as unexpected and unwelcome deviations from a subjective
baseline, the way people evaluate symptoms varies widely and depends
upon Situational factors. Symptoms differ greatly in their clarity as
cues, so that individuals have considerable latitutde in their reactions
to many physical signs. Furthermore, decisions concerning help seeking
behavior for physical deviations are based on the individual's evalua-
tion of symptoms rather than on the symptoms per se (Green & Roberts,
1974; Kasl & Cobb, 1964; Kirscht, 1974; Rodin, 1978). Generally, the
determinants of whether or not a symptom is evaluated as requiring a
doctor's attention involve the characteristics of the symptom, the
nature of the individual's consultations with other people, and cogni-
tive processes and biases that affect causal explanations.
The Symptoms
Many of the same characteristics of symptoms that influence their
perception also influence their interpretation. For example, it was
previously suggested that physical symptoms are more likely to be per-
ceived and attended to if they are painful than if they are not. Penne-
baker and Skelton (1978) point out that an important difference seems to
exist between painful and nonpainful symptoms in terms of their evalua-
tion as well. Painful symptoms, by their very definition as painful,
have a built-in negative interpretation. Nonpainful symptoms, however,
often have no clear interpretive component associated with them, and so
they are susceptible to a variety of interpretations depending on their
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context of occurrence. In fact, for painless s„to.s. the Interpretive
context detemines whether the physical sensations experienced are
defined as symptomatic at all.
There is indirect evidence from cancer delay studies that suggests
that painful symptoms are more likely than nonpainful symptoms to be in-
terpreted as signifying illness and necessitating medical care. Several
studies report that the absence of pain, bleeding, and discharge in re-
lation to cancer symptoms was frequently given by patients as a reason
for delaying diagnosis (Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Henderson, 1966; Hender-
son, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Gold, 1964; Lynch & Krush, 1968, 1969).
Lynch and Krush (1968) stated specifically that pain was believed to be
an essential prerequisite for cancer by many patients. Aitken-Swan and
Paterson (1955) found that patients thought it safe to delay seeking
help for cancer symptoms that didn't hurt, and they also found that pain
was the most frequent reason subjects gave for ending delay. Eardley
(1974), Hackett, Cassem & Raker (1973), and Shands et al
. (1951) all
similarly stated that patients in their samples who delayed for long
periods of time sought medical aid when pain occurred. Physical dis-
comfort was a significantly more frequent reason for seeing the doctor
among delayers than nondelayers in King and Leach's (1950) study; among
delayers, a much larger proportion did not think it necessary to see a
physician unless they were in pain. The studies mentioned here actually
concern behavioral responses to painful symptoms as opposed to evalua-
tive responses. However, it can be inferred that painful symptoms are
more readily interpreted as worthy of medical attention than are
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nonpainful ones. Contrary findings regarding people's tendency to
readily define painful symptoms as illness come from Cameron and Hinton
(1968) and Morden and Weisman (1975). who found no relationship between
the presence or absence of pain and delay in obtaining treataent for
symptoms of cancer.
While symptoms of greater number, frequency, and persistence are
assumed to be more easily perceived, they are also assumed to be more
promptly defined as indicating illness (Freidson, 1961; Kosa & Robert-
son, 1975; Mechanic, 1968). In a similar way, symptoms that change in
character are not only given special attention, but are more likely to
be evaluated as significant than symptoms that remain unchanged.
Twaddle (1969) interviewed elderly men who had reported a health condi-
tion within the past several years. Subjects reported that they began
to redefine themselves as not well when changes in feeling states
appeared; most important to the redefinition was the appearance of pain
and weakness. In his study of polio victims, Davis (1963) found that
parents were able to interpret their child's symptoms as relatively
insignificant until certain dramatically incongruous symptoms were
introduced (e.g., the child fell or was unable to walk).
Studies of delay in the presence of cancer warning signals indi-
rectly support the contention that any change in symptoms, other than an
alleviation of the symptoms, often leads to their redefinition. In her
review of delay research, Roberts (1965) stated that perceptions of
changes in symptoms of cancer frequently serve as a trigger to action in
seeking medical care. Abrams and Finesinger (1953) found that the most
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co™o„ reason for tenninatlon of delay was a change in the character or
sensation of a symptom. Similarly, the delayers in Clements and Wake-
field's (1972) sample typically sought help only when their first symp-
toms altered in type or severity. Although these studies again specify
behavioral reactions, they do indicate that the perception of a symptom
change often leads the individual to reevaluate the symptom as requiring
diagnosis
.
Studies of illness behavior have demonstrated that incapacitating
symptoms are likely to be evaluated as serious in addition to being
readily perceived. Suchman (1965) interviewed people who had recently
experienced a relatively severe illness episode, and found that the more
symptoms interfered with individuals' abilities to carry on their usual
activities, the more the individuals became concerned about the symptoms
and feared they signified the beginnings of an illness. According to
Suchman, the success with which the "denial of illness" can take place
depends largely on the degree of incapacitation or pain produced by
symptoms. Respondents were apt to underemphasi ze symptoms which were
neither severe nor incapacitating. Robinson (1971) began his study of
families' illness behavior with the assumption that the performance of
major social roles is everyone's first priority. He suggested that
those people whose illness condition impairs normal roleplaying will be
treated as ill so that they can be returned as quickly as possible to
the position where they can play their full social repertoire. In his
study of elderly males. Twaddle (1969) found that subjects began to
consider themselves ill not only when changes in feeling states
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occurred, but also when they became incapable of normal role perfonnance
because of debilitating symptoms. Twaddle emphasized that when the
perfonnance of central activities is disrupted by symptoms, the symptoms
are more likely to be viewed as significant than when they are nondis-
ruptive. Delay studies provide virtually no information as to whether
treatment is sought more promptly for incapacitating vs. nonincapaci-
tating cancer symptoms. Hackett, Cassem and Raker (1973) reported that
some subjects gave incapacity as a reason for first seeing a doctor
about a cancer warning signal. The lack of data regarding incapacita-
tion in relation to delay probably reflects the fact that few types of
cancer are accompanied by symptoms that would be considered disruptive
to activity performance.
Social Inputs
It is well accepted that relatives and friends commonly exert a
considerable influence on one's decisions surrounding physical symptoms.
Sociological studies show that the symptomatic person usually consults
some other people before seeking medical care, and that how others react
to symptoms does much to determine whether care is sought at all.
Individuals discuss with significant others the meaning of symptoms,
what label to apply to symptoms, how severe the illness episode is, what
form of help seeking behavior is appropriate, and at what point it
should be undertaken (McKinlay, 1975). Researchers agree that while
consultations take place at all phases of an illness episode, social
inputs assume greatest importance at the stage of deciding whether one
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truly ill and in need of professional aid. Mechanic (1968) argued
that the role of social factors in bringing a person to seek medical
attention becomes less important as symptoms become less common, less
familiar, and less predictable in their course. Although such may be
the case, it is clear that, to a large extent, the definition and
evaluation of symptoms are social in nature.
Freidson (1960) suggested that the process of seeking medical at-
tention for symptoms involves a network of consultants, which he called
"the lay referral structure." Symptom-experiencers casually explore
possible diagnoses of their symptoms with others, and this exploration
typically takes the form of referrals through a "hierarchy of author-
ity." Diagnoses are first shared within the intimate and informal
confines of the nuclear family, but may be subsequently shared with
successively more distant, authoritative laymen until the professional
medical practitioner is reached. Freidson speculated that the explora-
tion of diagnoses is rarely deliberate; rather, it takes place in
everyday, casual conversation.
In a study of subscribers to prepaid medical plans, Freidson
(1961) found that consultation about a symptom often took place in the
household before the doctor was called. Consultation with household
members was most likely to occur when the individual's complaint was
relatively severe. It appeared that discussion with immediate family
members directly affected the individual's definition of the symptom.
If the spouse agreed that the symptom was a sign of significant illness,
the doctor was more likely to be consulted than if the spouse disagreed.
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Furthe^ore. in the majority of instances, lay consultation did not take
Place outside of the home. A large variety of complaints seemed suffi-
ciently self-evident or pressing to require that the doctor be contacted
inimediately following the household consultation. However, when the
symptom's meaning or effect was more ambiguous, and household members
could not decide what to do, consultation with laymen outside the home
(e.g., relatives, neighbors, co-workers) tended to occur.
Suchman (1965) hypothesized that individuals experiencing symptoms
seek "provisional validation" from the lay referral structure in addi-
tion to information and advice about possible diagnoses. Provisional
validation involves the consent of one's friends and family to temporar-
ily suspend one's normal obligations. In Suchman's study of people who
had recently experienced a relatively severe illness, 74% of the sub-
jects reported discussing their symptoms with someone else before seek-
ing medical care. Most discussions were limited to one other person,
usually the spouse. The discussion was apt to occur as soon as symptoms
first appeared, and the subject actively sought out the discussant for
his or her opinion. For most respondents, the consultation did result
in provisional validation to seek professional help. Furthermore, in
almost all cases, the individual followed the recommendations of the
consultant. Suchman's findings regarding lay discussions of symptoms
indicate the positive contribution of such discussion to the seeking of
treatment.
That people define themselves as ill or not ill through their
interactions with others was also taken up by Twaddle (1972). Twaddle
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proposed that delay of the decision to contact a doctor about symptoms
IS a direct function of the time taken to have the decision "legiti-
-ted" by an authoritative layman. Support for this proposal was found
in Twaddle-s (1969) study of elderly males who had previously suffered
an illness. Ambiguity surrounding the meaning of a symptom typically
led to an exchange of information between the subject and his wife,
which in turn usually resulted in the subject agreeing to see the doc-
tor. Only when the husband and wife disagreed in their evaluation of
the symptom were other people (e.g., children, friends) consulted. If
one of these other people suggested seeing a doctor, and was considered
by the subject to be authoritative because of some professional medical
experience or personal experience with illness, a doctor was usually
consulted. Otherwise, long delays occurred before treatment.
Miller (1973) interviewed people who had symptoms of cancer of the
head or neck regarding their choice of consultants prior to seeing a
doctor, and their promptness in obtaining a professional diagnosis. The
majority of respondents discussed their symptoms with at least one
"medically uninformed" person, usually the spouse, before considering an
exam from a professional. About a quarter of the subjects initially
consulted a "medically informed" person. Approximately one- tenth of the
respondents went directly to a professional without first seeking advice
from any other source. In most cases, subjects followed the advice of
the person(s) they questioned about possible medications and treatments
for their symptoms. There were no significant differences between de-
layers and nondelayers in terms of their utilization of lay consultants.
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However, those respondents who refrained from discussing their symptoms
with others before visiting the doctor, delayed significantly longer
than those respondents who did search out others' opinions. The sub-
jects who failed to discuss their symptoms with other people often
explained that they hadn't wanted to worry others by informing them of
the symptoms, but that there had been considerable opportunity to share
the information.
Goldsen, Gerhardt, and Handy (1957) asked people with symptoms of
cancer of various sites whether they had discussed their symptoms with
anyone besides their physician. Only 17% of a large sample said that
they had not. Furthermore, the absence of communication with others
about one's symptoms was positively related to delay in obtaining
treatment. The authors suggested that some patients' reluctance to dis-
cuss their physical state was reflective of a general pattern of con-
cealing symptoms, in addition to a simple lack of opportunity for
conversing with other people.
Several studies of delay in response to cancer warning signals
report that the advice and persuasion of friends and relatives were
frequently given as reasons by patients for first seeing the doctor
(Abrams & Finesinger, 1953; Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Eardley, 1974;
Hackett, Cassem & Raker, 1973; Sugar & Watkins, 1961). Only one study,
however, has taken a step towards suggesting that individual differences
exist in people's willingness to accept social inputs when making deci-
sions about symptoms. In King and Leach's (1950) investigation of the
decision to seek treatment for cancer warning signals, it was found that
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t^e pe.cept,-on o. relatives. contH..t1ons ai..e.e.
.e.een
.ela.e. an.
nonde,ave.s. P™.pt patients pe.celved thei. relatives as
.avin, sho«n
a .ene.a, interest in thei. need
.0. a diagnosis. 0. as
.avin, provided
specific help in arranging care. ,„ contrast, delaying subjects de-
scribed the inputs Of their relatives as a pressure or
..nagging" for
care. These differences between nondelayers and delayers were viewed by
the authors as reflecting variations in patients' sensitivity to group
pressures to procure
.edical assistance. So™e patients see.ed to be
sensuive and responsive to the mere expression of concern by others
Whereas so.e appeared to require extreme pressure fro. others and acied
only when such pressure became intolerable.
Cognitive Processes
Rodin (1978) points out that attributional processes are espe-
cially likely to be engaged in when a person feels ill. Most illnesses
produce some degree of confusion, uncertainty, and fear, and ambiguity
enhances Individuals' desires to make causal attributions. Attributions
for disease represent cognitive attempts to understand and explain its
occurrence ( Janoff-Bulman S Lang-Gunn. in press). Furthermore, causal
attributions affect people's health-relevant behavior. For example.
Rodin speculates that people may put off seeking proper medical atten-
tion while carrying out a search for explanation and causation.
Evidence suggests that upon the initial perception of symptoms,
people usually explain their occurrence within a minimally threatening
framework. Mechanic and Volkart (1960) stated that people have a
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tendency to nomalize symptoms, and Twaddle (1972) similarly Indicated
that individuals first try to cope with symptoms by Interpreting them
within a framework of normality. Freidson (1961) demonstrated that the
perception of a physical disorder commonly leads to a pure.ly personal
and tentative self-diagnosis that stresses the temporary character of
the symptom. In a study of polio victims and their families, Davis
(1963) found that parents initially applied an everyday explanatory
notion (e.g.. virus, cold, upset stomach) to their child's apparent
si ckness
.
The disposition to initially interpret physical symptoms as due
to, at worst, a minor ailment, probably partially reflects information
people have about their own and others' illness experiences: minor ill-
nesses occur more frequently than major ones. There is also, however, a
clear motivational basis for the tendency to normalize or trivialize
symptoms of illness. By definition, illness is a negative event; it is
generally unpredictable, involuntary, and undesirable. The undesirabil-
ity of illness stems from the fact that it is a major source of pain and
suffering, and that it can disrupt and threaten an individual's life.
It seems obvious that most people want to avoid becoming a victim of
illness most of the time. This desire is likely to contribute to the
interpretation of symptoms as either normal or indicative of a minor
ai Iment.
Our tendency to attribute physical disorders to minimally threat-
ening causes probably rests not only on our desire to avoid negative
outcomes, but also on our belief that misfortunes happen to other
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people, not ourselves. We intellectually accept that bad things occur-
that people get cancer, that assaults are co™, and that individuals
have serious car accidents-and yet we simultaneously seem to believe
that
-It won't happen to me." Janoff-Bulman
, Madden, and Timko (Note 2)
found, for example, that college students estimated the likelihood of
misfortunes (e.g., crimes, accidents, natural disaster, cancer, heart
disease) happening to them as significantly lower than the likelihood of
the misfortunes happening to "the average person your age." Lang-Gunn
(Note 3) similarly found that relative to their estimates of "the aver-
age person," college students underestimated their own chances of
developing various illnesses, including kidney infection, pneumonia,
gastroenteritis, diabetes, coronary heart disease, and leukemia.
Weinstein (1980; Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982) had samples of college
students estimate how their own chances of experiencing both desirable
and undesirable life events differed from the chances of their class-
mates. Overall, subjects rated their chances to be above average for
positive events, and below average for negative events.
This apparent belief in our relative safety and security has been
labeled "the illusion of invulnerability" by Janoff-Bulman (Janoff-
Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in press; Janoff-Bulman, Madden & Timko, 1983), and
as "unrealistic optimism" by Weinstein (1980; Weinstein & Lachendro,
1982). Until recently, people's unrealistic optimism about the future
was regarded largely as a defensive phenomenon— a distortion of reality
motivated to reduce anxiety (e.g., Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles & Rosen-
stock, 1966). In line with this reasoning. Parsons (1951) suggested
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that people are motivated to underestimate the likelihood of their
becoming ill, especially seriously in.
Social psychologists investigating factors that underlie the per-
ception Of invulnerability have discovered, however, that this percep-
tion may be based on processes other than purely motivational ones. i„
one of his studies. Weinstein (1980) found, for Instance, that the
greater the perceived controllability of a negative event, the greater
subjects' tendency to believe that their own chances were less than
average of experiencing the event. The future occurrence of a negative
event was also rated as unlikely if the subject had a stereotype of the
particular kind of person to whom the misfortune was likely to happen.
Previous personal experience with a negative outcome increased the
likelihood that people would believe their own chances were greater than
average of suffering the outcome. In a subsequent study. Weinstein and
Lachendro (1982) forced subjects to pay more attention to the risk
factors of their peers that would Increase or decrease their chances of
experiencing particular misfortunes. This manipulation reduced but did
not eliminate subjects' optimism regarding the future possibility of
negative events. Weinstein concluded that unrealistic optimism arises
partially from egocentric tendencies that keep people from thinking
carefully about others' risk decreasing characteristics that are similar
to their own. The work of Weinstein in particular suggests that cogni-
tive processes, in addition to motivational biases, contribute to our
belief In our personal Invulnerability to illness and other undesirable
occurrences
.
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Rodin (1978) suggested that causal attributions for symptoms
have negative consequences for health care when people assign causes on
the basis of limited or incorrect evidence. That is, the misattribution
of the cause of particular symptoms influences the extent to which the
symptoms are viewed as worthy of professional care, which in turn influ-
ences help seeking behavior. There are many examples from studies of
delay in responding to cancer symptoms that demonstrate how misattribu-
tion processes might inhibit prompt behavior; only a relative few will
be cited here. Abrams and Finesinger (1953) found that most of the can-
cer patients in their sample considered the disease to be their fault or
the fault of others. These attributions, along with the belief that
cancer is a disease of "unclean origin," caused patients to feel guilty,
which led to their denial or avoidance of symptoms, and thus to delay in
seeking treatment. Lynch and Krush (1968) stated generally that the
misinterpretation of cancer symptoms frequently leads to delay. These
authors provided the specific instance of patients with cancer of the
penis who delayed obtaining care because they felt guilty about the sus-
picion that their symptoms were due to venereal disease. Several
studies report that delaying patients commonly attributed their symptoms
to a recurrence of a previous illness, or to an everyday, insignificant
ailment (Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Henderson,
1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; King & Leach, 1950). In
particular, Greer found that some breast cancer patients delayed obtain-
ing a diagnosis of a breast lump because they had a previous history of
benign breast tumors. In Gold's study of breast cancer patients, delay
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resulted for some women from the belief that their lump was caused by a
condition much less serious than cancer (e.g., an injury to the breast
recent weight gain, a swollen muscle). These and many other findings
from the delay literature support the notion that incorrect attributions
of causality for cancer symptoms may contribute to delay. Delay may
stem from guilt over the misattributed cause, or it may rest on the
minimal threat presented by the misinterpretation. Because causal
explanations for physical disorders appear to influence help seeking
behavior, cognitive processes that influence people's attributions for
physical symptoms will now be discussed.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) investigated cognitive heuristics
which determine probabilistic judgments in a variety of tasks. Although
these heuristics are efficient, they are not always valid, and so they
can lead to biases that are large, persistent, and serious in their
implications for decision making. Here, two cognitive heuristics people
use to assess the probability of an uncertain event-availability and
representativeness-are applied to the situation in which an individual
must make a judgment as to the meaning of physical symptoms.
When people use the availability heuristic, they estimate the fre-
quency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which
instances or occurrences of the event can be imagined or remembered.
"For example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle aged
people by recalling such occurrences among one's acquaintances"
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). Instances of frequent events are
typically easier to recall than instances of less frequent events, and
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likely occurrences are usually easier to imagine than unlikely ones
Thus availability is often a valid cue for the assessment of frequency
and probability (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstei n, 1977). However,
availability is sometimes poorly correlated with actual frequency or
probability, and therefore can lead to systematic errors in prediction.
Some objects or events may be more or less difficult to perceive, to
retrieve from memory, to construct from imagination, or to associate
with another event. Events that are more familiar, more emotionally
salient, and more recent, are more easily retrieved from memory.
Utilization of the availability heuristic may bias causal analy-
ses, in that the acceptability of causal candidates is affected by their
degree of availability (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). That is, the relative
salience of particular causal factors, or the ease of their retrieval
from memory, seems to greatly influence the explanation process. Just
as the relative frequency of highly available events is overestimated,
so the causal significance of highly available antecedents is overesti-
mated.
An example of how causal analyses of physical symptoms may be
biased through use of the availability heuristic is provided by the
phenomenon of "medical student's disease." Mechanic (1972) points out
that medical students frequently experience symptoms that they ascribe
to some pathologic process. Students notice in themselves an innocuous
physiological dysfunction, and attach to this an incorrect causal attri-
bution "of a fearful kind," which is usually modeled after a patient
recently observed, a clinical anecdote casually overheard, or a family
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member who has been ill. The
.edical student's exposure to specific
knowledge about disease provides a new framework for perceiving, identi-
fying, and giving meaning to previously neglected bodily feelings, and
this contributes greatly to the attribution process, m Mechanic's
view, the availability of detailed medical information facilitates the
perception of physical symptoms and their interpretation as significant
of illness.
The well known example of the medical student syndrome supports
the view that use of the availability heuristic does bias people's
causal attributions about physical symptoms. This bias has important
implications for medical help seeking to the extent that misattributions
encourage or inhibit help seeking behavior. In the case of cancer, it
appears that people often have readily available explanations for their
symptoms that do not include cancer as a possible cause. The fact that
causal misattributions for cancer symptoms are not only common but
frequently contribute to delay in seeking a diagnosis was pointed out
earlier. Delay studies also highlight, however, that if new information
relevant to cancer becomes available through the media or interactions
with other people, this information can facilitate care seeking for pre-
viously ignored symptoms because it initiates a redefinition of the
symptoms. Eardley (1974) found, for example, that considerable delay in
caring for breast cancer symptoms often ended when a chance event (e.g.,
reading an article about breast lumps, finding out a co-worker recently
had a lump diagnosed) altered hypotheses about the cause of the symptom.
Some patients of Abrams and Fines inger (1953) terminated delay when they
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heard that a friend or relative had died of cancer or had undergone sur-
gery as treatment for the disease. Findings such as these indicate that
whether cancer symptoms are attributed to the possible presence of can-
cer depends partly on the extent to which cues about cancer are avail-
able in the environment. Use of the availability heuristic may also
bias people's estimates of the probability that they will be afflicted
with a particular illness. According to the availability hypothesis, if
occurrences of a specific illness among one's family, friends, or
acquaintances are not easily recalled or imagined, people may underesti-
mate the probability of experiencing the misfortune. However, personal
experience with an illness makes it easier to recall instances of the
misfortune, and so leads to greater perceived probability through the
mechanism of availability. The availability hypothesis also implies
that judgments about the probability of suffering any illness depend
partly on the extent to which vivid images of that illness are available
when people think about it. Janis and Rodin (1979) showed how the lack
of vivid imagery associated with disease might affect preventive health
behavior:
For example, in our daily lives we seldom encounter persons suffer-ing from severe respiratory diseases such as emphysema or lung can-
cer and, consequently, vivid images of those diseases are not avail-
able to our imagination when we hear about the health consequences
of smoking. We are likely, therefore, to underestimate the likeli-hood that those illnesses could befall us and to ignore the recom-
mended preventive action of cutting down on smoking, (pp. 494-495)
It seems plausible that when use of the availability heuristic
leads people to make incorrect judgments as to the probability of
suffering particular illnesses, these errors would affect not only
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preventive health behavior, but help-seeking behavior as well, because
such probability judgments would influence people's explanations for
physical symptoms when they occur. An individual experiencing cancer
symptoms may well know that his or her symptoms are suggestive of can-
cer, and that immediate treatment for cancer symptoms is highly benefi-
cial. But if the likelihood of oneself becoming a cancer victim is
believed to be low because of an inability to remember or imagine other
people victimized by the disease, the individual may decide that the
symptoms could not be attributable to cancer after all and do not
require medical attention. In the case of cancer, many victims are
unwilling to admit to others that they have had the disease because of
the stigma of cancer and the possibly realistic expectation of discrimi-
nation. Thus, while cancer is a major killer, the fact that its victims
are not vocal may render victimization by the disease a relatively
unavailable event. Use of the availability heuristic might facilitate
help-seeking behavior when an illness has already hit close to home or
when the mass media has made vivid images of the illness available, for
in these cases the perceived probability of contracting the illness may
increase. For example, though awareness of breast cancer seemed to be
relatively high among women, it was not until Mrs. Ford's and Mrs.
Rockefeller's well publicized mastectomies that unprecedented vigilance
among women was shown through their use of breast cancer clinics and
physicians. Two public figures with breast cancer probably made occur-
rences of the disease easy to envision, and women perceived themselves
as more vulnerable than they otherwise would have.
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The representativeness heuristic cones into play in problems of
categorization. Categorization requires making Judgments as to the
probability that an object belongs in a given class, or that a certain
process will generate a particular event. People make judgments such as
these by assessing the degree to which the salient features of the ob-
ject or process are similar to the features presumed to be characteris-
tic Of the class or event. When the features are very similar, as when
an outcome is highly representative of the process from which it origi-
nates, then the probability that the process will produce the event 1s
judged to be high.
Causal explanations are often influenced by a primitive version of
the representativeness heuristic (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & Wil-
son, 1977). People tend to have strong a priori notions of the types of
causes that ought to be linked to particular kinds of effects. Specifi-
cally, individuals use the "resemblance criterion" to look for causes
whose principal features match or resemble those of the effect. Thus,
people believe that great events ought to have great causes, and emo-
tionally relevant events ought to have emotionally relevant causes.
Causes and effects must resemble one another in their outward features.
The simple resemblance criterion might figure heavily in people's
notions about the possible causes of cancer warning signs. The general
conception of cancer is one of a horribly painful, and above all, incur-
able disease (Mcintosh, 1974). People often view cancer as a necessar-
ily incapacitating illness that entails long periods of extreme suffer-
ing and radical treatments, including mutilating surgery and noxious
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therapies. Use of the resemblance criterion might lead people to assume
that the symptoms of such a debilitating and painful disease must also
be disruptive and severe. It was previously suggested that painful,
persisting, and incapacitating symptoms are more likely to be evaluated
as serious and as warranting professional attention than are nonpainful
and intermittent symptoms that do not interfere with one's activity, m
other words, symptoms that have significant effects may be attributed to
a major illness, while symptoms that have innocuous effects may be
attributed to a minor ailment. Initial cancer symptoms typically have a
slow and insidious onset, and are rarely painful or incapacitating. For
example, the most common warning signal of breast cancer is a small,
painless lump or thickening in the breast that does not produce a dis-
charge or any other alteration in the outward appearance of the breast
(Kushner, 1975). If the resemblance criterion is used in evaluations of
physical symptoms, the apparent triviality of cancer symptoms would lead
individuals to fail to correctly consider that these symptoms might be
linked to a serious, life threatening disease such as cancer. Rather,
symptoms of cancer may be misattributed to a cause as unnoteworthy as
the symptoms themselves seem to be. Several medical sociologists have
recognized that the most common forms of cancer do not usually appear in
a painful, alarming, or disruptive fashion, which mitigates against
early medical consultations (Apple, 1960; Mechanic, 1968; Stoekle,
Zola & Davidson, 1963; Suchman, 1965). Thus early detection of cancer
may be hindered by the fact that the characteristics of initial cancer
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sy.pto.s do not .atch the salient features of people's conceptions of
cancer and other serious health conditions.
Kahne^an and Tversky (1973) have deronstrated that people's in-
tuitive predictions often violate nonnative principles in ways that can
be attributed to representativeness biases. For example, when judging
the probability that an individual fits into a particular category,
people tend to examine the extent to which the individual displays a few
salient characteristics of category members, while ignoring base rates
for the categories. Weinstein (1980) points out that for many events,
1-ncluding the negative event of cancer, people may have a stereotyped
conception of the kind of person to whom the event happens. If individ-
uals do not see themselves as fitting the stereotype, the representa-
tiveness hypothesis suggests they will conclude that the event will not
happen to them, and they will overlook the possibility that few of the
people who experience the event may actually fit the stereotype.
Weinstein also noted that stereotypes of victims of negative
events may stem from both motivational and cognitive processes. Pos-
sibly, stereotypes of the victim serve an ego-defensive function, in
which case people would seldom see themselves as representing the type
of person who falls prey to misfortune. It is also possible that people
are struck by superficial differences between themselves and the stereo-
type (differences such as gender, age. or appearance) and fail to see
more fundamental similarities between themselves and the people to whom
the event occurs. Both lines of reasoning would lead to the expectation
that people would be apt to conclude that negative events will not
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happen to them. As mentioned previously, Weinstein found that when a
stereotype existed in college students' minds of the kind of person to
whom a negative event generally occurred, subjects judged their own
chances of suffering the negative event as less than average. There is
no research that has examined the prevalence or nature of people's
stereotypes about the type of individual who becomes a cancer victim.
If people do have an overall picture of who is likely to get cancer,
this might bolster perceptions of personal invulnerability to the dis-
ease. Such perceptions might in turn contribute to misattributions for
cancer symptoms, and thus to delay in seeking medical assistance for
those symptoms.
Behavioral Responses
When physical symptoms are perceived, alternatives for action do
not consist solely of obtaining a doctor's care or not obtaining care.
Rather, it appears that people engage in a variety of behaviors in re-
sponse to a physical deviation, including self-medication, withdrawal
from activities, and presenting the symptom to a physician in indirect
ways. Furthermore, a number of situational variables may discourage the
seeking of professional help, even when the desirability of such help is
acknowledged by the individual experiencing symptoms. It is generally
agreed that people who are in the early stages of an illness frequently
attempt to restore their health through their own efforts prior to con-
tacting a doctor. Unfortunately, very little empirical research has
been published concerning the prevalence and nature of behavioral
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strategies that are used in coping with sy.pto™s. other than the utili-
zation of .edical facilities. The lack of infonnation on this topic
probably reflects the methodological difficulties involved in gathering
data fron, syw,ptomatic people who have not consulted a professional
practitioner about their symptoms.
The evidence that is available indicates that a common strategy
for dealing with the first appearance of symptoms is to do nothing at
all. People refrain from taking any action, waiting "to see what hap-
pens" in regard to the symptoms. The self-prescription of delay often
takes place in hopes that the symptoms will just disappear (Freidson.
1961; McKinlay, 1975). In the case of cancer symptoms, Gold (1964) and
Lynch and Krush (1968) found that some patients who delayed getting
treatment had done so because they hoped the tumor or lesion would heal
and clear up without intervention. In a study of seeking care for
general medical symptoms, Zola (1973) found that there was often a
"temporal i zing of symptomatology" on the part of patients. That is,
subjects set external time criteria for the diagnosis of a symptom,
saying, "If it isn't better in three days, or one week, or seven hours,
or six months, then I'll take care of it." A variant of this strategy
involved the setting of a different kind of temporal standard- the
recurrence of the symptom. Some subjects reported that they had decided
to disregard a physical disorder until it recurred a certain number of
ti mes
.
When delay is prescribed and the symptoms persist, reoccur, or
worsen, it becomes apparent that waiting is not an effective strategy
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for getting rid of the symptoms, and more direct action may be neces-
sary. It is at this point that home remedies or self-medications are
tried, if a doctor is not contacted. In addition, the individual may
decide to rest or stay in bed for a day or so, in order to restore his
or her health (Davis, 1963; Freidson, 1961; McKinlay, 1975). There have
been relatively few studies of self-medication. In fact, self-
medication represents one of the least understood health-relevant
behaviors, even though it is also one of the most prevalent (Zola,
1972). On a general level, self-medication reflects the treatment of
conditions that the individual believes will not get better by them-
selves; or, the individual may consider the symptoms being treated as
too minor to warrant a medical consultation. Research that has been
carried out on self-medication shows that people who frequently self-
medicate also frequently utilize medical facilities (e.g., Jefferys
,
Brotherson & Cartwright, 1960). Kessel and Shepard (1965), in a study
of people who had seldom seen a doctor, found that the lowest rate of
self-medication occurred among those subjects who had not sought a
doctor's care for ten years. The decision to "take it easy" as a means
of alleviating symptoms may involve a temporary withdrawal from everyday
activities, including work, school, social, and leisure-time pursuits.
An individual who tries a home remedy or interrupts his or her normal
routine to rest is likely to attract the attention of household members.
Once other people become aware of the individual's symptoms, lay consul-
tations will probably take place.
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If symptoms continue or recur despite the self-prescription of
medication and/or idleness, it appears that most people will consider
seeking professional help (Freidson, 1961; Suchman, 1965). However,
situational factors substantially influence whether or not the physician
is actually called. Mechanic (1968) noted that other needs of an indi-
vidual compete with health needs, and may be viewed as more crucial to
fulfill. McKinlay (1975) similarly stated that "the need to cope with
symptoms, even though recognized, may be overridden by more pressing
issues." In his study of illness behavior, Koos (1954) found that the
question of when a symptom became noteworthy was tied to how important
matters of health and illness were to the family when compared with its
other needs and desires. It seemed that the choice of behavioral reac-
tions to symptoms was dictated by the place of health in the value
system of the family. Aside from exigencies that may interfere with
help seeking for symptoms, another situational factor determining action
concerns the availability of treatment resources (Koos, 1954; Mechanic,
1968; McKinlay, 1975). The extent to which treatment is viewed as
accessible is related to the cost, payment arrangements, physical proxi-
mity, and schedule of particular medical facilities. Studies concerning
responses to cancer symptoms support the proposal that delay often
occurs because certain life problems take precedence over a recognized
need for treating the symptoms. Domestic problems were given as a
reason for delaying care by patients in several studies (Aitken-Swan &
Paterson, 1955; Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Greer, 1974). Henderson,
Wittkower, and Lougheed (1958) reported that some subjects put off
53
seeking treatment because they couldn't spare any t,-.e f.o. their Jobs
see breast cancer patients who delayed diagnosis in Lynch and Krush's'
(1969) study stated that another family
.ember's illness had prevented
them from getting help sooner.
Individuals experiencing symptoms frequently seek professional
advice through telephone consultations, or through indirectly presenting
the symptoms to a doctor. Telephone consultations are regarded as a
routine component of medical practice, but the prevalence of their use
1s unknown (Zola. 1972). Zola (1972) suggested that the perception of a
physical disorder may prompt an Individual to obtain a "regular check-
up" as opposed to care for the swtom specifically. The check-up is a
«ay Of handling and presenting complaints that puts the burden on the
physician. According to Zola, individuals may fail to verbalize even
pressing complaints during the course of a physical exam. If the doctor
indicates that "the appropriate body system is in good working order."
The check-up is also a means for an individual to bring up a symptom in
a casual, offhand manner; the patient may say, "Oh yes, by the way,
while I'm here I wonder if you think this Is serious ..." Thus
patients use general check-ups to Indirectly seek help for particular
symptoms. Another indirect method people use to secure care for physi-
cal problems is to consult about symptoms while accompanying another
person to the doctor's office (Zola, 1972). In this case, the physician
is actually treating someone else, but the individual asks for a diagno-
sis of symptoms since the opportunity to do so is readily available.
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Abrams and Finesinger (1953) found that one reason for either
prompt action or the termination of delay among cancer patients, was
that the patients sought advice about their symptoms while escorting a
friend or relative to the doctor. More frequently, however, studies of
delay in diagnosing cancer report that a common situation prompting pa-
tients to initiate care for cancer symptoms was requiring contact with a
doctor for some other abnormality or illness. Aitken-Swan and Paterson
(1955), Greer (1974), Henderson. Wittkower and Lougheed (1958), and King
and Leach (1950), all found that a significantly greater proportion of
delayers than nondelayers presented themselves to the doctor with physi-
cal disorders that were totally unrelated to cancer. King and Leach
stated that delayers were aware of having cancer symptoms, and yet the
seeking of care depended greatly on whether or not there was some other
disturbance to see the physician about. Henderson, Wittkower and
Lougheed regarded the indirect presentation of cancer symptoms as a
compromise between the patient's wish to seek medical help and his or
her denial of the existence of a threat to life.
Several medical sociologists have suggested that people's deci-
sions to obtain or not obtain professional care for physical symptoms
are based on beliefs concerning the consequences of the behavioral op-
tions. Barker (1953), for example, focused on how the relative strength
of perceived costs and benefits of seeking medical attention for symp-
toms of illness determines whether or not such attention is actually
sought. He proposed that medical attention is likely to be viewed as
unattractive because of the time, expense, and pain it may involve, and
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because it .ay confix the presence of a sen'ous illness. Simultaneous-
ly, however, medical care is likely to be viewed as attractive, because
n may produce a quick remission of symptoms and return to good health.
Therefore, according to Barker, an individual experiencing signs of ill-
ness is inevitably in a state of psychological conflict, the resolution
Of which depends upon whether the consequences of seeing the doctor are
more attractive than unattractive or vice versa.
More specifically. Barker posited that two sets of "psychological
forces" operate concurrently in the situation of the individual suffer-
ing illness symptoms. One set of forces induces the individual to "move
toward" the diagnosis and trea^ent of symptoms, and includes two compo-
nents: the pain or discomfort caused by the symptoms, and the individ-
ual's expectation of returning to health if the illness is treated. The
other set of forces induces "movement away from" medical help, and con-
sists of three components: fear of diagnostic and treatment procedures,
fear of discovery of serious illness, and a concept of self as always
healthy. The primary implication of Barker's theory is that the
symptom-experiencer will decide to see a professional only if the
forces inducing movement toward diagnosis and treatment are greater than
the forces inducing movement away from medical attention (Shontz, 1975).
Robinson (1971) stated that there are two major outcomes people
consider when making decisions about how to respond to bodily disorders.
These are "the danger of going sick," i.e., seeking and accepting
treatment from a medical practitioner, and "the danger of non-
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treatment." I.e.. falling to see. professional advice. In Robinson's
model, a person experiencing physical symptoms evaluates what s/he
believes to be the short- and long-te™ physiological and social gains
and costs of each outcome. The perceived consequences of nontreatment
are presumed to be the reverse of those of treatment. The Individual
with symptoms will obtain medical care only If the gains of care are
believed to exceed its costs. According to Robinson's analysis, beliefs
regarding the costs and benefits of going and not going to the doctor
must be independently assessed for each individual on each occasion
symptoms are noticed.
In his theory of decision making about responses to symptoms,
Fabrega (1974) hypothesized that everyone has available a set of "treat-
ment plans" that may be implemented in order to alleviate the particular
symptoms under consideration. A person suffering symptoms computes the
potential benefits and costs entailed by each treatment plan, and then
subtracts the costs from the benefits. In this way, each treatment plan
becomes associated with a quantity that represents the amount of overall
utility that can be derived from its use. The individual selects one
treatment plan following a particular principle of choice; one may, for
instance, choose the treatment plan having the highest benefits, the
lowest costs, or the highest overall utility. The entire process of
decision making is likely to be repeated some time after the selected
treatment plan has been implemented. Fabrega suggested that empirical
applications of his model would allow researchers to specify the types
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of actions that are likely to be tsken h,, Hi«l o a by different populations in
response to symptoms of various types.
A comparison of these three theories of decision making about be-
havioral responses to symptoms of illness yields basic similarities and
differences among the models. Most simply, all the theories imply that
a person suffering symptoms will seek medical care if the positive con-
sequences of care are perceived to outweigh the negative consequences,
or if the results of obtaining diagnosis and treatment are viewed more
positively than those of abstaining from treatment. The models differ
however, in their assumptions about the beliefs upon which action deci-
sions are based. Barker's model puts forth a set of belieefs that are
expected to influence help seeking by any individual for any sign of
illness. Robinson's model assumes that beliefs about the consequences
of treatment and non-treatment are not generalized within populations
experiencing similar symptoms. In contrast, Fabrega proposes that it
would be desirable to empirically assess beliefs about illnesses and
treatments among different populations, on the assumption that such
beliefs detennine what behaviors are engaged in to remedy symptoms.
Fabrega's proposal resembles a methodology developed by Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980; Fishbein t. Ajzen, 1975) to measure attitudes in order to
predict and understand behavior. Ajzen and Fishbein call their model of
the attitude-behavior relation "the theory of reasoned action." The
theory of reasoned action begins with the assumption that behavioral
decisions are made in light of more or less careful deliberations, tak-
ing into account consequences and other factors that are believed to be
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associated with the available options. In the theory, the mediate
detennlnant of action Is the Individual's Intention to perfon. (o. not
perform) the behavior under consideration. The theory holds that
although a number of factors Influence the strength of the intention-
behavior relation, barring unforeseen events, people are expected to act
in accordance with their intentions.
There are two immediate detenninants of intentions. One is a
personal factor, attitude toward the behavior, which consists of the
individual's positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior.
The other determinant of intentions is a social factor, subjectiv^^.
This is the individual's perception of social pressures ^^^^^^^^^^^^
not perform the behavior. Generally, individuals will intend to perform
a behavior when they evaluate it positively and when they believe that
important others think they should perfom it. According to Ajzen and
Fishbein, the relative importance of the attitudinal and normative
factors in determining intentions depends partially on the intention
under investigation, as well as on the population of interest. In
addition, the relative weights of the factors may vary from one person
to another. The theory of reasoned action, as presented thus far, can
be summarized symbolically as follows:
B ^ X ct [w^Ag + w^SN].
Here, B is the behavior, I is the intention to perform (or not perform)
the behavior, Ag is the attitude toward the behavior, and SN is the
subjective norm concerning the behavior. Further, w^ and w^ are
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empirically dete™i„ed weighting parameters that reflect the relative
importance of Ag and SN.
The i^ediate determinants of an Individual's attitude toward the
behavior are his or her salient beliefs about the consequences of per-
fonning the behavior, labeled behavioralMiefi. In general, an indi-
vidual «ho believes that perfo™ing a given behavior will lead to mostly
positive outcomes will hold a favorable attitude toward performing the
behavior, whereas an individual who believes that perfo^ing the behav-
ior will result in largely negative consequences will hold an unfavor-
able attitude. Furthermore, the greater the confidence with which a
behavioral belief is held, and the more positive or negative the conse-
quence is perceived to be, the greater will be the beliefs impact on
the attitude. This part of the theory of reasoned action is depicted
symbolically by:
n
In this equation, b. is the behavioral belief (or subjective probabil-
ity) that performing B will lead to outcome i, e. is the evaluation of
outcome i, and the sum is over the n salient behavioral beliefs.
The subjective norm is determined by the individual's normative
beliefs, that is, by the beliefs that specific people or groups think
one should or should not perform the behavior. Generally speaking, as
the number of referents (e.g., one's spouse, friends, doctors) who are
believed to approve of perfonning the behavior increases, so does the
perceived social pressure to engage in the behavior. However, the
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effect of any given negative belief on the subjective no™ is moderated
by the individual's motivation to comply „ith the referent in question
Symbolically, the subjective no™ and its dete™inants are represented
n
SN a I b.m.,
where b. is a nomative belief concerning referent j, is the motiva-
tion to comply with referent j, and the sum is over n salient normative
bel iefs
.
In order to apply the theory of reasoned action to a specific be-
havioral domain, it is necessary to first elicit salient behavioral and
normative beliefs in a pilot study from individuals who are representa-
tive of the population of interest. These beliefs are then used to con-
struct a standard questionnaire containing measures of intention, atti-
tude toward the behavior, subjective norm, behavioral beliefs and their
evaluations, and normative beliefs and motivations to comply. Because
the theory of reasoned action maintains strict correspondence between
behavior and explanatory constructs, all measures must correspond to one
another in their action, target, context, and time elements.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) have demonstrated that application of
the theory of reasoned action permits highly accurate prediction of be-
havior in a wide variety of behavioral domains, including weight loss,
use of birth control, voting, and consumer behavior. They have shown
that these varied types of behaviors can be predicted with a great de-
gree of accuracy from intentions to perform those behaviors. Ajzen and
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F.shbem point out, however, that their theory can be applied to situa-
tions in Which the prediction and explanation of Intentions, rather than
behaviors per se, are at Issue. In such cases, a sa.ple of respondents
can be divided Into those who Intend to perfo™ a given behavior and
those Who do not. Differences 1n Intentions can be explained by examin-
ing patterns of differences In behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations
no^ative beliefs, and motivations to comply. Thus, by examining close-
ly the underlying belief structures, the researcher can gain a good
understanding of the factors that ultimately dete™ine a person's
decision to perform or not perform a given behavior.
According to the theory of reasoned action, external variables,
including attitudes towards targets (people and institutions), personal-
ity traits, and demographic characteristics, will be related to behavior
only If they are related to one or more of the variables specified by
the theory. Kore precisely, the relation between external variables and
behavior may be mediated by the dete™lnants of attitude toward the be-
havior, the determinants of subjective norm, and/or by the relative
weights of the attitudinal and normative factors. In the case of atti-
tude toward the behavior, differences among individuals on demographic
characteristics, for example, may produce differences in salient beliefs
about the consequences of perforaing the behavior. Alternatively, the
same salient beliefs may be held by individuals possessing different
background characteristics, but the strength with which the beliefs are
held may vary systematically. Finally, external variables may affect
individuals' evaluations of behavioral outcomes. The determinants of
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the normative component may be Influenced by external variables in
similar ways. That is. individuals' salient referents, the normative
beliefs they attribute to given referents, and their motivation to
comply with those referents, may each be affected by individual differ-
ence variables. The impact that external variables may have on the
determinants of the attitudlnal and negative components may in turn
influence the attitude toward the behavior and subjective non™. both of
Which may then have an impact on intention and behavior. However, even
when external factors affect the dete^inants of any particular variable
In the Ajzen and Fishbein model, it does not follow that they will
necessarily also affect the variable itself. For instance, even if an
external variable is shown to be related to the subjective norm, the
variable will not be related to intention should Intention be primarily
dependent on attitudlnal considerations. In spite of the fact that
there is no necessary relation between any external variable and inten-
tions or behavior, Ajzen and Fishbein do suggest that when external
variables are related to beliefs underlying a given behavior, demonstra-
tion of these relationships can add to understanding that behavior.
When cancer delay research is viewed from within the framework of
the theory of reasoned action, it Is not surprising that the research
has accomplished little by way of explaining delay behavior. As previ-.
ously discussed, the types of variables that have been examined in
studies of delay in seeking a diagnosis of cancer symptoms include demo-
graphic and personality characteristics, attitudes towards doctors and
the health care system, habits of medical care seeking, and previous
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expen-ence. knowledge, and affective reactions In
.elation to cance.
symptoms and cancer Itself, f™. the perspective of the theory of rea-
soned action. It IS because these types of variables can have an effect
on help seeking behavior only through their l.pact on mediating vari-
ables, that delay research has failed to provide an adequate explanation
Of the process whereby people reach a decision to present or not present
the,r cancer sy.pto.s to a doctor. However, since these types of vari-
ables have been found in so.e studies to be related to medical help
seeking for cancer symptoms, this does suggest that they might Indeed
contribute to an understanding of prompt and delay behavior, if their
indirect effects on behavior via mediating variables can be demon-
Strated.
The research reported in the present dissertation sought to under-
stand and explain women's decisions to delay or obtain immediate profes-
sional medical care for a breast cancer symptom, in accordance with this
line of reasoning. Middle-aged women were asked to imagine that they
had just discovered a specific change in one of their breasts, and
completed a questionnaire that assessed what they believed their emo-
tional, cognitive, and behavioral responses would be to this situation.
The methodology of asking people to predict their responses to an imagi-
nary situation has the potential problem that the individuals may be
unable to make accurate predictions. It is possible that responses to
actually discovering a breast symptom are quite different from the
responses women believe they would have to this situation when it is
hypothetical. Ideally, studies of delay in seeking care for breast
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cancer symptoms would collect data from symptomatic women in the time
intervening between their discovery of the breast abnormality and their
contacting a doctor. Unfortunately, this ideal is not a practical pos-
sibility. An alternative methodology would be to follow the example of
cancer delay studies and obtain retrospective data from women who had
breast cancer symptoms and sought a doctor's advice. This methodology
has the potential problem of biased retrospective accounts, particularly
if the doctor's diagnosis of the symptom is known to the respondent. In
addition, this methodology necessarily excludes subjects who are sympto-
matic but choose not to contact a doctor.
In the present study, attempts were made to enable respondents to
easily and realistically imagine themselves in the situation of finding
a breast cancer symptom. Respondents read a scenario about a woman who
discovered a breast symptom, in which the circumstances of the discov-
ery, especially the nature of the symptom, were described in detail.
Thus the respondents were provided with concrete mental images of the
situation. Furthermore, respondents were required to be between the
ages of 35 and 65 years old. The rationale for the age requirement was
that women over age 35 are considered to be at high risk of getting
breast cancer, and the risk of getting the disease increases with age
(American Cancer Society, Note 1). Therefore, the sample consisted of
women who, according to one key indicator, were relatively likely to
develop symptoms of breast cancer. It was expected that a substantial
proportion of respondents would have actually discovered a breast lump
at some time prior to participating in the study, and that these women,
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by drawing on thei. past experience, would be able to both
.ead1l,
-ag,ne themselves 1n the hypothetical situation and accurately predict
their responses to It. As expected, there was a sizeable number of
respondents In the sample who did have a history of breast lumps
comparisons of respondents who had such a history to those who did not
provided an Indication of the extent to which responses to the question-
naire items were affected by actual experience with breast cancer
symptoms.
The questionnaire respondents completed assessed two general sets
Of variables. First, the variables specified by Ajzen and Fishbeln's
theory of reasoned action were measured, so that the cognitive struc-
tures that dete™ined respondents' Intentions to engage In prompt or de-
lay behavior in seeking medical care could be examined. A second set of
variables was also measured, and the variables were tested for whether
or not they indirectly Influenced Intentions, through their Impact on
the other components of the Ajzen and Fishbein model. These variables
fell Into ten categories: respondents' emotional reactions to finding
the breast change, and their perceptions of what their emotional reac-
tions would be if the change turned out to be breast cancer; respon-
dents' personal diagnoses of the change (i.e., causal attributions);
respondents' actual medical history of breast symptoms and cancer;
respondents' beliefs about the incidences of breast lumps, breast
cancer, and deaths from breast cancer (I.e., variables invoking use of
the availability heuristic); respondents' perceived vulnerability to
breast cancer; respondents' beliefs about the symptoms and nature of
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breast cancer (I.e.. variables Invoking use of the representativeness
heunstic); respondents' attitudes toward their relationships with
doctors; respondents' general habits of seeking
.edical care; personal-
ity factors; and respondents' demographic characteristics.
TWO personality factors were assessed In the study, one of which
was health locus of control expectancies. An Increasing number of
health researchers have measured locus of control beliefs and have
attempted to relate these expectancies to a wide variety of health-
relevant behaviors (for reviews of this research, see Strickland. 1978-
Wallston
, wallston. 1982). Si.ply stated, the generalized expectancy'
that one's outcomes are the direct result of one's behavior or relative-
ly enduring characteristics is tended an internal locus of control
orientation. This is opposed to believing that one's outcomes are under
the control of powerful other people or are randomly detemined by such
forces as fate, luck, or chance; these beliefs are indicative of an
external locus of control orientation (cf. Rotter. 1966). m her review
of research on the locus of control construct and its relation to health
behavior, Strickland (1978) wrote. "Results of research conducted with
various instruments suggest that beliefs about internal versus external
control are related in significant and even dramatic ways to health-
related behaviors" (p. 1192). However, in a more recent review, Wall-
ston and Wallston (1982) stated that some of the apparently strong
relationships discussed by Strickland have not been supported by the
findings of additional research in this area.
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Although locus Of control beliefs have been studied in
.elation to
a host Of health-relevant behaviors, they have not been examined for
the,r possible influence on promptness and delay in seeking
.edical care
for physical symptoms. People differing in health locus of control ex-
pectancies have been found to utilize health systems differently. For
example. Krantz, Baum and Wideman (1980) found that internal college
students reported fewer clinic visits, and that a second sample of
Internals was .ore likely to self-diagnose symptoms than were externals.
Among the many health-specific measures of the locus of control
construct that have been developed, the one that is currently used most
widely, and was used in the present study, is Hallston. Mallston, and
DeVellis' (1978) Multidimensional Health Locus of Control (MHLC) Scales.
In addition to measuring internality, the MHLC Scales split externality
into two distinct components and measure each separately. These compo-
nents of externality involve the belief that powerful other people
control one's health, and the belief that chance, fate, or luck deter-
mines whether one Is healthy or 111. The three dimensions that are
tapped by the MHLC Scales (I.e., one of internality and two of external-
ity) are statistically independent.
The second personality factor that was assessed in the present
study was self-esteem. Specifically, Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem
Scale was included in the questionnaire. This measure was included on
the basis of cancer delay researchers' suggestion that general emotional
health contributes to prompt action in responding to cancer symptoms,
rather than to the maladaptive response of denying or avoiding the
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symptoms (cf. Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Henderson, 1966; Henderson.
Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Worden & Weisman, 1975).
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Pilot Study
The pilot study was administered to a sample of women that was
recruited in an informal manner; friends and colleagues of the author
distributed the pilot questionnaire to their friends and colleagues.
The only selection criteria for respondents were that the women be at
least 35 years old, and had not heard of the study prior to receiving
the questionnaire. Fifty women were asked to complete the questionnaire
and mail it back anonymously in an accompanying stamped, addressed
envelope. A total of 34 completed questionnaires was returned (64.0%);
however, one was returned too late for inclusion. Therefore, 33 ques-
tionnaires were used in the pilot study. The respondents ranged in age
from 36 to 77 years old, with a mean age of 53.19 years.
The questionnaire was self-contained, and was described as part of
a study of decisions people make about seeking medical help, particular-
ly the different decisions women make when they discover a lump in their
breast (the pilot questionnaire is contained in Appendix A). Respon-
dents read two brief scenarios. One described a woman, Ann, who immedi-
ately sought medical care after discovering a lump in her breast; the
second scenario described Susan, who delayed seeking medical care for
the identical symptom. Both scenarios began by describing that the
woman (Ann or Susan) woke up one morning, took a shower, and while
showering felt "a hard, tiny lump on the edge of her left nipple. The
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'™p was so s.an. s.alle. than the sUe of a pea, that Ann/Susan wasn't
sure U was anything unusual. Aside f™. the ,™p. Ann/Susan hadn't
noticed anything about her physical condition that was different from
nonnal. Ann/Susan thought about how s^all the lu.p was and that she was
feeling as well as she usually did."
At this point, the first scenario read, "She thought that, even
though the l«p was tiny and she felt fine, she should find out if the
lu.p was something serious. Ann got out of the shower and decided she
would immediately call her doctor. She made an appointment to have an
examination." In contrast, at the same point, the second scenario
stated, "She thought that, because the l™p „as tiny and she felt fine.
She should watch the lump to find out if it would change or go away.
Susan got out of the shower and decided she would watch the lump for a
while. She could always make an appointment to have an examination at a
later time."
Following the scenarios, the questionnaire instructed respondents
to imagine that what happened to Ann and Susan had just happened to
them. Respondents were told to imagine that they had just found a lump
in their breast while taking a morning shower, and the details of the
size and nature of the lump were repeated. The instructions asked the
respondent to answer the questionnaire items as if she had actually
experienced the situation described.
The questionnaire followed the methodology of Ajzen and Fishbein
to elicit salient outcomes. In separate questions, respondents were
asked to list what they saw as the advantages and disadvantages of
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list anything else they associated with immediately calling the doctor
To elicit salient referents, respondents were asked to list any people
or groups who would approve of them immediately calling the doctor, and
any people or groups who would disapprove of this behavior. The same
set of questions was repeated with regard to "watching the lump for a
while, as Susan did," in order to elicit salient outcomes and referents
for this behavioral decision. The pilot questionnaire was also used to
elicit salient emotions women would experience in reaction to discover-
ing a breast lump. Specifically, respondents were asked to list the
emotions they felt when they found the lump in their breast. Additional
items on the pilot questionnaire concerned respondents' behavioral in-
tentions and demographic characteristics.
The advantages and disadvantages that were listed by respondents
for the behaviors of immediately calling the doctor and watching the
lump for a while were used to obtain the modal salient outcomes that
appeared on the final questionnaire. For each of the two behaviors,
responses that referred to similar outcomes were grouped together into
outcome categories. All outcome categories that were listed by at least
10% of the sample were chosen for inclusion in the final questionnaire.
This procedure resulted in the nineteen outcomes that are listed in
Table 1. Although the outcomes chosen were elicited in response to the
behaviors of immediately seeking care and delaying medical care, the
table shows that in the final questionnaire, all outcomes were worded to
be appropriate to the behavior of delaying medical care (i.e..
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Table 1
Modal Salient Outcomes, Referents, and Emotions
Modal Salient Outcomes
"ing '° t^^t the change In h.ast is noth-
'
"°?irn?;^?h"e^:-S?e:\r?^:rne^^?se^^^^'^^°- °" of
T wn!!?^"'™^"?"''' "^'^""'^ or get worseI woj;,d^avo,d be,ng inconvenienced by taking ti^e'Lay fro. ™y daily
This would give me time to find a doctor I trust
'
""treVt^er
''''''
'° surgery™L'/or other disabling
I would avoid wasting the doctor's time
a:«"i:^ut^h:r?[:^rgro:^::^rr^aJ°°""
'lnf*\lon^\^brurth?i2:rL'h:t^1ot:L*:„^™^^-^%-S"3^
I would save money
nim/ner to make an accurate diagnosis
I would be decreasing my chances for a complete cureThe lump would go away
^u i
I would avoid upsetting my family
J^wnMiH^^ ^'J'
treatment and I might die
I would not know what the change in my breast means
Modal Salient Referents
My co-workers
m,, u„^l,^.
My doctor American Cancer Society
Modal Salient Emotions
FP.^^^nf
'""^ Disbelieving and shocked
In.ir^l 5
^PP':'\hensive Pessimistic and hopeless
TnoT ^'""'^y Concerned and worriedAngry and annoyed Sad and depressed
Surprised and curious
73
™on1ton-ng the b.ast change for a whne rathe, than 1™ed1ately caning
the doctor).
Respondents' lists of the people or groups who would approve and
disapprove of both behaviors were used to obtain
.odal salient refer-
ents. All referents that were listed by at least m of the sample were
chosen for inclusion In the final questionnaire, which resulted in the
11 referents that are listed in Table 1. Lastly, respondents' lists of
emotions they felt after finding the breast s^to. were categorized, to
yield the nine emotional reactions that are shown at the bottom of the
same table.
The Study
Recruitmen of Respondents
Respondents were recruited for the study in the following manner.
Street lists were obtained for two neighboring towns in western Massa-
chusetts. The street lists provided the name, address, and year of
birth of every person who was at least seventeen years of age, and was
considered a town resident, as of January 1, 1983. Every fifth woman
who was recorded on the street lists as having been born between 1918
and 1948 (i.e., was between 35 and 65 years old) was sent a letter that
briefly described the study and requested her participation. (The let-
ter is contained in Appendix B.)
The letter introduced the author as a doctoral student in social
psychology who needed help with her dissertation research on how women
make decisions about seeking medical care. It asked potential
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respondents 1f they would be willing to fill out a questionnaire In
Change in her body, and then answer questions concerning what they would
think, feel, and do If they were In the sa.e situation as the wo.an In
the story. The confidentiality of all responses was assured, and an
Offer was „,ade to send participants results of the study after Its
completion.
A stamped, addressed postcard was enclosed with each letter. The
women were asked to return the postcard after marking the appropriate
response option as to whether or not they would cooperate with the study
(the postcard is contained in Appendix B). If they did choose to parti-
cipate, the women provided their name, telephone number, and best time
to be called about the research. Each woman who returned the postcard
Indicating that she would be willing to complete the questionnaire was
telephoned, so that she could ask any questions she
-ay have had about
her participation. All women who agreed on the telephone to participate
i-n the study were sent a questionnaire, along with a stamped, addressed
envelope for its return. The questionnaire Included the author's tele-
phone number, so that respondents were able to ask about any questions
or problems they had in filling out the fom. Table 2 presents the re-
sponse rates for all stages of the recruitment process. Not shown in
Table 2 is that, of the 164 women who were sent a questionnaire, 134
respondents (81.7%) returned completed questionnaires.
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The Questionnaire
Introduction
The entire questionnaire packet respondents received is in Appen-
dix C. Respondents first read and signed an informed consent fo™. and
then read instructions on ho« to use the rating scales that were con-
tained in the questionnaire. The questionnaire was described as part of
a study of the different decisions people .ake about seeking
.edical
help, particularly the decisions wo.en make about what to do when they
notice a change in their breast. After these introductory co-ents, the
following scenario was presented for respondents to read:
dressed Tt".^' i™ ^ ^^-^er before gettina
bump was quite small smallpr th^n thf / ^^^^ mpple. The
cT;.^ l^^ ""^"^^ ^^^1 the doctor if the thickeninq oer-
::s^%?sTinlf?a???ng l^l ZHT''' ^^^^
At this point, respondents were instructed to imagine that what
happened to Ann had just happened to them. They were told to imagine
that they had "just felt a hard, tiny thickening on the edge of your
left nipple while taking a morning shower. The bump is so small,
smaller than the size of a pea, that you aren't sure there is really
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not,ced anything out o. the oH1na.. about you. physical condition
Respondents were then asked to answer the questionnaire i.«H :stionn items as if theyhad actually experienced this situation.
The Ajzen and Fishbein MnHoi
In the first half of the questionnaire, the components of AJzen
and Fishbein's theory of reasoned action were assessed.
,„ p,.t1cular
the f,rst two items on the questionnaire measured respondents^ behavior-
al intentions. Respondents answered. "„« likely is lt that you would
to do, rather than Immediately call the doctor?" and, "How likely Is it
that you would decide to mediately call the doctor?" on seven-point
scales, with "unlikely" (scored as
-3) and "likely" (scored as
.3) at
the endpoints. The next three questions that appeared on the question-
naire are not a part of the Ajzen and Fishbein model. Respondents were
asked how long they would wait to call the doctor if the l^p disap-
peared, if the l™p did not change in any way, and if the lump did grow
or change. There were 13 labeled response options for these questions.
Which ranged from "less than one day" to "would never call the doctor."
Attitudes towards the behaviors of monitoring the breast change
and immediately calling the doctor were obtained in two separate mea-
sures. Specifically, the concept "For you to decide to monitor the
change in your breast for a while, rather than immediately call the
doctor" was rated on 20 seven-point scales, most of which were taken
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fro. the evaluation, potency, and activity factors of the semantic dif-
ferential (Osgood. Suci S Tannenbau™,. 1957). The concept "For you to
decide to Immediately call the doctor" was rated on the sa.e 20 scales
(see Appendix C for a complete listing of the scales). All ratings were
scored fron,
-3 to .3. Responses to each set of scales were submitted to
a principal components factor analysis, followed by orthogonal factor
rotation. For both analyses, the same 11 scales had the highest load-
ings (all exceeding
.65) on the first, evaluative factor. These scales
were: foolish-wise, weak-strong, aimless-motivated, useless-useful,
passive-active, sick-healthy, bad-good, ha™ful-benef1cial
. impractical-
practical, objectionable-acceptable, and impossible-manageable. Scores
representing attitude toward monitoring the breast change were computed
by summing ratings of this concept on the 11 scales, so that higher
scores indicated more favorable attitudes. Scores representing attitude
toward immediately calling the doctor were also computed by summing
responses to the appropriate 11 scales, and again, favorable attitudes
were indicated by higher scores.
Inserted after the attitude measures was an open-ended question
that is not a variable in the theory of reasoned action. The respondent
was told to "Suppose you did decide to immediately call the doctor for
advice about the change in your breast," and was asked to write in what
advice she thought the doctor would give her.
The next two questionnaire items were measures of subjective
norms. Respondents answered, "How likely is it that most people who are
important to you would think you ought to monitor the change in your
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breast for a while, rather than mediately call the doctor?" and "How
likely 1s U that .ost people who are Important to you would thin, you
ought to l™ed1ately call the doctor?" on seven-point scales, with the
endpolnts labeled "unlUely" (scored as
-3) and "likely" (scored as
.3)
Although not a part of the Ajzen and Fishbein
.odel
, the question "How
likely 1s It that you would talk to people who are important to you to
find out what they think you ought to do about the change in your
breast?" was asked at this point. Responses were n,ade on a seven-point
scale labeled "unlikely" (scored as 1) and "likely" (scored as 7) at the
endpoints.
The next section of the questionnaire assessed outcome evaluations
for nine of the 19 outcomes that were constructed from the pilot study.
Each of the following nine statements was rated on a seven-point scale,
with the endpoints labeled "bad" (scored as
-3) and "good" (scored as
'
+3).
IZ Z ^° ^''^ ^^^^^^ feel confidence in myself is-For me to avoid unpleasant medical procedures is-
no^hin'g sIr?oil
"^^^^^^ ^^at a change in my breast is
For meto handle my problems and decisions on my own, instead ofturning them over to someone else is-
i t
'°d'aily'°rou^?ne is:"'
^' by taking time away from my
For me to take time to find a doctor I trust is-
FarZ In ^^^^^/Pf^'^ing.as a silly and foolish alamist is:
breasffnr Jhp'n^rt^'^r information about a lump in myo ast fo the doctor to make an accurate diagnosis is-For me to not know what a change in my breast means is:
Because six of the 19 consequences were obviously undesirable, it seemed
that asking respondents to evaluate these outcomes might cause the women
to no longer give serious consideration to the questionnaire. Therefore,
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these six consequences were assigned an unfavorable outcome evaluation
Of -3.
I would feel anxious, fearful, and worried
^0™ \':rr]?.^?rt^ r - ^et wo.se
treatments ^ '° ^"•'S^'-y ^"1/or other disabling
I'woulVhe'i^''" *° a--" °'- ^P'-^^d
It-Soi^dtto-?:^^- ?rL"?-„t%^n^ S^dfe"-
Four consequences were assigned a favorable outcome evaluation of +3
The lump would go away
I would avoid upsetting my family
Again, values for these evaluations were assigned rather than assessed
to preclude the possibility that respondents would doubt the seriousness
of the study if they were asked to rate the favorableness of clearly
desirable outcomes.
The outcome evaluations were directly followed by Items measuring
behavioral beliefs. Behavioral beliefs were assessed with regard to all
of the 19 outcomes. Respondents rated the likelihood that each outcome
would result from monitoring the breast change rather than immediately
calling the doctor. These ratings were made on seven-point scales that
had unlikely" (scored as -3) and likely (scored as +3) at the end-
points. The behavioral belief items were worded in the first person,
e.g., If I monitored the change In my breast for a while rather than
called the doctor immediately, I would feel anxious, fearful, and
worried. '
The next set of items on the questionnaire assessed normative
beliefs. On seven-point scales labeled "unlikely" (scored as -3) and
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l^^eiy. (scored as
.3) at the endpoints. respondents
.ted the,> sub-jective p.o.a.„U1es that U referents (obtained
.ro. the p1,ot stud.)
would reco^end monitoring the breast change Instead of calling the
doctor. The non„at1ve belief Items were also worded In the first per
-
breast for a while rather than call the doctor l^edlately
After the negative beliefs, respondents rated their motivation to
comply with each referent by responding to the statement.
"Generally
speaking, I want to do what my [referent] thlnk(s) I ought to do "
These ratings were made on seven-point scales, where the "unlikely"
endpoint was scored as 1, and the "likely" endpoint was scored as 7 In
another set of Items, each referent was rated In te™s of how Hkely the
respondent would be to talk to that referent about the decision to seek
medical care or not. Specifically, the statement, "I would talk to my
[referent] to find out what they (s/he) thlnk(s) I ought to do about the
change In my breast" was rated on the same response scales used for
motivations to comply. This latter set of Items is not a component of
the Ajzen and Fishbein model.
Variables External to the A^ypn
and nsnbein Model ~
Emotional reactions
. Respondents provided their emotional reac-
tions to finding the breast change. The phrase, "Discovering the change
in my breast made me feel" was followed by nine scales; each scale
corresponded to one of the nine emotions that was obtained from the
pilot study. Subjects rated the extent to which discovering the change
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-de the™
.ee, each of the nine emotions, on seven-polnt scales Uheled
not at all" (scored as 1) and extremely" (scored as 7) at the end-
Pomts. Respondents also Indicated what their emotional reactions would
be ,f the breast change proved to be breast cancer. They rated. "If the
Change turned out to be breast cancer. I would feel" on the sa^e nine
scales that measured emotional reactions to finding the breast change.
Personal diagnoses, m between the ^o sets of emotional response
™easures were three questions that concerned respondents' personal diag-
noses of the breast sy.pton,. In an open-ended question, respondents
were asked to provide their own diagnosis of the change in their breast.
A scaled question asked the women to Indicate the extent to which their
personal diagnosis represented a life-threatening condition. Responses
to this question were made on a seven-point scale, where one endpoint.
not life- threatening." was scored as 1, and the other endpoint. "life-
threatening." was scored as 7. On the third item respondents provided
their subjective probability that the change in their breast was a symp-
tom of breast cancer; ratings were made on a seven-point scale with
unlikely" (scored as 1) and "likely" (scored as 7) at the endpoints.
At this stage in the questionnaire, respondents were given further
instructions. The Instructions stated that the remainder of the ques-
tionnaire contained items that did not require the women to respond as
if they had discovered a change in their breast. The respondents were
asked to stop Imagining that they had found the change, and to answer
the rest of the questions as they normally would.
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^^iHLhlstoi^,. several questions were asked concerning respon-
dents' actual history of breast sy.pto.s and cancer. The first question
asked the wo^en if they had ever discovered a l™p in their breast If
the respondent answered yes. she was asked to report how ™any ti.es she
had discovered a breast lu.p, and whether or not she had had the lu.p(s)
examined by a doctor. If the respondent reported that a doctor had
examined the lump, she was asked to indicate how much time went by
between her discovery of the lump and contacting the doctor (responses
were coded as number of days); she was also asked to provide the doc-
tor's diagnosis of the lump. All respondents were asked if they had
ever had any breast symptoms other than a lump, and if so, to briefly
describe the symptoms. Each woman marked whether or not she had ever
had breast cancer, whether or not she had ever had any type of cancer
other than breast cancer, and whether or not her mother or sister(s) had
ever had breast cancer. Those respondents whose mother or sister had
ever had breast cancer were asked to rate, "On the whole, how successful
was her outcome from breast cancer?" on a seven-point scale labeled
"unsuccessful" (scored as 1) and "successful" (scored as 7) at the end-
points.
Availability
.
Five questions assessed respondents' beliefs about
the incidences of breast lumps, breast cancer, and deaths from breast
cancer. Respondents were asked to provide their opinions as to the per-
centage of: women that discovers a breast lump at some time in their
lives, breast lumps that is diagnosed as breast cancer, and women that
gets breast cancer. Respondents were further asked, "What percentage of
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Of U?" Similarly, an additional Ue. asked for what percentage of
wo.en Who have breast cancer, and are treated for the disease, die of
n. TWO separate questions asked respondents to write in the number of
wo.en they knew who had discovered a breast ,u.p that was not diagnosed
as breast cancer, and how .any women they knew who had discovered a lump
that was diagnosed as cancerous.
Mnerabilltj,. Perceived vulnerability to getting breast cancer
was assessed by one item that asked. "How likely is it that you will one
day get breast cancer?" on a seven-point scale, labeled "unlikely"
(scored as 1) and "likely" (scored as 7) at the endpoints. Subjects
rated the extent to which they had personal control over not getting
breast cancer, and the extent to which they believed there was a parti-
cular type of woman who had a high chance of getting breast cancer.
These ratings were made on seven-point scales, where the endpoints "not
at all" and "completely" were scored as 1 and 7, respectively. An open-
ended question asked respondents to provide a description of the type of
woman who has a high chance of getting breast cancer. In a scaled
response, subjects rated the extent to which they matched their descrip-
tion. This was also a seven-point scale that had "not at all" (scored
as 1) and "completely" (scored as 7) at the endpoints.
Representativeness. The next section of the questionnaire as-
sessed respondents' beliefs about the symptoms of breast cancer.
Respondents were presented with a list of 30 physical symptoms that was
drawn from the Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness (Pennebaker.
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1982), and the «.e.1can Cancer Societys (Note
,) description of breast
cancer symptoms. They were asked to rate each symptom as to how fre-
early. Initial stages. Ratings were n,ade on the following scale.
2 = laHv' Ininf! k'^"'! Produces this symptom
3 = early' nU a Ctll P^°^"^« this sw?l
4 = ea"]^: Inl e" cine";Sfl P;;oduces thl^ s'y'Sptom
5 = early. Initial hreas? ll^lir^^/^tclT t^l\lZToT
Of the 30 symptoms presented, five are described by the American Cancer
society (Note 1) as symptoms of breast cancer: pain or tenderness in
breast, nipple; lump or thickening in breast; change in retraction or
scaliness of nipple; bleeding or discharge from nipple; and, change in
size, shape, or skin of breast. The other 25 symptoms are not symptoms
of breast cancer, but some are symptoms of other types of cancer: con-
vulsions; sore or stiff muscles, back; hot flashes; shortness of breath,
coughing; weight loss; hair loss; change in appearance of wart or mole;
fever; numbness, tingling in any part of body; headaches; blurred
vision; weight gain; a sore that doesn't heal; upset stomach, stomach-
ache; faintness. dizziness; heartburn, indigestion; ringing in ears;
constant thirst; abnormal Pap smear; chills; chest pains; running,
congested, or bleeding nose; weakness, tiredness; abnormal vaginal
bleeding; and sore throat, hoarseness, difficulty swallowing.
The next set of items assessed respondents' beliefs about the dis-
ease of breast cancer. Specifically, respondents rated, "Breast cancer
1s" on 23 seven-point, bipolar scales. The scales were drawn from
studies that have examined what dimensions lay persons use to classify
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illnesses, and where specific illnesses are judged to fall on these
dimensions (D'And.ade, Pulnn. Ne.love « Ro.ney,
,972; Fab.ega, 1974-
Fabrega
.
Manning. 1972; He.zlich, 1973; dentins
. ZyansM
,
,968.
'
Oones. Wiese. Moore
, Haley, ,981; Linz. Penrod. Siverhus s Leventha,
1982). The 23 sca,es were scored fro. -3 to .3. and were labeled by the
following endpolnts: pe™anent-te.porary; incurable-curable; dlsabl-
ing-e.powering; dangerous-safe; painful-painless; serlous-.lld-
11fe-threaten1ng-not life-threatening; recurrlng-not recurring; unpre-
dictable-predictable; contaglous-not contagious; inheritable-not
inheritable; unpreventab,e-preventable;
uncontrol,ab,e-controllable;
dirty-clean; mysterious-well-understood; unfair-fair; bad-good;
punishing-rewarding;
unpleasant-pleasant; undeserved-deserved; a
disease that results in permanent bodily changes-a disease that 'results
in no bodily changes; a disease that results in pemanent personality
changes-a disease that results in no personality changes; and. a dis-
ease that requires long treatment-a disease that requires short treat-
merit.
Relati onships with doctors. Respondents rated the concept, "In
general, my relationships with doctors have been" on five bipolar,
seven-point scales: bad-good; hannful-beneficial
; unsatisfactory-
satisfactory; uncomfortable-comfortable; and unfriendly- friendly
. The
scales were scored from 1 to 7. Responses to these five scales were
found to have a high internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha =
.97).
Therefore, responses to the scales were summed, to yield a general
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~ Of respondents, attitudes toward the,> past relationships with
doctors. Higher scores represented
.ore favorable attitudes.
a^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^Sre^eekina. Two ite.s that were drawn from
studies Of delay by Goldsen. Gerhardt, and Handy (,957) and King and
Leach (1950) tapped respondents' general habits of seeking medical care
The first item asked, "In general, when you notice a physical symptom,
do you usually go to the doctor right away or do you wait?" Responses
were made on a seven-point scale; the endpoint "usually wait" was scored
as 1, and the endpoint "usually go right away" was scored as 7. The
second item asked, "In general, do you consult doctors on a regular
basis or only in emergencies?" Again, responses were made on a seven-
point scale, but in this case the endpoints were labeled "only in emer-
gencies" (scored as 1) and "on a regular basis" (scored as 7).
Personality factors
.
The Multidimensional Health Locus of Control
(MHLC) Scales (Wallston, Wallston 8 DeVellis. 1978) were described on
the questionnaire as a measure of opinions about general health and ill-
ness issues. The MHLC Scales are comprised of three scales: the Inter-
nal Health Locus of Control (IHLC) Scale, the Powerful Others Health
Locus of Control (PHLC) Scale, and the Chance Health Locus of Control
(CHLC) Scale. Each of the scales consists of six items, making a total
of 18 items. All of the items utilize a six-point scale, ranging from
"strongly disagree" (scored as 1) to "strongly agree" (scored as 6).
Responses to the six items within each scale were summed, as each scale
proved to be internally consistent. Cronbach's alpha was .73 for the
IHLC Scale, and higher scores indicated a belief that internal factors
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are responsible for one's health. Po. the PHLC Scale, Conhach's alpha
was
.70, and higher scores were indicative of a belief that one's health
IS detennined by powerful other people. Lastly, Cronbach's alpha for
the CHLC Scale was
.68, and higher scores represented the belief that
one's health is a matter of fate, luck, or chance.
Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem Scale was presented on the ques-
tionnaire as asking respondents for their general feelings about them-
selves. Ten items comprise the Self-esteem Scale. The items utilize a
four-point scale, in which the score of 1 is labeled "strongly dis-
agree," 2 is labeled "disagree," 3 is labeled "agree," and 4 1s labeled
strongly agree." Appropriate items were reverse scored, and responses
to all of the Items were summed (Cronbach's alpha =
.83). Higher scores
indicated higher self-esteem.
.
Demographics
.
In the last section of the questionnaire, respon-
dents provided background information. Specifically, they provided the
following data: their marital status, the year they were born, their
ethnic background, their religion, whether or not they were employed,
their occupation (if employed), the last year of school they completed,
the number of people they were living with, their household's annual
income, and the number of people who were being supported by that
income. Respondents who were married were asked to report the last year
of school their husband completed, whether or not the husband was
employed, and what their husband's occupation was, if he was employed.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Description of Respondpnt^
The 134 respondents ranged 1n age from 35 to 65 years old. with a
-an age of 45.55 years. Almost three-guarters of the wo.en were
.ar-
"•ed (73.,., n=98). 32 respondents (16.4%) were separated or divorced
10 (7.5%) had never been earned, and three (2.2%) were widowed. Mari-
tal status was missing for one respondent. The number of people re-
spondents were living with ranged from zero to seven, with a mean of
2.32. The great majority of the women were white (96.3%, n=129)- two
respondents (1.5%) were blac., one (.7%) was Hispanic, and one (.'7%) was
Asian. One respondent did not report her ethnic background. Of the
sample, 68 respondents (50.7%) indicated their religion was Protestant,
32 (23.9%) were Catholic, and nine (6.7%) were Jewish. Nine women
(6.7%) marked their religion as "other," and 14 (10.4%)
.^ported they
had no religious preference. Two respondents did not provide their
religious affiliation.
Most of the respondents (73.1%, n=98) were employed. Of the em-
ployed respondents, five (5.1%) perfomed janitorial duties; three
(3.1%) were saleswomen; six (6.1%) were aides or clerks; 19 (19.4%) were
secretaries;
,7 (17.3%) were in health-related occupations (e.g.. nurse,
occupational therapist. X-ray technician); eight (8.2%) were self-
employed; nine (9.2%) were teachers; 20 (20.4%) were administrators;
and 11 (11.2%) were professionals (e.g., professor, social worker.
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Psycholo,,st,. AS a w.o,e t.e sample was unusuall,
educated. 4,
respondents (30.6.) had a graduate deg.ee. 39 (29.,« ,ad a college
degree. 27 (20.1%) had completed so.e college, and 15 (11. 2« had
attended a trade school. Only 12 respondents (8.9.) did not have any
formal education beyond high school.
Of the 127 women who reported their household's annual income 10
(7.9« reported it as $10,000 or less; 15 (11.8%) as $10.001-$20
.
000 - 29
(22.8%) as $20,001-$30,000; 36 (8.3%) as $30.001-$40.000; 17 (13 4%) as
$40.001-$50.000; and 20 (15.7%) as S50.001 or .ore. Seven women did not
provide this infonmation. The nunber of people supported by the house-
hold's annual income ranged from one to eight, with a mean of 3.24. An
additional measure of economic status was computed in the following way:
Each income category listed above was assigned the value of the cate-
gory's midpoint, e.g., the category $10,001-$20,000 was assigned the
value of $15,000. Then, the assigned income was divided by the number
of people supported by the income, to yield the average income available
for each person supported. The average income per person supported
ranged from $1,250 to $35,000. and had a mean of $11,468.83.
A total of 100 respondents reported their husband's education.
Sixty men had a graduate degree, 17 had a college degree, nine had com-
pleted some college, nine had a high school diploma, and five had not
graduated from high school. Most of the husbands (91%) were working.
Of the husbands who were employed, almost one-half (46.2%, n=42) were
professionals (e.g., professor, physician, psychologist). Two men
(2.2%) were custodians; two (2.2%) were salesmen; 10 (11.0%) were
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Skilled laborers (e.g.
.
mechanic,
.ason, toolnaker); seven (7.7fl had
miscellaneous jobs such as computer progra-er, textbook editor, and
research assistant; six (6.6%) were self-employed; 10 (11.0%) were
business executives, and 12 (13.2%) were teachers or administrators.
Fully 41.8% of the respondents (n=56) reported that they had ac-
tually discovered a lump in their breast. Of these. 48 women indicated
the number of times they had discovered a breast lump. (The other eight
women gave such responses as "several" or "many" times.) The number of
previous breast lumps ranged from one to six. with a mean of 1.67. The
large majority of the 56 respondents did have the lump(s) examined by a
doctor (85.7%. n=48)
.
Six women (10.7%) reported that a doctor had
found the lump, and only two women (3.6%) never had the lump examined.
The 48 women who did ask a doctor to examine their l™p indicated how
much time went by between their discovery of the lump and their contact-
ing the doctor. Responses ranged from less than 24 hours to one year;
the mean number of days was 23.70. and the median number of days was
four.
One-fifth of the respondents (20.1%, n=27) had experienced breast
symptoms other than a lump. Two women (1.5%) had previously had breast
cancer, and five women (3.7%) had previously had a type of cancer other
than breast cancer. Twenty respondents (14.9%) had a history of breast
cancer in their immediate family.
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The A.izen and Fishbpin Model
Predictors of Intentions
Two intentions were assessed: intention to monitor the breast
change for a while rather than i^ediately call the doctor (^-.45,
S0=2.41), and intention to immediately call the doctor (ji=.88. SD-2 27)
As Shown in Table 3. which displays correlations among intention, atti-'
tude. and subjective norm measures, these two intentions were highly
negatively correlated (r=-.825. £<.005). For each respondent, a differ-
Mlilintention score was obtained by subtracting her intention to call
the doctor from her intention to monitor the breast change. Differen-
tial intention scores ranged from -6 to .6. with negative scores indi-
cating an intentional preference for immediately calling the doctor, and
positive scores indicating an intentional preference for monitoring the
breast change (i.e.. delaying
.edical care). The mean differential in-
tention score was
-1.33 (SD=4.46), indicating that the sample as a whole
had a slight intentional preference for seeking medical care immediate-
ly.
Two separate measures assessed attitude toward the behavior of
monitoring the breast change (possible range =
-33 to +33, X=-6.71.
SD=16.44) and attitude toward the behavior of immediately calling the
doctor (possible range = -33 to +33, M8.26. SD=12.41). The correla-
tion of intention to monitor with attitude toward monitoring was .733
(£<.005), and the correlation of intention to call the doctor with atti-
tude toward calling the doctor was .618 (£<.005). A differential atti-
tude score was obtained by subtracting attitude toward calling the
to
o
001
CO
n in
O)
>
o
00
c
•r—
+J
4->
S-
o
+->
u
oQ
to
c
o
c o
(U +->
+J
c c
1—
I
o
s:
on
mon
CO
c
o
(0
a)
s. !a
o <ao 't—
&.
>
C
a
u
0)
-4->
c
cx) in
>— 00
00
O <Ti isOo o
to LD <X>
00 o^
to
in «^
LD O
C\J CTi O
00 to «^
(U
c >
O O) T-
•I- -a +->
+-> 3 OC +-> (U
<U -r- •!-)
+-> +J JD
C +J 3
I—( ea;
s-
o
4->
O
OQ
t_)
E
s-
o
c >
O <U -i-
•r- XJ +->
+-) 3 UC +-> OJ
O) -I- •<-,
-M +J JDC -M 3
ID o 00
I— o r-. 2:1
^ LD 00 (/I
to CM O
00 1— ^
to CTl LD
c^j to
tn CO CT>
CTl to I—1|
LD I— 00
LD C\J
un to
CT> I— 00
00 in ^
to cn in
CO in to
tn to to
CTl in
e >
o <D -1-
•r- T3 +-)
-M 3 UC -M OJ
OJ -r- -r-i
+->
-I-) J3C 4-> 3
I—I cC 00
(U
>
oo
a;
•»->
o
94
doctor fro. attitude toward
.onitoHng the breast change. Differentia,
attuude scores had a possible range of -66 to .66, with negative scores
indicating a favorable attitude toward i™ediate,y calling the doctor
and positive scores indicating a favorable attitude toward monitoring
the breast change instead of calling the doctor. The .ean differential
attuude score was
-24.97 (SD=26.95), indicating that the sa.ple as a
"hole had a favorable attitude toward i™ed1ately seeking
.edical care
The correlation between differential intention and differential attitude
was high and positive (r=.736, £<.005).
Subjective norm was also measured with respect to monitoring the
breast change (X=-1.77, SD=1.87) and immediately calling the doctor
(^=2.11, SD=1.46). The correlation of intention to monitor with the
corresponding subjective norm was .595 (£<.005), while the correlation
of intention to call the doctor with its corresponding subjective nonn
was somewhat lower, although significant {r=.385, ^<.005). A differen-
tial subjective norm score was obtained by subtracting the subjective
nom for calling the doctor from the subjective nom for monitoring the
breast change. Differential subjective nom scores ranged from -6 to
+6, with negative scores indicating a perceived likelihood that impor-
tant referents would think the respondent ought to immediately call the
doctor, and positive scores indicating perceived referential pressure to
monitor the breast change. The mean differential subjective norm score
was
-3.88 (SD=3.01), indicating that, on the average, respondents be-
lieved that most people who were important to them would think they
ought to immediately call the doctor for advice about the change in
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on
r
the,> breast. The correlation between differentia, intention and dif-
ferential subjective norm was .557 (£^<.005).
Three separate regression equations were constructed in order to
test the prediction of intention to monitor the breast change, intenti
to in^ediately call the doctor, and differential intention, from thei
corresponding attitude and subjective nor. measures. The regression of
intention to monitor on attitude toward monitoring and subjective norm
for monitoring found that both predictors were significant, together
accounting for 60% of the variance in intention (R=.775,
^<.001). The
regression coefficients were
.580 (£<.001) and .294 (£<.001) for the
attitudinal and normative components, respectively. The regression of
intention to call the doctor on attitude and subjective norm scores for
calling the doctor revealed that only attitude was a significant predic-
tor (b=.560, £<.001), accounting for 39% of the variance in intention
{R=.628,
^<.001). The regression of differential intention on differen-
tial attitude and differential subjective norm showed that both predic-
tors were significant, together accounting for 57% of the variance in
intention (R=.753, £<.001). The regression coefficients were .623
(p<.001) for the attitudinal component, and .194 (£<.05) for the norma-
tive component. Prediction of each of the three intention scores was
found to be highly accurate. However, it is apparent that attitudes
toward the behaviors of delaying medical care and immediately seeking
medical care were more important determinants of choice intentions than
were subjective norms.
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Predictors of Attitudes and Subjective Norms
In the theory of reasoned action, the Mediate dete™i„ants of
attuude are behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations.
,„ the present
study, behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations were obtained (or
assigned) for 19 consequences of deciding to monitor the breast change
for a while rather than call the doctor immediately (see Table 1)
These behavioral beliefs and outcome evaluations were used to compute an
estimate of attitude toward monitoring the breast change. For each of
the 19 consequences, the behavioral belief was multiplied by the corre-
sponding outcome evaluation, and then the products were suened. This
estimate of attitude (possible range =
-171 to .171, i(=-26.79, SDM2.42)
was found to predict the direct measure of attitude toward monitoring
with a high degree of accuracy (r=.630, £<.005).
In the Ajzen and Fishbein model, the determinants of an individ-
ual's subjective norm are normative beliefs and motivations to comply.
In the present study, respondents were asked to provide their normative
beliefs and motivations to comply with respect to 11 referents. How-
ever, In the section of the questionnaire that obtained normative
beliefs and motivations to comply, respondents were also asked to "leave
blank any questions that do not apply to you (for example, if you do not
have any children, leave blank all the questions that ask about 'my
children')." This procedure resulted in missing data for some respon-
dents. For all referents except "in-laws." missing data for normative
beliefs were replaced with the respondent's own mean normative belief
score, and missing data for motivations to comply were replaced with the
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respondent's own ™ean motivation to comply score. The referent "In-
laws" was dropped fro. analyses completely, because there was an espe-
cially large number of missing responses for this referent (38.8% of the
sample had missing data).
Respondents' normative beliefs and motivations to comply were used
to compute an estimate of their subjective norm for monitoring the
breast change. For each referent, the normative belief was multiplied
by the motivation to comply, and then the products were suited. This
estimate of subjective norm (possible range =
-210 to +210, )(=89.18,
SD=63.14) significantly predicted the direct measure of subjective norm
for monitoring (r=.491, £<.005).
Cognitive Foundations of Intentions to Monitor
This section begins a more detailed analysis of the beliefs that
were found to constitute the underlying cognitive foundations of respon-
dents' intentions to monitor the breast change for a while rather than
immediately call the doctor, or not to do so. In order to examine the
effects of beliefs on intentions to monitor, the sample was divided into
two groups on the basis of responses to the item that assessed this in-
tention. The first group, "non-delayers," consisted of 74 women (55.2%)
whose responses to the intention scale fell below the midpoint (i.e.,
the "unlikely" side of the scale). The second group, "delayers," was
made up of 60 women (44.8%) whose responses to the intention scale fell
above the midpoint (i.e., the "likely" side of the scale). No respon-
dent checked the midpoint of the intention scale. The utility of this
Classification of respondents 1s evident 1n Table 4 which presents, for
both non-delayers and delayers, the mean attitude, subjective no™, and
intention scores.
Results for non-delayers show that this group had clear prefer-
ences against n,on1tor1ng the breast change, and for calling the doctor
immediately. The results concerning delayers are less straightfon,ard
Although delayers had a positive differential Intention score, a nega-
tive score for Intention to call the doctor, and a positive attitude
toward monitoring, they were also positive in their attitude and subjec-
tive norm regarding calling the doctor. In addition, delayers had a
slightly negative attitude estimate and differential attitude, as well
as negative subjective norm scores for monitoring (as assessed by both
the direct and estimated measures) and a negative differential subjec-
tive norm. Those respondents who intended to monitor the breast change
rather than Immediately call the doctor, and had a favorable attitude
toward doing so, also had a favorable attitude and perceived social
pressure toward immediately calling the doctor. Despite the apparent
ambivalence of the delayers. It is clear that their responses differed
from those of the non-delayers, in the expected directions. On measures
concerning monitoring, delayers were significantly more positive in
their attitude, and less negative in their estimated attitude, subjec-
tive norm, and estimated subjective norm. On measures concerning
calling the doctor, delayers had a negative intention score while non-
delayers had a positive intention, and delayers had a less favorable
attitude and a less positive subjective norm. On the differential
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Table 4
Intentions Attitudes, and Subjective Norms
of Delayers and Non-delayers
^^^^^^^^ Dela^ Non^^ela^
X SD
55
Attitude* g ~.. - ^
Estimate of Attitude*
-ifiy in'f;
-''^-''^ 11.92
Subjective Norm* Igg ^^'^^ "47.00 32.41
Estimate of Subjective ' "^-^^ l.H
Norm* t-7 ,Q
-57.28 65.98
-I15.05 47.24
Call Doctor
Intention*
.i i -7c
Attitude* go! 2.46 l.io
Subjective Norm* ]' aq \ A 25.75 6.811-04 2.62 1.06
Differential Intention* 3.2O 2.12
.5.00 1.44
Differential Attitude*
-2.79 19.64
.42.94 16.71
Differential Subjective
-2-15 3.30
-5.28
,.82
Difference between means of delayers and non-delayers is significant at
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scores, delayers Intended to .onito. «h1,e
„on-de,ayers Intended to can
the doctor, and delayers were less negative on their attitude and sub-
jective no™ scores. Thus, in comparison to non-delayers, the delayers
had stronger preferences for monitoring the breast change, and against
immediately calling the doctor.
Behavioral Beliefs Underlying
Attitudes Toward Monitoring
Table 5 presents the mean behavioral beliefs and outcome evalua-
tions for delayers and non-delayers. In addition. Table 5 presents cor-
relations for the measure of intention to engage in delay behavior with
the behavioral beliefs and with the outcome evaluations. The discussion
Of the results contained in Table 5 focuses on the means rather than on
the correlations, in order to highlight as clearly as possible the dif-
ferences between delayers and non-delayers on the underlying determi-
nants of attitudes and intentions. On Table 5, for the behavioral
beliefs, a positive score indicates that the outcome was Judged as
Hkely to result from monitoring the breast change, while a negative
score indicates that the outcome was judged as an unlikely result. For
the outcome evaluations, a positive score indicates that the outcome was
rated as "good," while a negative score indicates that the outcome was
rated as "bad." Table 5 shows that delayers and non-delayers differed
significantly on their evaluations of four out of nine consequences for
which evaluations were made. In comparison to non-delayers, delayers
gave a more favorable evaluation of the consequence "control my own
health and feel confidence in myself," and less negative evaluations of
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avoid unpleasant
.edical procedures" and "be able to convince
.yself
that the change is nothing serious." While delayers gave a neutral
evaluation for "avoid appearing as a silly and foolisb alannist," non-
delayers gave this consequence a negative evaluation.
On the behavioral beliefs, delayers and non-delayers differed sig-
nificantly on the perceived likelihood of every consequence, with the
exception of "this would give me time to find a doctor I trust." Seven
of the consequences were judged as neither likely or unlikely by delay-
ers, but as unlikely by non-delayers: I would be controlling my own
health and would feel confidence in myself; I would be handling my
problems and decisions on my own instead of turning them over to someone
else; I would avoid being inconvenienced by taking time away from my
daily routine; I would avoid wasting the doctor's time; I would avoid
appearing as a silly and foolish alan^ist; I would be able to provide
enough information about the lump for the doctor to make an accurate
diagnosis; and, I would avoid upsetting my family. Two consequences
were perceived by delayers as neither likely nor unlikely to result from
monitoring the breast change, whereas non-delayers perceived them to be
likely: My condition would become more serious or get worse; and, I
would be decreasing my chances for a complete cure. While both delayers
and non-delayers rated as unlikely the consequences of "I would avoid
unpleasant medical procedures," "I would be able to convince myself that
the change in my breast is nothing serious," "I would save money," and
"the lump would go away," delayers rated them as less unlikely than did
non-delayers. Both delayers and non-delayers perceived "I would feel
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anxious, fearful, and worried,"
"cancer would have time to grow or
spread," and "I would not know what the change in
.y breast neans" as
likely consequences of monitoring, but delayers less so than non-
delayers. Finally, the consequences of "I would be more likely to need
-ajor surgery" and "it would be too late for treatment and I might die-
were judged as unlikely by delayers, whereas non-delayers judged the
former as likely and the latter as neutral.
Normative Beliefs Underlyin g Subjective Nnrm.
with Respect to MonitoriTiq ^^-^
Table 6 presents the mean nonnative beliefs and motivations to
comply for delayers and non-delayers, as well as the correlations for
intention to delay with normative beliefs and motivations to comply.
For the normative beliefs, a positive score would indicate respondents'
perceptions that the referent in question would be likely to prescribe
monitoring the breast change, while a negative score indicates that the
referent would be unlikely to prescribe monitoring. For the motivations
to comply, the higher the score, the more respondents reported generally
wanting to behave in accordance with the referent's prescriptions.
On the normative beliefs, delayers and non-delayers differed sig-
nificantly on the perceived likelihood that every referent would think
the breast change ought to be monitored. Each referent was believed by
both groups to be unlikely to recommend monitoring. However, for every
referent, delayers judged prescriptions for monitoring as less unlikely
than did non-delayers. On the motivations to comply, delayers and non-
delayers differed significantly in their ratings for only three
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Both delayers and non-deU.ers had high average scores on motivations to
ccply with these three referents. However. 1n comparison to delayers
non-de,ayers gave significantly higher ratings for generally wanting t^
act as doctors, their doctor, and the American Cancer Society recom-
mend.
Summary
Respondents' Intentions to delay seeking
.nedlcal care or immedi-
ately seek care for the breast symptom were highly correlated with their
attitudes toward delayed and prompt help-seeking behavior, and with
their perceptions of which behavior other people would be likely to
recommend. However, respondents' personal evaluations of the two
behavioral options were more strongly related to Intentions than were
their perceived social pressures to choose one behavior over the other.
When respondents were classified into the "delayer" and "non-delayer-
groups it was clear that, in comparison to the delayers, the non-
delayers were more extreme in their unfavorable evaluations of delay and
their favorable evaluations of prompt help-seeking. The delayers mani-
fested ambivalence in their attitudes, in that they were somewhat
favorable toward engaging in both delayed and prompt behavior. The less
extreme attitudes of delayers relative to non-delayers were reflected in
the finding that delayers tended to believe that delaying medical care
wuld be neither likely nor unlikely to result in various consequences.
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es
Relationships of External Variables
to Differential Intentions
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between differen-
tia, intention scores and scores for the variables that were assessed in
the questionnaire, but are externa, to the AJzen and Fishbein ™ode, 3
The f,rst set of correlations computed was between differential inten-
tions and respondents' ratings of the likelihood that they would tal. to
"people who are important" to the™, as well as each of the ten refer-
ents, to find out what the referents would think they ought to do about
the breast change. Table 7 presents the
.eans and standard deviations
for these ratings, and the results of the correlations. The column of
means shows that the sample as a whole would be neither likely nor un-
likely to talk to important others. On the average, respondents be-
lieved they would be likely to seek out their doctor, doctors, and their
husband for advice about the change in their breast, but would be un-
likely to consult with any other referent. The third column in the
table shows that differential intention scores were negatively corre-
lated with the likelihood of talking to three referents: doctors, one's
own doctor, and the terican Cancer Society. Respondents who intended
to monitor the breast change for a while rather than call the doctor
Imnediately believed it was unlikely that they would consult with the
cancer society, or with their own or other doctors. These findings
provide support for the reliability of the choice intention measures.
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Table 7
Likelihoods of Consulting with Referents- Means
w^t'h ''^'T'/"^ Correlationsit Differential Intentions
would talk to:
I
people who are
important to me 4.22
my co-workers C , DO
doctors 5.55
my friends 3.40
my children 3.15
my parents 3.02
my doctor 6.48
my husband 5.18
my siblings 3.04
my relatives 2.30
the American Cancer
Society 3.17
to find out what they (s/he)
think(s) I ought to do about
the change in my breast.
differential intmvMnn
2.57
-.076
1.78
.120
1.88
-.351*
2.18
.014
2.08
-.083
1.82
-.047
1.08
-.460*
2.04
-.019
1.98
-.094
1 .64
-.023
2.24
-.181*
*£<.05
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correlation coefficients «ere also computed between differential
intentions and responses to eac. of the three variables that measured
how long respondents would wait to call the doctor if the lu.p in their
breast manifested specific characteristics. Each of the three correla-
tion coefficients was significant. Intentional preference for monitor-
-9 the sy.pto. instead of calling the doctor i^ediatel, was positively
associated with waiting a longer period of time to call the doctor if
the l^p disappeared (r=.527, £<.005), if the lu.p did not change in
any way (r=.673. £<.0O5), and if the lump grew or changed (r=.43g,
£<.005). These findings provide further support for the reliability of
responses to the intention measures.
Table 8 presents the correlations between differential intentions
and respondents' ratings of their emotional reactions to finding the
breast change, as well as their ratings of what their emotional reac-
tions would be if the change turned out to be breast cancer. The table
shows that four emotional reactions to finding the breast change were
significantly negatively correlated with differential intention. The
stronger respondents' intentional preferences were for monitoring the
change instead of calling the doctor, the less they felt fearful and
apprehensive, anxious and panicky, concerned and worried, and sad and
depressed upon discovering the breast symptom. Three emotional reac-
tions to the possibility of the change turning out to be breast cancer
were significantly related to differential intention scores. Intention
to monitor the symptom was negatively correlated with feeling fearful
no
Table 8
Correlations Between Differential Intentions
and Emotional Reactions
Emotions FinHinn u Change turned out tod g the change
__be_breast_cancer
Embarrassed and ashamed
,081
Fearful and apprehensive
-.280*
Anxious and panicky
-.372*
Anqry and annoyed 054
Surprised and curious
"128
Disbelieving and shocked
-.ns
Pessimistic and hopeless
-.]^S
Concerned and worried
-.213*
Sad and depressed
-.206*
.097
-.215*
-.158*
.150*
.101
.013
-.049
-.048
-.107
*£<.05
mand apprehensive, and anxious and panicky, but this Intention was
positively correlated with feeling angry and annoyed.
In an open-ended question, respondents were asked to provide their
own diagnosis of the change In their breast. A total of 108 women
answered this question, and responses fell into three categories- a
diagnosis that the change was a sy.pto. of cancer (n=30). a diagnosis
that the change was not a cancer symptom (n=59), and an uncertain diag-
nosis that the change was either cancerous or non-cancerous (n=20).
Respondents were also asked to rate the extent to which their personal
diagnosis represented a life- threatening condition (!i-3.59. SD=1.98).
and the likelihood that the change in their breast was a symptom of
'
breast cancer (X=4.27, SD=1.70). Responses to both of these items were
significantly negatively correlated with differential intention scores.
The stronger respondents' Intentional preferences were for monitoring
the change Instead of calling the doctor, the less respondents judged
their personal diagnosis as representing a life-threatening condition
(r=-.353, £<,005). Stronger intentional preferences for monitoring were
also associated with lower subjective probabilities of the change being
a symptom of breast cancer {r=-.384, £<.005).''
Pearson correlations were computed between differential Intention
scores and respondents' ratings of breast cancer. Table 9 presents the
results of the correlations, and the means and standard deviations of
the ratings. There were no significant findings among the correlations,
suggesting that respondents' conceptions of breast cancer did not
112
Table 9
^°"''^'andVn.^ Standard DeviationsCorrelations with Differential Intentions
'
Breast cancer is:
permanent vs. temporary
incurable vs. curable
disabling vs. empowering
dangerous vs. safe
painful vs. painless
serious vs. mild
life-threatening vs. not
life- threatening
recurring vs. not recurring
unpredictable vs. predictable
contagious vs. not contagious
inheritable vs. not inheritable
unpreventable vs. preventable
uncontrollable vs. controllable
dirty vs. clean
mysterious vs. well
-understood
unfair vs. fair
bad vs. good
punishing vs. rewarding
unpleasant vs. pleasant
undeserved vs. deserved
a disease that results in permanent
bodily changes vs. no bodily changes
a disease that results in permanent
personality changes vs. no personal-
ity changes
a disease that requires long
treatment vs. short treatment
r wi th
differential
intention
4.57 1.73
.039
2.52 1.40
-.034
4.66 1.07
.126
6.45
.90
.112
5.03 1.74
-.108
6.74
.57
-.017
6.29 1.19
-.045
5.37 1.08
.017
5-41 1.70
-.025
1.22
.85
.009
5.46 1.41
-.053
4.87 1.81
-.027
3.01 1.67
-.119
3-68 1.11
..053
3.40 1.55
.067
5.08 1.34
-.011
5.74 1.35
-.056
4.57 1.08
.034
6.61 .92
.009
5.59 1.48
.011
5.82 1.09
.005
4.50 1.29
-.051
5.34 1.32
-.124
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influence the,> Intentions to delay seeking „edica, ca.e or i^ediatel,
seek care for the breast symptom.
The general measure of respondents' attitudes toward their past
relationships with doctors (possible range = 5 to 35, 5(=29.73, SD=5.97)
also was not significantly correlated with differential intention
scores. In contrast, the two items that addressed respondents" general
habits Of seeking medical care were found to be significantly related to
differential intention. Specifically, the first item asked. "In gener-
al, when you notice a physical symptom, do you usually go to the doctor
right away or do you waif (M.37, SD=2.06), and the second Item asked,
"In general, do you consult doctors on a regular basis or only in emer-
gencies" {^=5.09, SD=1.93). Intentional preference for monitoring the
breast change instead of calling the doctor was negatively related to
self-reports of usually going to the doctor right away when noticing a
symptom (r=-.553, £<.005) and consulting doctors on a regular basis
(r=-.313, £<.005).
Of the three scales that comprise the Multidimensional Health
Locus of Control Scale-the Internal HLC Scale (possible range=6-36,
X=24.06, SD=4.53). the Powerful Others HLC Scale (possible range=6-36,
55=16.02, SD=5.11), and the Chance HLC Scale (possible range=6-36,
5(=16.14, SD=5.09)-only the PHLC Scale was significantly correlated with
differential intention scores (r=-.254, £<.005). Intentional preference
for monitoring rather than immediately contacting the doctor was in-
versely related to respondents' beliefs that their health is determined
by powerful other people. Responses to the Self-Esteem Scale (possible
114
on
re-
-nge=,0-40.
^33.88. SD=4.21)
.ailed to cc.elate significantly with
differential intention.
Finally, relationships between differential intention and respon-
dents" demographic characteristics were examined. Pearson correlati
coefficients were computed between differential intention scores and
spondents- age and education, the number of people respondents reported
they were living with, their household's annual income, the average
income per person in their household, and their husband's education.
The only significant correlation involved respondents' education; the
higher the level of formal education respondents had completed, the
stronger their intentional preference was for monitoring the breast
change rather than immediately calling the doctor (r=.210, £<.05). Chi-
square tests were used to examine the relationships between differential
intention and respondents' marital status, ethnic background, religion,
employment status (i.e., whether they were or were not employed), and
husbands' employment status. For the chi-square tests, the sample was
divided into two groups on the basis of differential intention scores,
and the groups were compared across the response categories for each
demographic variable. The group of "non-delayers" was made up of 67
respondents (50.0%) who scored below the median on differential inten-
tion, indicating an intentional preference for immediately calling the
doctor. The group of "delayers" consisted of the other half of the
respondents, who scored above the median on this measure, indicating an
intentional preference for monitoring the breast change. The chi-square
tests revealed that there were no significant associations between
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differential Intention and the demographic variables of marital status
ethnic background, religion, employment status, and husbands' employment
Status
Relationships of External Variables to DifferentialAttitude and Differential Subjective
The following variables were found to be significantly correlated
with differential intention: ratings of emotional reactions of fear,
anxiety, concern, and sadness in response to finding the breast change;
ratings of emotional reactions of fear, anxiety, and anger if the change
turned out to be breast cancer; the extent to which personal diagnoses
of the change were judged as representing a life- threatening condition;
the perceived likelihood that the change was a symptom of breast cancer;
two measures of general habits of seeking medical care; the Powerful
Others Health Locus of Control Scale; and respondents' education. Ajzen
and Fishbein state that because intentions are determined by attitude
and subjective norm, any effects of external variables on intentions
must be due to their impact on one or both of these factors. Therefore,
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between each of the
external variables listed above, and differential attitude and subjec-
tive norm scores. The results are presented in Table 10.
The table shows that favorable attitudes toward monitoring the
breast change, and perceived referential pressure to monitor, were both
associated with the absence of fear and apprehension, anxiety and panic,
and sadness and depression, upon discovering the symptom. In addition,
the more favorable respondents' attitudes were toward monitoring, and
116
Correlations Between External Variables and DifferentialAttitude and Subjective Norm
''^'^^"^^^^
Emotional reactions to findinq
_Attitude__
the breast change:
Fearful and apprehensive o-^n*
Anxious and panicky "'900* •''81*
Concerned and worried
""fnc -.292*
Sad and depressed " onL "-063
-•^08*
-.245*
Emotional reactions if the change
turned out to be breast cancer:
Fearful and apprehensive loo
Anxious and panicky " "-084
Angry and annoyed " no^ -•"'01
•^37
^026
Personal diagnosis represents
life- threatening condition
-.351*
Likelihood that change is a
symptom of breast cancer
-.338*
General habits of seeking medical
care:
Usually goes to the doctor right
away when physical symptom is
'''''''
-.563*
Consults doctors on a regular basis
-.316*
Powerful Others Health Locus of
Control
Education
-.268*
.094
-.201*
-.305*
-.368*
-.139
-.185*
.088
*2.<.05
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the more respondents believed other people would prescribe monitoring,
the less they believed the change in their breast was a symptom of a
life- threatening condition or breast cancer. Favorable attitudes and
normative pressure toward monitoring were inversely related to respon-
dents' self-reports of having a general habit of going to the doctor
right away when they notice a physical symptom. Similarly, favorable
attitudes toward monitoring were inversely related to self-reports of
consulting doctors on a regular basis as opposed to only in emergencies.
The more respondents had a favorable attitude toward monitoring, and
believed that important other people would prescribe monitoring the
breast change instead of calling the doctor, the less they believed that
powerful other people control their health.
Prediction of Intention from External Variables
Eight regression equations were constructed in order to determine
whether the consideration of variables external to the Ajzen and Fish-
bein model, in addition to the attitudinal and normative components,
improved the prediction of choice intentions to delay seeking medical
care or immediately seek care. Specifically, differential intention
scores were predicted from differential attitude scores, differential
subjective norm scores, and scores for each external variable that was
significantly correlated with one or both of the attitudinal and norma-
tive factors. These predictions were made by means of hierarchical
multiple regression analyses, in which differential attitude and subjec-
tive norm were entered as predictors of intention on the first step of
118
the analysis, and the external variable under consideration was entered
as a predictor on the second step.
Table 11 presents the results of these regression analyses. Only
three of the eight variables tested were found to contribute signifi-
cantly to the prediction of differential intention, above and beyond the
contributions of differential attitude and subjective norm. These vari-
ables were: the extent to which respondents reported feeling anxious
and panicky upon discovering the change in their breast, respondents'
perceptions of the likelihood that the change was a symptom of breast
cancer, and the extent to which respondents had a general habit of going
to the doctor right away when they notice a physical symptom. Inten-
tional preferences for monitoring the breast change instead of immedi-
ately calling the doctor were predicted by the absence of anxiety,
subjective probabilities that the change was not a breast cancer symp-
tom, and having a general habit of waiting to go to the doctor when
noticing a symptom. However, each of the three external variables
accounted for only 3% or less of the variance in intentions to engage in
prompt or delayed help-seeking behavior.^
Behavioral and Normative Beliefs
Underlying External Variables
Ajzen and Fishbein state that if external variables are found to
influence the attitudinal and/or normative factors, this influence must
be accounted for by the variables' effects on one or more of the deter-
minants of the factors, i.e., behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations,
normative beliefs, and motivations to comply. In order to examine the
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-pact on the deten^inants of the three external variables that were
significant predictors of differential intention, correlations were
computed Of each external variable with the behavioral beliefs and with
the outcome evaluations (see Table 12), and with the normative beliefs
and motivations to comply (see Table 13).
Table 12 shows that the relationships of the behavioral beliefs to
the external variables-anxiety in reaction to finding the breast
change, perceived likelihood that the change was a breast cancer symp-
tom, and having a habit of seeking care promptly for physical problems-
were quite similar across the three variables, although not identical.
All three external variables were significantly correlated with 11 of
the 19 behavioral beliefs, and the direction of the correlations was
consistent among the external variables for each of these beliefs. The
correlations of the outcome evaluations with the external variables did
not yield similar, significant results across the three variables.
Therefore, the discussion of the results in Table 12 focuses on the
correlations involving the behavioral beliefs.
Respondents who had little anxiety about the breast change, gave a
low likelihood that the change was breast cancer, or had habitually put
off medical care, believed that monitoring the breast change would en-
able them to control their own health with confidence, and handle their
decisions by themselves. These same respondents also believed that
delaying treatment for the breast change would allow them to avoid
wasting a doctor's time and to save money. Further, these women thought
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Table 13
Correlations of External Variables with NormativeBeliefs and Motivations to Comply
Motivations to Comply Normative Belipf«;
Referent
Co-workers
Fri ends
Doctors
Children
Parents
My doctor
Husband
Siblings
Relatives
American
Cancer Society ,084
r. with
Anxi ety
r with
Li kel i hnoH
r with
naui z
r wi th
Anxiety
r wi th
Likelihood
r with
Habit
-.070
.022
-.100
-.262*
-.255*
-.356*
.027
.077
-.092
-.315*
-.321*
-.464*
.113
.068 .269*
-.181*
-.297*
-.360*
.107
.084
-.025
-.191*
-.141
-.256*
.103
.137
-.046
.044
-.097
-.116
.028
.085 .253*
-.235*
-.312*
-.383*
.063
-.001
-.081
-.149*
-.247*
-.265*
.136
.077
-.027
-.207*
-.275*
-.345*
.153*
.174*
.027 -.156*
-.258*
-.361*
179*
.151
-.229*
-.317*
-.342*
"'£<.05.
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that the breast lu^p would probably disappear if they
.onltored 1t on
their own for a while.
The respondents who were anxious after noticing the breast change
did attribute the change to breast cancer, or were apt to quickly seek I
doctor's advice for bodily sy.pto.s, believed that negative consequences
would be likely to follow from delaying treatment for the change. They
were certain that they would feel anxious, fearful, and worried if they
did not i^ediately obtain professional care. These groups of women
thought that delay would result in their condition becoming more serious
and requiring major surgery. Additionally, high anxiety, cancer attri-
butions, and habits of prompt behavior were positively associated with
perceptions that delaying care would give cancer time to spread, de-
crease the chances for a complete cure, and increase the chances of
death from disease.
Turning to Table 13, it can be seen that the correlations of the
normative beliefs with the external variables produced results that were
very much the same across the three variables. All three external vari-
ables were significantly inversely related to ratings that eight out of
the ten referents would recommend monitoring the breast change rather
than immediately calling the doctor. The greater respondents' anxiety,
the higher their judged likelihood of breast cancer, and the more they
tended to promptly seek a physician's care, the less the women believed
that their co-workers, friends, husbands, relatives, and medical profes-
sionals would agree with deciding to delay care for the breast change.
Also notable in Table 13 is that motivations to comply with the
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suggestions of doctors, one^s own doctor, and the African Cancer
society, were positive,, related to having a habit of seeking treatment
right away for physical abnormalities.
Summary
Intentions to engage in delayed rather than prompt help-seeking
behavior were associated with the absence of anxiety and panic in re-
sponse to discovering the breast change, low subjective probabilities
that the change was caused by breast cancer, and having established a
habit of waiting to go to the doctor after noticing a physical symptom.
These three variables significantly contributed to the prediction of
intentions, above and beyond attitudinal and normative considerations.
However, the contribution of the three variables to explaining the vari-
ance in intentions to immediately seek care or delay care, was quite
small in each case. Low anxiety, non-cancer attributions, and having a
general habit of delaying medical treatment, were linked to perceptions
that delaying care for the breast change would be unlikely to result in
undesirable outcomes.
Determinants of Perceived Likelihood that
Change is Breast Cancer
Of special interest in the present study was investigating the
determinants of respondents' interpretations of the breast change.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between respondents' rat-
ings of the likelihood that the change in their breast was a symptom of
breast cancer, and three sets of variables: variables invoking use of
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the representativeness heuristic, variables invoking use of the avail-
ability heuristic, and perceived vulnerability to breast cancer. The
first set of correlations computed was between the likelihood ratings
and respondents' ratings of how frequently breast cancer produces each
of 30 symptoms, when breast cancer is in its early, initial stages.
Table 14 presents the means and standard deviations of the frequency
ratings, and the results of the correlations. The first column on the
table shows that the five symptoms that actually are symptoms of breast
cancer (the first five symptoms listed on the table), received the high-
est mean ratings as to how frequently they are produced by early breast
cancer. It can be seen in the third column that only two correlation
coefficients were significant out of the 30 obtained. Higher subjective
probabilities of the change being breast cancer were associated with
higher assigned frequencies of breast cancer producing convulsions and a
lump or thickening in the breast.
The second set of correlations was between the likelihood ratings
and responses to the seven questions concerning the incidences of breast
lumps, breast cancer, and deaths from breast cancer. The means and
standard deviations of these items, as well as their correlations with
the likelihood ratings, are presented in Table 15. The third column of
the table shows that two of the correlation coefficients were signifi-
cant. Higher probabilities of the change being breast cancer were
associated with a higher assigned percentage of breast lumps that is
diagnosed as breast cancer, and a higher assigned percentage of women
that gets breast cancer. The final correlation computed was between the
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Table 14
Frequencies of Breast Cancer Symptoms: Means StandarHDeviations and Correlations with Likelihood
^
that Change is Breast Cancer
How frequently is each of the following
a symptom of breast cancer, when breast
cancer is in its early, initial stages?
lump or thickening in breast
change in size, shape or skin of breast
change in retraction or scaliness
of nipple
bleeding or discharge from nipple
pain or tenderness in breast, nipple
change in appearance of wart or mole
a sore that doesn't heal
weakness, tiredness
weight loss
abnormal Pap smear
sore or stiff muscles, back
'
abnormal vaginal bleeding
numbness, tingling in any part of body
chest pains
shortness of breath, coughing
faintness, dizziness
fever
weight gain
upset stomach, stomachache
hot flashes
headaches
sore throat, hoarseness, difficulty
swal lowing
hair loss
heartburn, indigestion
3.96
3.29
3.27
3.07
3.01
2.87
2.71
2.01
1.98
1.94
1.76
1.60
1.58
1.57
1.49
1.47
1.43
1.42
1.40
1.39
1.39
1.37
1.35
1 .29
r with perceived
likelihood that
change is breast
SD cancer
.76 .187*
.77
.050
.82
.115
.82
.134
.95
.094
1.13
.065
1.09
.125
.96
.126
.92
.125
1.01
-.064
.88 -.026
.79 .029
.73 .060
.76
-.014
.71 .048
.70 .038
. 69
. 046
.66 -.035
.62 .028
.63 .067
.62 .036
.66 -.039
.62 .033
.55 -.010
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Table 14
(continued)
How frequently is each of the following
a symptom of breast cancer, when breast
cancer is in its early, initial stages?
blurred vision
chills
constant thirst
ringing in ears
running, congested, or bleeding nose
convulsions
SD
1.25
.49
1.24
.51
1.20
.49
1.18
.46
1.18
.43
1.10
.33
r wi th percei ved
likelihood that
change is breast
cancer
.048
.010
.047
-.015
.076
.174*
*£<.05
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likelihood ratings and responses to the single item assessing respon-
dents' perceived likelihood that they will get breast cancer
-one day"
(5^=3.58, SD=1.59). Higher probabilities of the change being breast
cancer were associated with higher subjective probabilities of one day
getting breast cancer (r=.183, £<.05).
Chi-square tests were used to examine the relationships between
the perceived likelihood of the change being breast cancer and responses
to three questions concerning respondents' actual medical history:
whether or not the women had ever discovered a lump in their breast;
whether or not they had ever had any breast symptoms other than a lump;
and whether or not their mother or sister(s) had ever had breast cancer.
For the chi-square tests, the sample was divided into two groups, the
"cancer" and "non-cancer" groups, in the same way that was described
previously. The chi-square tests revealed that whether or not respon-
dents had ever discovered a lump in their breast was the only variable
significantly associated with the perceived probability that the change
was a symptom of breast cancer (x2(l)=io.73, £<.005). Of the 78 women
who reported never having had a breast lump, 32 (41.0%) judged the
change as unlikely to be breast cancer, and 46 (59.0%) judged the change
as likely to be cancerous. Of 54 women who reported having a history of
one or more lumps, 39 (72.2%) rated breast cancer as unlikely, and 15
(27.8%) rated breast cancer as likely. Therefore, respondents who had
previously discovered at least one lump in their breasts were less like-
ly to believe that the change was a symptom of breast cancer, than
respondents who had never discovered a lump.
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For the subsa.ple of respondents who did have a history of breast
lumps, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between ratings of
the likelihood that the change was a sy.pto. of breast cancer, and
the number of ti.es the women reported having discovered a lump, as well
as the number of days they reported having waited to contact a doctor
after discovering the lump(s). The latter variable produced a signifi-
cant correlation; respondents who rated the chances of the change being
breast cancer as relatively high took a fewer number of days to contact
a doctor about breast lumps they had actually discovered in the past
(r=-.311, £<.05). For the subsample of respondents whose mother or
sister(s) did have a history of breast cancer, a correlation was com-
puted between ratings of the likelihood that the change was a symptom
of breast cancer, and respondents' ratings of how successful their
mother/sister's outcome was from breast cancer ()(=3.80, SD=2.80). This
correlation was not significant.
Predictors of Perceived Likelihood
that Change is Breast Cancer
The following variables were found to be significantly related to
respondents' ratings of the likelihood that the change in their breast
was a symptom of breast cancer: ratings of how frequently breast cancer
produces the symptoms of convulsions, and a lump or thickening in the
breast, when breast cancer is in early stages; opinions as to the per-
centage of breast lumps that is diagnosed as breast cancer, and the
percentage of women that gets breast cancer; respondents' ratings of the
likelihood that they will get breast cancer one day; and respondents'
actual expenence with b.east ,„.ps.
. stepwise multiple regression
analysis was pe.fonned in which each of these variables was entered as a
predictor of the perceived livelihood of the change being breast cancer
The results of this analysis revealed that only two predictors- the per-
ceived likelihood of one day getting breast cancer (b=.218. £<.05) and
whether or not respondents had ever found a lump in their breasts
(b=-.194. E<.05)-were significant. One predictor-the percentage of
lumps that is diagnosed as breast cancer-was marginally significant
(b=.175. £<.10). Together, these predictors accounted for m of the
variance in the subjective probability that the change was a symptom of
breast cancer (R=.327, £<.05).
Because women who had a history of breast lumps gave smaller
chances that the breast change was cancerous than women who did not have
such a history, the same regression analysis was conducted on each of
these two groups separately, for exploratory purposes. For the women
who had never discovered a breast lump, the regression of the likelihood
ratings on the five variables that were significantly correlated with
these ratings revealed that two predictors- the percentage of lumps that
is diagnosed as breast cancer (b=.331, £<.05), and the perceived likeli-
hood of one day getting breast cancer (b=.306, p<.05)-were significant,
together accounting for 18% of the variance (R=.424, p<.005). For the
women who had found at least one lump in their breasts, the same regres-
sion analysis revealed that no predictors were significant. However,
for this group of women it was found that the number of days they re-
ported having waited to contact the doctor after finding the lump{s) was
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significantly negatively correlated with the perceived likelihood that
the change was breast cancer. Therefore, this variable was entered as a
predictor in the regression equation along with the other five vari-
ables. The results showed that the ti.e taken to contact a doctor after
discovery of a breast lump was a significant predictor (b=-.435, p.<.05)
accounting for 19% of the variance in perceived likelihood that the
change was a symptom of breast cancer.
Determinants of Perceived Vulnerahi lity
to Breast Cancer
A secondary purpose of the present study was to examine the deter-
minants of women's perceived vulnerability to breast cancer. Pearson
correlation coefficients were computed between ratings of the likelihood
of one day getting breast cancer and each variable that was hypothesized
to influence this perceived likelihood. The first set of correlations
computed was between the liklihood ratings and responses to the seven
questions that concerned the incidences of breast lumps, breast cancer,
and deaths from breast cancer. The presentation of these correlations
in Table 15 shows that one correlation coefficient was significant.
Higher subjective probabilities of getting breast cancer were associated
with a higher assigned percentage of breast cancer victims who are
treated for the disease but die of it. The second set of correlations
computed was between the likelihood ratings and respondents' ratings of
the extent to which they have personal control over not getting breast
cancer (X=2.56, SD=1.65), the extent to which they believe there is a
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{X=4.32. SD=1.69), and the extent to which they match their own descrip-
tion of this particular type of woman (X=2.95, SD=1.98). Results showed
that perceived personal control over getting breast cancer was not
significantly correlated with perceived vulnerability to the disease.
Results also showed that respondents who indicated that they are likely
to get breast cancer one day tended not to believe that there is a
particular type of woman who has a high chance of getting breast cancer
(r=-.158, £<.05). However, respondents who felt vulnerable to breast
cancer also viewed themselves as matching the characteristics of women
who have a high chance of getting the disease (r=.577, £<.005).
Respondents' descriptions of the type of woman who has a high
chance of getting breast cancer were classified into 16 categories.
Twenty-five respondents (18.7%) did not answer this open-ended question.
The 109 women who did provide a response listed from one to eight char-
acteristics of a likely breast cancer victim. Table 16 displays the 16
categories and the number of respondents who gave each description.
Over one-half of the respondents stated that having a family history of
breast cancer puts women at high risk of getting the disease; this was
by far the most frequently cited category. The second most frequent
description of the woman likely to get breast cancer involved her per-
sonality traits. The likely victim was described as being anxious,
depressed, and perfectionistic; "she represses her emotions" and "buries
her own needs— she worries about others first." More than 10% of the
sample stated that nulliparous women, women who consume alcohol.
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Table 16
Descriptions of the Likely Breast Cancer Victim
has a high chance of getting breast cancer? „ °^
H sample
Woman has a family history of breast cancer sO 59Woman has certain personality traits, e.g., sheis anxious, depressed, type A, and unable io
express her emotions and needs
chnSren'""
^^'^"'^ breastfeed
Woman uses caffeine and/or alcohol and/or tobacco
Woman eats poor diet, e.g., diet high in fats andadditives, and low in vitamins and minerals 15 n 9
Woman lives and works in stressful environment 14
Woman is older
23 17.2
19 14.2
18 13.4
10.4
12 9.0
Woman has been exposed to carcinogens in the
environment
Woman is large-breasted
Woman has a history of breast symptoms, e.q
fibrocystic disease
Woman is in generally poor physical condition
Woman takes hormones, e.g., birth control pills
Woman doesn't exercise
Woman has certain ethnic background, e.g
, she
IS Southern European, Jewish, or non-Asian 4 3^0
Woman is overweight
3 22
Other: Woman's body had a physiological change
Woman has had children
Woman has breastfed children
Woman is of upper SES 5 3 7
10 7.5
8 6.0
7 5.2
7 5.2
5 3.7
4 3.0
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tobacco, and caffeine, and wo.en who maintain an inadequate diet, have a
high chance of getting breast cancer.
Chi-square tests were used to examine the relationships between
the perceived melihood of one day getting breast cancer and responses
to the three questions that concerned respondents' actual
.edical his-
tory: whether or not the women had ever discovered a lump in their
breast; whether or not they had ever had any breast symptoms other than
a lump; and whether or not their mother or sister(s) had ever had breast
cancer. For the chi-square tests, the sample was divided into two
groups on the basis of ratings of the likelihood of one day getting
breast cancer. The "invulnerable" group consisted of 61 women (45.9«)
who scored below the median, indicating that they are relativly unlikely
to get breast cancer, and the "vulnerable" group was made up of 73 women
(54.ir.) who scored above the median, indicating that they are relatively
likely to get breast cancer one day. The chi-square tests revealed that
whether or not respondents' mother or sister(s) had ever had breast
cancer was the only variable that was significantly associated with the
perceived probability of one day getting breast cancer (x2(l)=7.44,
E<.05). Of the 114 women whose relatives had not had breast cancer, 58
(50.9%) judged themselves as unlikely to get breast cancer, and 56
(49. IX) judged themselves as likely to get the disease. Of the 20 women
who had a mother or sister with breast cancer, three (15.0%) felt invul-
nerable, and 17 (85.0%) felt vulnerable to getting breast cancer.
Therefore, respondents who had a family history of breast cancer per-
ceived themselves as more likely to get breast cancer one day than
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respondents who did not have a history of breast cancer within their
immediate family.
For the subsample of respondents who had a history of breast
1U.PS. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between ratings of
the likelihood Of one day getting breast cancer, and the number of ti^es
the wo.en reported having discovered a lunp, as well as the number of
days they reported having waited to contact a doctor after discovering
the lu.p(s). Neither correlation was significant. For the subsample of
respondents whose mother or sister(s) had a history of breast cancer, a
correlation was computed between ratings of the likelihood of one day
getting breast cancer and respondents' ratings of how successful their
mother's/sister's outcome was from breast cancer. This correlation was
not significant.
Predictors of Perceived Vulnerability
to Breast Cancer
Four variables were found to be significantly associated with re-
spondents' ratings of the likelihood of one day getting breast cancer:
opinions as to the percentage of breast cancer patients who are treated
for the disease but die of it, the extent to which respondents believed
there is a particular type of woman who has a high chance of getting
breast cancer, the extent to which respondents believed they match their
own description of this particular type of woman, and respondents'
family history of breast cancer. A stepwise multiple regression analy-
sis was performed in which each of these variables was entered as a
predictor of the perceived likelihood of one day getting breast cancer.
The results of this analysis revealed that only one pred1ctor-the
extent to which respondents judged themselves as matching their own
stereotype of a likely breast cancer victim (b=.504. £<,001)-was sig-
nificant. Whether or not respondents' mother and/or sisters had ever
had breast cancer was of marginal significance (b=.158. t<.,o). These
two predictors together accounted for m of the variance (R=.587,
E<.001).
Because of the chi-square result that women who had a family his-
tory of breast cancer differed from women who did not have such a
history on their perceptions of the likelihood of one day getting
breast cancer, the same regression analysis was conducted for each of
these two groups separately. For the women who did not have a mother or
sister with breast cancer, the regression of the likelihood ratings on
the three variables that were significantly correlated with these
ratings revealed that the same variable-the extent to which respondents
Judged themselves as matching their own stereotype of a likely breast
cancer victim {b=.508, E.<.001)-was significant, accounting for 26% of
the variance. For the women who did have a mother or sister with breast
cancer, the Identical regression analysis revealed that a different
variable-the percentage of breast cancer victims who die of the disease
In spite of being treated for it (b=.549, e.<.05)-was significant,
accounting for 30? of the variance in perceived vulnerability to breast
cancer.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The Theory of Reasongd Artinn
Prediction of Intentions
The present study found that women's Intentions to engage in
prompt or delay behavior in seeking medical care for a breast cancer
symptom correlated highly with corresponding attitudinal and normative
measures. Because a woman's intention to engage in prompt or delay
behavior reflects a choice between these two alternatives, differential
intentions, attitudes, and subjective no™s were assessed. Differential
intentions were significantly predicted by differential attitudes and
differential subjective norms. Respondents who had intentional prefer-
ences for monitoring the change in their breast for a while rather than
Imedlately calling the doctor, were more favorable in their evaluations
of monitoring than of Immediately seeking help, and believed that impor-
tant others would be more likely to prescribe monitoring than immedi-
ately seeking a doctor's advice. Although differential attitude and
differential subjective norm were both significant predictors of choice
intentions, the attitudinal component proved to be a more important
determinant of help-seeking decisions than the normative component.
Similarly, although both attitude toward monitoring the breast change
and subjective norm with respect to monitoring contributed significantly
to the prediction of Intentions to monitor, the attitudinal factor was
found to have a greater influence than the normative factor. In the
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prediction of intentions to immediately call the doctor, the only sig-
nificant predictor was attitude toward in^ediately seeking help, for
subjective norm failed to make a significant contribution. The choice
respondents made between delaying medical care and seeking medical care
promptly was primarily determined by personal, attitudinal considera-
tions as opposed to social, normative considerations.
Delayers Versus Non-delayers
In the present study, promptness and delay in seeking medical care
for a breast cancer symptom were defined empirically, on the basis of
the sample's responses to the measure of intention to monitor the breast
change rather than immediately call the doctor. The group of delayers
intended to monitor the change rather than call the doctor right away,
whereas the group of non-delayers did not intend to monitor the change.
This classification of respondents was found to be useful for under-
standing the women's intentions to delay or not delay care, in that
delayers and non-delayers differed significantly on their mean responses
to the two additional intention measures and every measure of attitudes
and subjective norms that underlie intentions.
The most clearcut differences between the two groups were on the
assessment of differential intention, the measure of intention to imme-
diately call the doctor, and the direct measure of attitude toward moni-
toring the breast change. The mean differential intention scores showed
that delayers intended to monitor the change, while non-delayers in-
tended to call the doctor immediately. Quite similarly, mean scores for
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non-
intention to call the doctor revealed that delayers did not intend to
immediately contact a doctor, while non-delayers did intend to do so.
Delayers had a mean positive evaluation of deciding to monitor, and
delayers had an unfavorable evaluation of this decision. Results of the
remaining measures of attitudes and subjective norms showed that, rela-
tive to the non-delaying group, the delayers were less negative in their
attitudes toward monitoring, and less positive in their attitudes toward
calling the doctor. In addition, delayers perceived prescriptions for
monitoring by other people to be less unlikely, and they perceived pre-
scriptions for calling immediately to be less likely. Thus, in compari-
son to non-delayers, the group of delayers had stronger intentional
preferences for delaying medical care and against seeking care promptly.
Underlying this intentional choice were more favorable evaluations of
the decision to delay and less favorable evaluations of the decision to
immediately seek care. Intentions to delay were further determined by
perceptions that important others would exert relatively less pressure
to either delay or not delay.
Because delayers and non-delayers differed on each component on
the theory of reasoned action, a detailed examination is warranted of
the cognitive structures that were found to underlie the intentions of
each group. The responses of the non-delayers to the intention, atti-
tude, and subjective norm measures were quite consistent, which provided
a clear picture of the cognitive foundation of the intention to seek
medical care promptly. That is, the non-delayers clearly did intend to
call the doctor immediately and did not intend to monitor the breast
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care
change. Accordingly, they had a favorable attitude toward seeking
mediately, and an unfavorable evaluation of putting off professional
care. Further, the non-delayers believed that people who were Important
to the. would reco^end seeking
.edical attention 1-edlately. but would
not recommend delaying action.
In contrast to the non-delayers, the delayers were inconsistent in
their assessments of the components that determined their intention to
delay, so that the cognitive foundation of this intention is more diffi-
cult to clearly identify. The delayers displayed ambivalence in their
attitudes toward delay and prompt behavior, and their responses to the
intention, attitudinal. and normative measures had generally greater
variance compared to the responses of non-delayers. As stated above, it
was clear that delayers did intend to monitor the breast change and did
not intend to immediately call the doctor. Additionally, delayers were
favorable in their attitude toward monitoring on the direct measure of
this attitude. However, on the indirect measures of attitude toward
monitoring, delayers were slightly negative in their evaluations of this
behavior. Furthermore, delayers were favorable in their evaluations of
the decision to immediately call the doctor. The delayers believed that
other people would recommend prompt help-seeking behavior, and would
tend not to recommend delaying medical treatment.
It is apparent that delayers' intentions to delay medical care
were not rooted in unfavorable attitudes toward immediately seeking
care, or in perceived social pressure to delay care. In fact, the in-
tentions of delayers did not even appear to originate in the possession
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of highly favorable attitudes toward delaying, and the intentions were
held despite perceived normative pressure for prompt medical attention.
It seemed that intentional preferences for delay were detennined by the
absence of polarized attitudes with respect to both intentional
choices-the lack of strongly favorable attitudes toward immediate care,
and the lack of strongly favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward
delay. The decision to delay seeking medical care for a breast cancer
symptom may be a decision made by default, the result of moderate
evaluations of each of the two behavioral options. A delayer may reason
that because going to the doctor right away is not an especially desir-
able option, and monitoring the symptom is not particularly good or bad,
she might as well put off seeking a professional diagnosis.
The absence of polarized attitudes on the part of delayers in com-
parison to non-delayers was also seen in the results concerning the de-
terminants of attitudes, behavioral beliefs. Delayers and non-delayers
differed significantly on the perceived likelihood that 18 out of 19
consequences would result from monitoring the breast change rather than
calling the doctor immediately. However, delayers judged nine of these
consequences as neither likely nor unlikely to occur, and on eight other
consequences, the mean likelihood ratings of the delayers were closer to
the neutral point than the ratings of non-delayers.
Relative to the delayers, the non-delayers were more convinced
that several types of consequences would be unlikely to follow from
monitoring the breast change. Non-delayers believed that the decision
to delay would not allow them to confidently handle their health and
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other problems on their own, or to gather enough infon^ation about the
breast sy.pto. to enable a doctor to diagnose it accurately. They also
believed that they would not avoid inconveniencing themselves, their
family, or their doctor, by monitoring the change, and that monitoring
would not save them from spending money or undergoing medical proce-
dures. Furthermore, non-delayers believed it would be unlikely that
they would be able to avoid appearing as alannists, or convince them-
selves that the symptom was not serious and that it would go away. Non-
delayers were more certain than delayers that if they did not i^ediate-
ly call the doctor, their condition would worsen and cancer would have
time to grow, so that their chances for a cure would be decreased and
more extensive treatment would be necessary. Non-delayers were also
more sure that they would feel anxious about the change in their breast
and would not know what the symptom meant. Only one consequence of
delaying, "it would be too late for treatment and I might die," was
rated as neither likely nor unlikely by non-delayers; delayers rated
this consequence as unlikely to result from the decision to monitor the
breast change rather than seek immediate care.
External Variables
Prediction of Intentions
Three variables that are external to the theory of reasoned action
were found to contribute significantly to the prediction of choice in-
tentions, above and beyond the contributions of differential attitude
and differential subjective norm. Intentional preferences for monitoring
ining
the breast change rathe, than 1™ediately calling the doctor, were pre-
dicted by the absence of anxiety and panic In reaction to discovering
the sy^pto.. AS noted In the Introduction, studies of delay In seeking
a diagnosis of cancer sy„,ptoms have considered affective reactions to
the discovery of the symptoms to be Important variables In explal
delay behavior, although findings concerning the Influence of these
reactions on delay have been inconsistent. The findings of the present
study concur with those of Cameron and Hinton (1968) and Sugar and
Watkins (1961), who suggested that the experience of anxiety in response
to finding a symptom of breast cancer may be associated with early help-
seeking. Intentions to delay calling a doctor about the breast change
«ere also predicted by low subjective probabilities of the change being
a breast cancer symptom. This finding supports Rodin's (1978) notion
that when people assign causes to symptoms on the basis of limited
information, this can inhibit help seeking behavior. It is also in line
with cancer delay researchers' conclusions that the Interpretation of
breast cancer symptoms as due to a cause other than cancer promotes
delay in obtaining a diagnosis (Cameron J, Hinton. 1968; Eardley, 1974;
Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Sugar S Watkins, 1961). The third variable
found to be predictive of Intentions to delay was the self-report of
having a general habit of waiting to go to the doctor after noticing a
physical symptom Instead of going to the doctor right away. One of the
least equivocal findings of cancer delay studies is that cancer pa-
tients' behavioral reactions to the symptoms of their disease are
similar to their behavioral responses to the symptoms of previous,
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other illnesses (Clements
, Wakefield. 1972; Goldsen. Gerhardt
. Handy,
1957; Hackett. Cassem S Raker, 1973; Henderson, Wittkower S Lougheed.
1958; King & Leach, 1950).
Unlike prior cancer delay studies, the present study provided
empirical evidence as to how the absence of anxiety in response to find-
ing a cancer symptom, misattributions for the symptom, and general
habits of putting off medical treatment, might indirectly influence
delay in seeking care for the symptom, as well as directly contribute to
delay. Specifically, the indirect impact of these external variables on
intentions to delay was explained in terms of their impact on mediating
variables, the determinants of intentions. First, the relationships of
these three variables to the direct determinants of differential inten-
tions-differential attitude and differential subjective norm-were
examined. It was found that the absence of anxiety upon discovering the
breast change, low subjective probabilities of the change being a breast
cancer symptom, and having a general practice of waiting to seek a doc-
tor's advice for physical symptoms, were all associated with favorable
attitudes toward monitoring the breast change rather than immediately
calling the doctor, and the perception of social pressure to delay
medical care. Next, the relationships of the external variables to
indirect determinants of intentions were investigated, in that correla-
tions were computed between the external variables and the behavioral
belief measures.
These correlations revealed that respondents who had a low level
of anxiety, made non-cancer attributions, and generally delayed medical
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care, were convinced that
.onitoring the breast change would enable the™
to control their own health and other problems with confidence These
wo^n were also certain that by delaying care, they would avoid wasting
a doctor's ti™e and would save money, since the lu.p would probably just
go away, m contrast, the anxious, cancer-attribution, and general non-
delayer respondents were more sure than their counterparts that they not
only would feel anxious about the breast symptom if they did not call
the doctor, but they also believed that their condition would become
™ore serious and that cancer would spread, thereby increasing the need
for disabling treatments and decreasing the chances for a complete cure.
Finally, the anxious, cancer-attribution, and general non-delayer groups
perceived the possibility of dying as a result of delayed treatment to
be more likely than did the other groups of respondents. In summary, it
1s apparent that the absence of anxiety in response to finding a breast
cancer symptom, the attribution of the symptom to a cause other than
breast cancer, and having a general tendency to wait before seeking care
for physical symptoms, all contribute to intentional preferences for
delay partly because they impact on specific and general beliefs that
determine intentions to delay. However, each of these variables was
shown to also have a direct, non-mediated link to the decision to post-
pone medical care for the breast change.
Causal Attributions
One focus of the present study was determining the basis on which
respondents assigned causes for the breast change they were asked to
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imagine they had discovered. More specifically, the predictors of the
perceived likelihood that the change was a breast cancer sy.pto. were
examined. It was found that respondents' actual history of having or
not having lumps in their breasts was related to the women's interpreta-
tions of the hypothetical breast change. Respondents who had never
found a breast lump believed the chances were greater that the change
was a cancer symptom than respondents who had found at least one breast
lump. The reason that the respondents with a history of breast lumps
tended to make non-cancer attributions probably lies in the fact that,
for most of the women, their lumps were diagnosed as caused by a non-
cancerous condition. In particular, of the 56 respondents (41.8% of the
sample) who reported having a history of breast lumps, only two had ever
had breast cancer. Since the great majority of the women who had ever
found a breast lump had benign tumors, it is not surprising that they
would interpret the hypothetical breast change as also being non-
malignant. Greer (1974), in his study of delay in seeking medical care
for breast cancer symptoms, found that women who had a history of benign
breast tumors often assumed that a subsequent lump was benign, and so
the women were apt to delay obtaining a diagnosis of that lump. Other
studies of cancer delay report that delay occurs because patients fre-
quently attribute their cancer symptoms to a recurrence of a previous
illness that was not cancer (Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Gold, 1964; Hender-
son, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; King & Leach, 1950).
Since respondents who had a history of breast lumps were found to differ
from respondents who did not have such a history on their interpretations
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Of the imaginary breast change, these two groups were treated separately
m examining the predictors of causal attributions for the change.
For the subsample of respondents who had never discovered a lump
in their breasts, it was determined that two variables significantly
predicted subjective probabilities that the breast change represented
breast cancer. Greater likelihoods of breast cancer were associated
with higher assigned percentages as to how many breast lumps are diag-
nosed as cancerous, and with greater perceived likelihoods of one day
getting breast cancer. It is probable that both of the predictor vari-
ables invoked utilization of the availability heuristic (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). That is, when estimating the percentage of all breast
lumps that are diagnosed as breast cancer, the respondents may have made
their estimates according to how easily they could recall cases of
cancerous breast tumors they had heard about through other people or the
media. When the women were unable to recall such cases, they made a
judgment that few breast lumps are indeed caused by cancer, and thus
assumed that their own imaginary lump was not attributable to breast
cancer. In a similar way, respondents' appraisals of the likelihood of
one day getting breast cancer depended partly on the extent to which the
women had personal experience with breast cancer that made vivid images
of the disease available to them; this point is more fully discussed
below. In terms of the present discussion, the point is that women who
perceived themselves as invulnerable to breast cancer were likely to
interpret the change in their breast as due to a condition other than
cancer.
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These results suggest that, among women who have never found a
breast lump before, decisions regarding the cause of a lump are rooted
at least partly in cognitive processes. Traditionally, cancer delay
researchers have emphasized motivational factors that influence the in-
terpretation of cancer symptoms. For example, researchers have indi-
cated that people deny the possibility that their symptoms are caused by
cancer, because they are so fearful of having the disease (Bard &
Sutherland. 1955; Cameron & Hinton. 1968; Greer, 1974; Shands et al..
1951). The findings of the present study do not negate the role that
motivational factors play in assigning causes to cancer symptoms. How-
ever, they do point out that cognitive factors, such as availability
biases, also play a role in cancer symptom attributions.
For the subsample of respondents who had found at least one lump
in their breasts, only one variable was significantly related to subjec-
tive probabilities that the breast change was a symptom of breast can-
cer. This variable was the number of days that passed between the
respondents' discovery of the lumps and their contacting a doctor for
advice about the lumps. A greater likelihood of the change being breast
cancer was associated with having taken a fewer number of days to con-
tact a doctor. This result is interesting when it is contrasted with
the results for the respondents who did not have a history of breast
lumps. The contrast suggests that, among women who have a history of
breast tumors (or more specifically, a history of benign breast tumors),
causal attributions for a new lump do not depend upon the availability
of information about other women's experiences with breast tumors.
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Rather, once women have experienced the situation of finding a lu.p in
their breast, they .ay automatically interpret and respond to the dis-
covery Of another lump in much the same way as they did previously, it
Should be recalled that one predictor of respondents' intentions to seek
help or not for the breast change was their interpretation of the
change. If it is true that women tend to give the same attribution for
a newly discovered lump as for previous lumps, then it is not surprising
that their behavioral response to previous lumps is predictive of their
interpretation of a new lump.
Vulnerabil ity
Another focus of the present study was on investigating factors
that influenced the extent to which respondents perceived themselves as
vulnerable to breast cancer. The study examined the predictors of re-
spondents' ratings of the likelihood that they will get breast cancer
one day. Whether or not respondents' immediate family members had ever
had breast cancer was found to be significantly associated with the
respondents' perceptions of vulnerability. Respondents who had a mother
or sister with breast cancer were more likely to perceive themselves as
vulnerable to the disease than respondents who did not have such a his-
tory in their family. Having a female blood relative with breast
cancer does, in fact, increase one's chances of getting the disease
(American Cancer Society, Note 1). Nonetheless, as mentioned briefly
above, respondents' judgments of the likelihood of one day getting
breast cancer were probably affected by the cognitive bias of
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availability. The availability hypothesis Implies that because having
experience with a disease
.akes the disease
.ore vivid and salient in
memory, this experience leads to a greater subjective probability of
getting the disease. This further implies that the occurrence of breast
cancer in one's family would lead to an exaggerated perception of vul-
nerability to breast cancer, in comparison to the perceptions of women
whose mother and sisters were not victims of breast cancer. Because
perceived vulnerability to breast cancer was found to differ between
respondents with and without a family history of the disease, these two
groups were considered separately in examining the predictors of vul-
nerabil ity.
For the subsample of women whose mother and/or sisters had never
had breast cancer, one variable significantly predicted the extent to
which they believed they will be likely to get breast cancer. This
variable was the extent to which the respondents viewed themselves as
matching their own descriptions of the type of woman who has a high
chance of getting breast cancer. The less respondents judged themselves
as matching their stereotype of a breast cancer victim, the less they
perceived themselves as vulnerable to breast cancer.
Weinstein (1980) has suggested that the possession of stereotypes
of victims of negative events stems partly from motivational processes.
In this view, stereotypes serve an ego-defensive function, and so people
rarely see themselves as similar to the type of person who suffers mis-
fortune. However, Weinstein has also noted that stereotypes of victims
may be rooted in cognitive processes, such as representativeness biases
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(Tversky & Kahne.an, 1974). According to the representativeness hypo-
thesis, when people decide whether or not they fit a stereotype, they
examine the extent to which they match the salient characteristics of
those who do fit the stereotype. If people find differences between the
characteristics of their stereotypes of victims and their own qualities
or attributes, they are likely to conclude that they will avoid victimi-
zation. The present study showed that this cognitive bias operates in
judgments as to the likelihood of being victimized by breast cancer.
Respondents who found discrepancies between their own characteristics
and their description of a typical breast cancer victim believed that
they are relatively unlikely to ever get breast cancer.
It is noteworthy that, to some degree, respondents' descriptions
of the type of woman who has a high chance of getting breast cancer were
accurate representations of some of the factors that are considered to
put women at high risk of getting the disease. The American Cancer
Society (Note 1) states that risk factors for breast cancer include a
family history of breast cancer, never having had children, and being
middle-aged or older. These factors were listed in respondents' ac-
counts of who is likely to get breast cancer (see Table 16). Therefore,
it might appear that rather than giving biased estimates of the likeli-
hood of getting breast cancer, respondents simply used their knowledge
of the risk factors in breast cancer to realistically estimate their own
risk of getting the disease. It may seem that the possession of correct
information about the characteristics of women who are at high risk of
getting breast cancer would lead to greater accuracy in assessing one's
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own risk. However, a further examination of the implications of the
representativeness hypothesis indicates that relying on stereotypes of
victims in estimating one's own chances of victitnization does bias these
estimates, even when the stereotypes accurately incorporate known risk
factors. In using the representativeness heuristic to judge the proba-
bility of getting a disease, for example, people tend to ignore base
rates for the disease, which biases their subjective probabilities. In
the present study, respondents' opinions as to the percentage of all
women who get breast cancer were unrelated to their assessments of their
own chances of getting breast cancer. Furthermore, reliance on one's
stereotype of disease victims in making judgments as to the likelihood
of getting the disease results in the failure to consider that victims
of the disease do not always match the stereotype; this failure biases
the likelihood judgments. Women who are quite knowledgeable about the
risk factors in breast cancer may overlook the fact that many breast
cancer victims do not have a history of breast cancer in their family,
and do have children. This gives rise to the conclusion that the pos-
session of information as to the risk factors of breast cancer, whether
correct or incorrect, will lead women to make biased estimates of their
chances of getting the disease, if they do not believe that they display
the risk factors. Women who do not see themselves as having the charac-
teristics that cause women to have breast cancer will underestimate
their vulnerability to breast cancer. The present study demonstrates
that this underestimation may indirectly contribute to delayed help-
seeking for a breast cancer symptom.
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For the respondents who had a .other or sister with breast cancer
one variable significantly predicted their ratings of the likelihood of
getting breast cancer one day. Respondents who perceived themselves as
more vulnerable believed that a higher percentage of breast cancer vic-
tims die of the disease despite being treated for it. This finding is
inconsistent with some researchers' suggestions that motivational pro-
cesses cause people to defensively deny the possibility of becoming ill,
especially seriously ill (e.g., Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles & Rosenstock,
1966). If motivational processes determined this subsample's estimates
of getting breast cancer, the respondents would be expected to give
themselves a smaller chance of getting breast cancer when they believed
that breast cancer is often fatal. In contrast, this finding is not in-
consistent with the notion that cognitive processes, including avail-
ability biases, figure heavily in people's judgments of the likelihood
of suffering an illness. The availability hypothesis states that emo-
tionally salient events exert a disproportionate impact on inferences as
to the frequency with which those events occur. In support of this
statement, the present study found that respondents who considered their
mother and/or sister to have had an unsuccessful outcome from breast
cancer (perhaps meaning that the relative died), believed that a larger
percentage of breast cancer victims die despite receiving treatment
(r=-.415, £<.05). Given that a family member's poor outcome from breast
cancer can be an emotionally powerful event, the experience of this
event apparently inflates estimates of how many women die from the
disease, which in turn inflates the perceived likelihood of getting the
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disease. This cognltively based explanation for the finding that re-
spondents «ho had a family history of breast cancer perceived themselves
as more vulnerable to the disease if they also believed that breast
cancer 1s incurable. Is only a speculation. However, it does point to
the possibility that cognitive biases, as opposed to only motivational
ones, determine people's perceptions of their vulnerability to cancer.
The Decision to Delay
In the present study, respondents read a scenario about a woman,
Ann, who discovered a breast cancer symptom and decided to delay seeking
medical care for the symptom. The results of the study suggest that a
different scenario would more realistically represent the process by
which women decide to delay professional treatment for a symptom of
breast cancer. This scenario is presented below.
One morning, Ann woke up and took a shower before qettinq
fppf. h.^H ^^H-^r'^- showering, she happened toeel a ard tiny thickening on the edge of her left nipple Thebump was quite small, smaller than the size of a pea. Ann wasn'?
sure there was anything unusual about the spot. Aside from this
change, she hadn't noticed anything about her physical conditionthat was different from normal.
°^ shovjer and thought about what she should do.bnould she call the doctor for an appointment or should she watch
the symptom on her own? Ann thought it would be somewhat advantage-
ous to call her doctor right away, but she also thought it would be
of some benefit to monitor the change by herself for a while. She
didn't really have any strong opinions one way or the other. While
Ann believed that other people, including her family, her friends,
and most physicians, would probably recommend having an exam immedi-
ately instead of waiting, she didn't imagine that they would feel
very strongly about what to do either. Ann didn't think that any-
thing particularly good or bad would happen to her if she put off
calling the doctor. She didn't feel anxious about having found the
change in her breast and she didn't believe it could be caused by
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shl'fus^-^?;-J^^-;,:- ™:-^P?-ica1 s„.o.s . past.
st^AMnli IZmi irdu IhTdont'^' ^-ast once before, and
diagnosed the lump as be"™ l„d t.d Lt T J*^" "^^d
found* reast f^ps^ i ^^ncIudTIh^ '/"'" ^^d
breast cancer Ann didn'? Jhini .Sm are rarely diagnosed as
Methodology
The methods that were used in the present study raise several
issues that need to be addressed. One issue concerns the fact that
intentions to seek medical care or not for a breast cancer symptom were
assessed with respect to the hypothetical discovery of such a symptom.
Respondents formed their intentions on the basis of imagining that they
had discovered a change in their breast, so that the intentions under
investigation were not formed in the context of actually experiencing
this situation. This raises the potential problem that the intention
measures did not provide valid indications of what respondents' inten-
tional preferences for help-seeking would be, if the women actually
discovered the breast change described. The respondents might make
different decisions about obtaining medical treatment, if and when they
find a symptom of breast cancer, from the decisions they believed they
would
.ake when they were asked to picture themselves making such
choices, certain procedures were followed In the study to minimize this
potential problem. The respondents were not simply instructed to ima-
gine that they had discovered a breast cancer symptom, or a lump in
their breast. Rather, respondents read a scenario about a woman who
discovered a change in her breast, and the circumstances in which she
made the discovery as well as the characteristics of the change, were
described in detail. Thus respondents were given specific pieces of
information they could use to readily imagine themselves in the situa-
tion of finding a breast symptom. Furthermore, the requirement was made
that the respondents be 35 years of age or older. The sample thereby
consisted of women whose age put them at high risk of getting breast
cancer.
It is possible that respondents' supposed intentions to seek medi-
cal care or not differed from what their actual intentions would be, be-
cause the women perceived themselves as likely to respond in a socially
desirable way to finding a breast symptom. In the situation of deciding
whether to seek medical attention promptly or to delay care for a breast
abnormality, the socially desirable decision is to immediately seek pro-
fessional care. It did not appear that respondents' hypothetical inten-
tions were invalid because of social desirability biases, since a large
proportion of the sample was self-identified as having intentional
preferences for delay. Fully 44.8% of the respondents judged that they
would be likely to monitor the change in their breast for a while,
rather than call the doctor immediately. Two additional measures of
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intentions also showed that these delayers believed they would be likely
to monitor the breast change, but would be unlikely to call a doctor 1.-
niediately for advice about the sy.ptom. Furthermore, intentional pref-
erences for delay or pronipt behavior among all respondents, as assessed
by differential intention scores, were found to be reliable. The find-
ing that a substantial portion of the respondents reported having inten-
tions to delay medical care argues against the possibility that choice
intentions, even though hypothetical, were forced purely on the basis of
social desirability biases rather than on respondents' realistic ap-
praisals of what their intentional choices would be. However, it is
clear that additional research is needed that will examine the intention
to delay seeking care for a breast cancer symptom when the intention is
formed in response to a real, as opposed to an imaginary, symptom.
Another methodological issue involves the study's focus on the
prediction of intentions instead of behavior. As just discussed, the
study assessed respondents' intentions to engage in prompt or delayed
help-seeking behavior with regard to the hypothetical occurrence of a
breast cancer symptom. Because intentions were measured in relation to
an imagined experience, it was not possible to obtain a measure of
actual behavior and then test the extent to which intentions predicted
behavior. This brings up the potential problem that, had the study
measured help-seeking intentions and behaviors among symptomatic women,
intentions might be found to be unrelated to the behavioral observa-
tions. Little understanding of delay behavior would be gained by
predicting intentions to delay, if intentions were not predictive of
this behavior. However, theoretical and empirical work by Ajzen and
Fishbeln (1980) suggests that Intentions would have accurately predicted
behavior In the situation of responding to a breast cancer sy.pto™. if
n had been possible to test the prediction. Ajzen and Fishbein state
that Intentions predict behavior, if certain prerequisites are .et.
They have demonstrated that Intentions significantly predict behavior in
a wide variety of behavioral realms, including losing weight, using
contraception, and consumer and voting choices, when these prerequisites
are fulfilled.
For intention to predict behavior, the behavior observed must be
under volitional control. According to Ajzen and Fishbein, a behavior
is under a person's volitional control if the individual can decide at
will to perform it or not perform it. When this definition is applied
to the topic of the present study, it is apparent that calling a doctor
for advice about a cancer symptom is largely under volitional control,
although this action may be inhibited by lack of financial resources.
The second requirement that needs to be met for intention to predict be-
havior, is that intention and behavior must be assessed at corresponding
levels of generality. Thirdly, the intention must not have changed in
the interval between the time at which it was assessed and the time at
which the behavior was observed. To ensure a strong intention-behavior
relationship, it is therefore desirable to assess intention in close
temporal proximity to the behavior, since the longer the intervening
time interval, the more likely is the occurrence of unforeseen events
that may change the intention. In the case of investigating delay in
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seeking care for a breast cancer sympto.. 1t would certainly be possible
to design a study in which these latter two prerequisites were ^et, if a
sample of symptomatic women could be obtained. The ideal study would be
a prospective one, in which a sample of sympto^tic women would be
followed over time. The women who developed breast cancer symptoms
would complete measures of their intentions for prompt or delayed help-
seeking behavior before they contacted a doctor, and then their help-
seeking behavior or lack of it would be assessed. If such a study were
carried out, there would be no theoretical reason to suspect that inten-
tions would not accurately predict behavior. Hopefully, prospective
studies of this type will be performed in the future, not only to pro-
vide a better understanding of delay in seeking medical care for breast
cancer symptoms, but to also provide a basis on which effective inter-
ventions can be designed to deter delay behavior.
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regression coefficients were .483 (p<.001 and §35 (i^lSB^f r theattitude and subjective norm estimates, respectively
attitnHf^nH^c'K^'^!^''^"*''^ intention scores were predicted from theitude and subjective norm estimates, and each of the three external
liX lT' Predictions were made by means of hierarch?ca mu -tiple regression analyses, where the estimates were entered as pred c-
Tnllfl ^'"'^ '''P 'I '''^^'''^ the externarvar able underi vestigation was entered on the second step. The following tablepresents the results of these analyses.
r uow oi
External variable b
Anxious and panicky upon
finding breast change
-.141
Likelihood change is a
symptom of breast cancer -.130
Usually goes to the
doctor right away when
physical symptom is
noticed
-.315
2 R Significance
R_ change of R change
.654 .428 .016
647 .418 .014
698 .487 .075
.056
.087
.000
Respondents' feelings of anxiety and panic after discovering the breast
change, and their ratings of the likelihood that the change was a breast
cancer symptom, marginally contributed to the prediction of differential
intentions, above and beyond the attitude and subjective norm estimates
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variable accounted for S, of1:r:aJ?a^^Il„1?^;2?e„1[:i
?^?e^5;4s.
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his questionnaire is part of a study that explores the different decisionspeople .a.e about seeking
.edical help. We are particularly inter
-
different decisions wo.en .a.e about what to do when thly fi.d
.
their breast. Some women decide to call their doctor immediately an
some women decide to watch the lump for a while to see what happens
'
Please
read the scenarios below. The scenarios describe the experiences of two
women. Ann and Susan. You will see that, although the women had the same
experience, they had different reactions to that experience
--outofthesho.^
leaveV^S:^^^' Slus'^^^^as^hte^?^^ ^h^f^l tlt^d^^J^^^ 1°
edge of ner left nipple. The lump'^ario sl^ll m 1 r^'^ha? h^s?ze"o?:pea. that Susan wasn't sure it was anything unusual. Aside from the lumo
from"n:?JSK
^^'-"^ condi tio^^haTwa?d1T??;ent
Susan thought about how small the lump was and that she was feelinq as
Tnl\tl'.' "^'^^^ht that, because the lump was ny ands e felt f ne, she should watch the lump to find out if it would chaLe or
or a ihile'^Sh^'n °1H °( ^'^^ ''''''' watch thTlum
at a iSer time
^ appointment to have an exa;i,ination
We would like to know what your reactions would be if you had the same
experience as Ann and Susan. First, try to imagine that what happened to
Ann and Susan has just happened to you. Imagine that you have just found
a lump in your breast while taking a morning shower. The lump is on the
edge of your left nipple; it is hard and smaller than a pea. Other than
the lump, you haven't noticed anything out of the ordinary about your
physical condition. Next, please respond to the following questions as
if you have just experienced the same situation as Ann and Susan. We
realize that responding as if you are actually in this situation may be
difficult. Please take your time and do your best. There are no right
or wrong answers to any of the questions.
?Jun"%^^S:riJ'yo:?V?:Is?.^^"'^^°"^ ^^-^ -^^^ 1^ you ^ad Just
2) What do you see as the disadvantages of immediately call ing the doctor?
3) Is there anything else you associate with immediately calling the doctor?
Are there any people or groups who would disapprove of you irmediately
calling the doctor?
TutlVaT " advantages of watching the lump for a while, as
What do you see as the disadvantages of watching the lump for a while?
Is there anything else you associate with watching the lump for a while
9) Are there any people or groups who
for a while?
10) Are there any people or groups who
lump for a while?
11) What emotions did you feel when you
approve of you watching the lump
disaoprove of you watching the
found the lumo? (Please list.)
12) On each of the ' fol lowi ng scales, please out sn y in fh=
to your response. ^ ^ '^^^ space that corresponds
a) I intend to immediately call the doctor, as Ann did
likely
: : : :
•
.
.
.- unlikely
b) I intend to watch the lump for a while, as Susan did
likely
: ; : : • •
.
: unlikely
13) Suppose you decided to watch the lump for a while (i e von Hid nn.
14) Suppose you decided to watch the lump for a while and it did not ao
away. ="
a) Would you eventually call the doctor? yes no
b) If yes, how long would you wait to call the doctor froni the time
you found the lump? (Please give number of days, weeks months
or years
.
)
'
1)
5)
Background Information
What is your marital status?
Never married
^Married
_Separated or divorced
Widowed
2) What year were you born?
3) Ethnic Background:
_White
Jlack
_Hispanic
_Asian
Other:
4) Religion:
Cathol ic
^Protestant
_Jewish
Other:
None
What is the last year of school you completed?
8th grade or below
Some high school
^Graduated from high school
_Some business or trade school
_Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graaudted from college
_Sonie graduate work
_Graduate degree
6) Are you employed? yes
If yes, what is your occupation
7) How many people do you live with? people.
8) What is your household's annual income?
510,000 or less
SlO.OOl - $20,000
320,001 - 530,000
530,001 - 540,000
540,001 - 550,000
550,001 or more
9) How many people does this income support? people.
If you are present!.
...hm
, please answer the following questions.
1) What IS the last year of school your husband completed?
8th grade or below
Some high school
Graduated from high school
Some business or trade school
Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work
Graduate degree
2) Is your husband employed? yes no
If yes, wnat is nis occupation?
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP!
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Hello,
people make about seeking medical hi!r I ^studying decisions
medical care in the United States ±t r' -nf
"^^^
"^t of
important to find out .lit iTlyVoZ jo ToT^Tl?'. ^°cular I am studying how women make decisions abo^t \care for health problems that apnlv onlv ^^''^"^ medicalYour name has been chosen Ts\ Ztl I men.
in Hampshire County °' " ^-Ple of women living
study^rfUlli:^;° aTesti^nnalr:" 5^ S^^^"^ '^'^ ^ "^^^read a brief sto'ry abou^ a^ioLTwh^'-,, ^ \''p:;.\^L^^^^^^
^"^^
body, and Chen you would answer auesrinn=
Particular change in her
think, feel, and do if you we? e in th^ "^at you would
the story. The questionnaire L^p ^""^^ion as the woman in
to complete. All of ZrreLont T/u ^"'^ hour
and your nan,e would never be a^;"- J^d T''^'^'' confidential
to not answer any questions vou do " ^^^^
you could fill out th^^,^^!^ '° Furthermore,
Enclosed is a stamped, addressed postcard that t wnniw
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Department of
S^r °ect"d"^^':-H "-^"^ '^^^ - hesS~b out
Sincerely,
Clvu/ltli u. llA^M^^
Christine Timko
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
In the questionnaire you are about to fin out, you are first
asked to read a story about a woman who notices a particular
Change in her body. You are then asked to imagine that you
are in the same situation as the woman in the story, and to
answer questions concerning what you believe you would think,
feel, and do if you were in this situation. You are also
asked to provide your opinions about some general and specific
health-related issues, as well as some information about your
actual medical history.
If you have any questions while you are completing the
questionnaire, do not hesitate to call me. Christine Timko. at
545-1390 (days) or 586-8142 (evenings). You are free to not
answer any questions on the questionnaire that you do not want
to answer, and to discontinue your participation in this study
at any time. All of your responses will be completely confidential
and your name will never be associated with them; the questionnaire
will be identified by a number, rather than by your name.
^hisltidy^
"""^^^ statement and I agree to participate in
Signature Date
Instructions
In the questionnaire you are about- rr. fn
ILIT''' T^'^' "^^^— 3pa e ;';o^ e°t;'j: T^^^^"'^^ ''^^ usetha best describes your opinion. For e^ampSe ^f" " '""^'^ ^^e placeweather m Massachusetts" on such a scaS rh!' ^^l^^*^ t° "te "Theas follows: ^"l^- ^ e seven spaces should be interpreted
The weather in Massachusetts is
good;
extremely quite TTi^hnT'
-^^IIEh^''Tll^ :bad
'^"ite extremely
yo„r:.si.' jst.-j^"" ^^^^^
The weather in Massachusetts is
good:_
: x
The weather in Massachusetts is
good:
:
The weather m Massachusetts is cold in January,
likely: .
^^^^^^
^^li^'iiiih^Tr'-i^iiii^^iii^^
In making your ratings, please remember the following points:
(1) Place vour marks in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries:
this
not
this
(2) Please try Co answer every item.
(3) Never put more than one check mark on a single scale.
US
,3
. ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
..3
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^
...o.. rw.
^
^^^^^
a change in her breast.
On. corning, »„„
„p ^ ^
^ouse. ^„ 3h„„,rlng, ,he happen., ro ,e.l a a
" "
-S. her i.er nippie.
.h. hn.p ... ,„i,e s^U, . . L L L T
.nr...
.„,rh.ng ah.r h.r ph.r.a.
.....In rh.::: .'^
^r''
Ann got out of the shower and thought about what she should do Sh.immediateiv callinc rh« H„.^ <:
n i . e consideredly g t e doctor for an appointment, but she thought rh.^ u-
^^.^^
best to monitor the change herself for a .lle/l^L ^ Z
U.P3 in their breasts that soon disappear b. themselves. She was not an alalnd She would closel, watch the bump on her own. Ann decided she would call Ioctor 1 the thlCenlng persisted, grew, or changed. She felt that, for the timebeing, there was no risk in not calling the doctor.
We would like to know what your reactions would be if you Had the same experience
Ann. First, try to imagine that what happened to Ann has just happened to
.
imagine that you have Just felt a hard, tiny thickening on the edge of your left
nipple while taking a morning shower. The bump is so small, smaller than the si^e
of a pea. that you aren't sure there is really anything different about the spot.
Other than this change, you haven't noticed anything out of the ordinary about your
physical condition. Next, please answer the following questions as if you have just
experienced the same situation as Ann. We realize that responding as if you are in
this situation may be difficult, but please take your time to think seriously about
what your reactions would actually be. There are no right or wrong answers to any
of the questions. Thank you.
as
vou.
Part A
1) How likely is it that you would declrlp ^^for a while, as Ann decided to do father th^'" ^'^^^^ "reast
' immediately calling the doctor?likely:
likely
3)
extremely sl,,,,,y '-l^^-^-j^r^--—---^
llA'llTo.Z?''''^ " ^""'^ ''"^^ ^^-r noticing it would you
less than one day^ two months
two days
three months
one week
SIX months
two weeks
one year
three weeks
^more than one year
our weeks ,
,
^would never call the doctor
sia weeks
^) If the lump did not change in any way (i e it- ^iA .
less than one day ^,,„ ^,two months
two days
^ three months
one week SIX months
two weeks
one year
three weeks
more than one year
four weeks n,
^would never call the doctor
six weeks
less than one day two months
'^^y^ three months
"^^^ six months
two weeks
one year
three weeks
„ore than one year
four weeks
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^
six weeks
6) For you Co decide to monitor the change in yourthan inunediately calling the doctor, would be:
breast for a while, rather
wise
:
strong:
motivated:
useful:
active
:
slck::_
pleasant
:_
easy
:
comfortable:
good:
emotional:
pessimistic
:_
excitable
:_
harmful
:_
practical:_
convenient
:_
ef fortful:_
troublesome
:
acceptable
manageable
_: foolish
_:weak.
_: aimless
_:useless
_: passive
_: healthy
_: unpleasant
_:difficult
_:uncomfortable
_:bad
_: unemotional
_: optimistic
_: calm
_:benef icial
_: impractical
_: inconvenient
_: effortless
_: peaceful
_: objectionable
_: impossible
7) For you to decide to immediately call the doctor would be:
wise
:
strong
motivated
useful:
active
:
sick:
pleasant
:_
easy
:_
comfortable:
good
:_
emotional
:_
pessimistic
:
excitable
_: foolish
_:weak.
_: aimless
_: useless
_: passive
_:healthy
_:unpleasant
_:dif ficult
_: uncomfortable
_:bad
_:unemotional
: optimistic
: calm
For you to decide to immediately call ^h« a'ii-eiy t e doctor would be
harmful
practical
convenient
effortful
troublesome
acceptable
manageable
beneficial
impractical
inconvenient
effortless
peaceful
objectionable
impossible
Suppose you did decide to immediately call ^h. a
i-iediatel, caUing the doctor? ' 'l""
likely:
: unlikely
XJ'^fi::i:di:t:^y"c:^!^c°d^oc^:^° ^'-^^^^^-^ ^° ^^^^k you
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
•
• :unlikelv
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
'
• :unlikelv
1) For a>e to control my own health and feel confidence in myself is:
good : • .
.
• .'•
: :bad
2) For me to avoid unpleasant medical procedures is:
good : : .
.
•
•
•
•
: :bad
TelZsVr ^''^ " "-^^^^^ ^ ^'^-^^ - breast is nothing
good
:
:bad
4) For me to handle my problems and decisionschem over Co someone else, is:
"^""^"^ °^ own, instead of turning
good:
:
• '•
: :bad
5) For me to avoid being inconvenienced bv takino ^•routine is: "'^ g time away from my daily
good:
:
•
= :bad
6) For me to take time to find a doctor I trust isIS
;
good:
:
.
.
.
:bad
For me to avoid appearing as a silly and foolish alarmist
good:
:
"
• ' :bad
good:
:
" •
•
: :bad
9) For me to not know what a change in my breast means is:
good: : • .
.
- •
•
:
: :bad
Part Bi
confidence in ^yZif .
conttoiling
„y o«n health md »o„ld feel
likely:
2)
_:unlikely
3)
lL\nT'°''-^'' '^^"^^ ""^^"^ ^ -hile rather than calledthe doctor immediately, I would avoid unpleasant medical procedures
likely: : • • .
•
: : unlikely
If I monitored the change in my breast for a while rather than called fhpdoctor immediately, I would feel anxious, fearful, SSfwor^ie".
likelv: : . . .
•
•
: :unlikely
4) If I monitored the change in my breast for a while rather than calledthe doctor immediately, I would be able to convince mvself that tLchange in my breast is nothing serious. '
likely: • . .
.
• •
• : : unlikely
dLr^r"''".""^
^^^""^^ ™^ ''"^"^ ^ "hil^ "^her than called the
oZ iLr", '""'^^^"^ P""^"'^ decisions on m/wn nstead of turning them over to someone else.
likely:
; ;
. . .
. , •,
,
• • : runlikely
6) If I monitored the change in my breasr fo.
likely:^
: :
•
.
'
'
'
• : unlikely
7) If I monitored the change in my breast for- , u.idoctor immediately, I would avoid h^f ^"^^ ^^^^ "Hed the
from my daily routine.
°" inconvenienced by taking time away
likely:
: . .
_
~"
'
'•
: unlikely
8) If I monitored the change in my breast for . „h,M
likely:
: :
•
.
.
'
• ' : unlikely
other disabling treatments- ^ surgery and/or
likely
:
_:unlikely
likely:
:
•
.
.
-
•
•
'
: unlikely
^^eL=-;-r-.^-.r—^^^^^^^
likely: • . .
.
•
•
: : unlikely
12) If I monitored the change in my breast for a while rather than called thedoctor xnnnedxately, cancer would have time to grow or spread
likely:
:
• •
.
.
• : : unlikely
13) If I monitored the change in my breast for a while rather than called thedoctor immediately, if and when I did call the doctor I woulfbe ab!e to
ZlnoliT^'"'
^"^"^'"-^^ ^'^-^ for him/her to make an accurate
likely:
; ;
.
.
.
.
: :unlikely
Ynrl
'"^^ =^^"8^ breast for a while rather than called thedoctor immediately, I would save money.
likely:
: ; . . . .
, •, i
^ • •
• : :unlikely
ILl ^^ange in my breast for a while rather than called thedoctor immediately, I would be decreasing my chances for a complete cure
16) If I monitored the change in mv breast fnrdoctor unmediately, the'lun^p ZuiTll\tZ "'''^ '''"^'^ ^^an called the
likely:
; ; . .
,
'
•_ •
.: unlikely
17) If I monitored the change in mv breast fnr = u.idoctor i:„.ediately. I wLld av^id'^u^s^I^.'^^g^^^J^,"^^" '^^^ "^^^^ the
likely; ; .
'
•
= ^: unlikely
likely:
: ;
'
•
• ' :unlikely
likely:
: :
•
.
.
"
'•
: unlikely
"my children")!
^^^^^ ^^^""^ ^he questions that ask about
likely:
: . .
.
'
•
. : unlikely
likely: : • .
.
•
•
'
: unlikely
w'hUe:°r:t;:r"?:an calTtL^So^ct^ "-"""i"^ ^^^"^^ ^" ''"^^ ^, uLiie tn l the doctor immediately.
likely: • . .
.
•
•
' :unlikely
while^'SertiL'San l^t' '° """'^"^ ^'^^ '^'^^^^^ ^" ""-^ ^or ani e, rath than call the doctor immediately.
likely: • • .
.
•
'
• : unlikely
5) My parents would think I ought to monitor the change in my breast for awhile, rather than call the doctor immediately.
likely: • •
.
.
•
•
• : :unlikely
2i?r'°^r"''/''"' ' '° """^^"^ breast for awhile, rather than call him/her immediately.
7) My husband would think t ^
likely:
;
„v
„ ^
" '
' :unllkely
°J My in-laws would rhnr,^ t
likely;
;
g.
'
'
'• :unlikely
likely:
; .
.
"
'
.' :unllkely
likely:
;
-
• :unlikely
likely:
: .
'
.:unlikely
Part CI
'> o.„.„u,
.,.^.„,. , „
^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^
likely:
; .
.
" "
:unlikely
2) Generally supaleinn t
-
pe king, i „an. to do what
.y f.iends think I ought to do.
likely:
: . .
_
~ '
-
• :unlikely
» ce„„n,
.p....„,. , „
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^
likely:
;
.
.
,
'
• '. :unlikely
=.»..auv sp„.,„,,
,
„^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
•-
-
'
..'unlikely
5) =.«=„n, sp,..i„,.
,
„^
^ ^^^^^
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
• •.
..'unlikelv
6) c.„.„u,
.p„k,„,. , „.„
„^
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
•_ ' :unlikely
7) Generally speaking. I want to do what
.y husband thinks 1 ought to do.
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
•
• :unlikely
8) Generally speaking, I want m u
'° '° "'^^ ™^ ^"-^-^ ^hinlc I ought to doilKely:
: .
.
"
-
- '•. ••unlikely
9) Generally speaking, I „ant m u
"^"^
^° ^° Siblings think I ought to do.likely:
: .
.
-'
•
•_ :unlikely
10) Generally speaking, I „ant to do what mv rpl ^•W y relatives think I ought to do.likely:
:
:unlikely
r."u""tr""^- ' " - -."cn C„„, S.c.„.
.M„.,
likely:
;
"'
-
' '
.:unlikely
Part C2
i) I would talk to my co-worker=; co e-> a
about the change L my breL". "'^^ ^^^^ ^'^i-'^ I ought to do
likely:
:
'
-• '• •unlikely
likely:
:
'
' :unlikely
"
'b:«'?.rjH^;:,"
"rs.^^/'" °" -^^ «
-
likely:
:
.
.
.
.:unlikely
likely:
: :
.
' '
• ' :unlikely
"
^^o™'2.riL°."i/:;"'L3".""'' °" '"'^
'
««^'
"
likely:^
: : .
.
'
-
•
• : unlikely
Jhe"°c;Lg:1n"yTre::t!'^ " ^^^^ ^^^^''^ ^ -^^^ - about
likely:
:
.
.
.
'
• ' : unlikely
likely:
; . .
.
~'
•
• .- : unlikely
8) I would Calk to my in-law<5 m f ^
likely:
;
Qx ^
'
'
• :unlikely
«rSL^f-;- .0
, ^^^^^
^^^^^
likely:
:
^'
-
'
' :unlikely
10) I would talk to my relatives m f ^
^he Change in
.y Lait^"^^^ " ^^"^ ^^ey think I ought to do about
likely:
;
,,, ^
~
'
-'• :unlikelv
ii; I would talk to the Ampri^,„ n
<.".^=
.0 .o - th.,
,
likely:
;
'
'
• : unlikely
"""--;r"h:^;;:,r:rjri- —ai .actions
Discovering the change in breast made
.e feel:
1) Embarrassed and ashamed
extremely:
2) Fearful and apprehensive
extremely:
:
3) Anxious and panicky
extremely:
:
4) Angry and annoyed
extremely:
5) Surprised and curious
extremely:
:
6) Disbelieving and shocked
extremely:
.:not at all
.•not at all
:not at all
:not at all
.•not at all
:noc at all
7) Pessimistic and hopeless
extremely:
:
.
.
.
'
•
' :not at all
8) Concerned and worried
extremely:
:
•
.
.
~
'
'•
' ^:not at all
jDiscovering the change in my breast made me feel
9) Sad and depressed
extremely: :::•.,
not at all
Part E-This section of the questionnaire asks about your personal diagnosisof the change in your breast. Please respond to the questions, eve!ir your answers are guesses.
1) What is your own diagnosis of the change in your breast?
2) To what extent does your personal diagnosis represent a life-threatenine
condition? °
life-threatening:
: : : : : life-threatening
3) How likely is it that the change in your breast is a symptom of breast cancer?
^^^e.ly:
: : ; ; ; . :unlikely
Part F—This section of the questionnaire asks about what your emotional reactions
would be if the change in your breast turned out to be breast cancer.
If the change in my breast turned out to be breast cancer, I would feel:
1) Embarrassed and ashamed
extremely:
: : : : ; ; .-not at all
2) Fearful and apprehensive
extremely:
: : : : : ;
:not at all
3) Anxious and panicky
extremely:
: : : : : :
:not at all
4) Angry and annoyed
extremely:
: : : : : :
:not at all
5) Surprised and curious
extremely: :::::: :not at all
i
" the Change in ,,east turned out
.o
.e breas. cancer I .
6) Disbelieving and shocked ' ' =
extremely:
7) Pessimistic and hopeless
extremely:
:
8) Concerned and worried
extremely:
:
9) Sad and depressed
extremely:
:
:not at all
.:not at all
:not at all
_:not at all
Section II— Instructions
~.
,„.„,„„^„ „„,^„,
^^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^
CO .e.p„„. „
^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^
PI.... th..
,
^^^^
^^^^
questions as you oomaUy
„„„id. H3„^
*"iio«"o:;™cirL3;::rs"^ij:."'' '~ '° —
1) Have you ever discoverpri a i,,m^uj.icoverecl lump in your breast? vpc=j'^=> ^no
ILjiies: How many times? time(s)
yes
Did you have the lamp(s) examined by a doctor?
ILZM-- How much time went by between your discovery of thelump(s) and you contacting a doctor? Pleas^ indthe number of days, weeks, months, or years
IVhat was the doctor's diagnosis of the lump(s)?
2) Have you ever had any breast symptoms other than a lump? yes
ILies: Please briefly describe the symptom(s).
e
ves
^yes
yes
3) Have you ever had breast cancer?
^) Have you ever had any
.,pe of cancer ocher
.Han 5reas. cancer^
5) Has your .other or sister(s) ever had breast cancer^
on the „hoXe. how successful
„as the. outcome fro^ brelTler.
successful:
:
„
- ^unsuccessful
6) HOW .any ti.es in the past year have you performed a breast self e .times o - xamination?
2) p.rc,„t.g. „f i„.p. 13 ,i,j„„„, ^3 ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^
3) Uh.t p.rcmt.ge of „o.„ g,t, b„.,t cancsr? j
the disease, die of it? 7
5) What percentage of women who have breast cancer, and are treated for thedisease, die of it?
x
6) HOW many women do ,ou .now who have discovered a breast lump that was notdiagnosed as breast cancer? women
7) HOW many women do you .now who have discovered a breast lump that wasdiagnosed as breast cancer?
„omen
'~to'':r:::t":an:e?
^^aiT^Je:"^^^^ vulnerability
answers are guesses '
questions, even if your
1) How likely is it that you will one day get breast cancer?
likely:
:
•
.
.
•
•
: :unlikely
2) To what extent do you have personal control over not getting breast cancer?
completelv:
:
•
.
.
'
•
'
: :not at all
4) How would you descrihp rh^ ^
breast cancer? ' '^^^ "^o has a high chaace of getting
5) To what extent do you oiatch this description?
completely:
: : •
.
.:not at all
Part D-Below is a list of physical symptoms. We wouldsymptom as to how frequently it i« ! Z '^"^ each
breast cancer is in its earL in^ °^ "hen
scale to rate each sJ^ptSr'^^-^^'^ '^"^^ ^^e following
1 = early, initial breast cancer never produces this symptom
= early, initial breast cancer rarelv produces this symptom
3 = early, initial breast cancer sometimes produces this symptom
= early, initial breast cancer usually produces this symptom
= early, initial breast cancer always produces this symptom
ea^rs^i^toT"'"^
'''' corresponds to your rating in the space preceding
1) convulsions
.
2) sore or stiff muscles, back
3) hot flashes
_
^) shortness of breath, coughing
.
5) weight loss
6) hair loss
7) pain or tenderness in breast, nipple
8) change in appearance of wart or mole
_
9) fever
_10) numbness, tingling in any part of body
1 = never : 2 = rare] v i. -
- 3 - so^ne^,
, ,
^^^^ ^ __
11) headaches
_12) blurred vision
^13) weight gain
14) lump or thickening in breast
-13) Change in retraction or scaliness of n,pp,e
16) a sore that doesn't heal
—
17) upset stomach, stomachache
—18) faintness, dizziness
19) u
— heartburn, indigestion
—20) ringing in ears
—21) constant thirst
_22) bleeding or discharge from nipple
_23) abnormal Pap smear
_24) chills
_25) chest pains
_26) running, congested, or bleeding nose
_27) weakness, tiredness
-28) change in size, shape, or skin of breast
_29) abnormal vaginal bleeding
30) sore throat, hoarseness, difficulty swallowing
Breast cancer is:
permanent
:
incurable
:
disabling:
dangerous
:
temporary
curable
' empowering
: safe
Breast cancer Is:
painful
:
serious
:
life-threatening:
recurring:
unpredictable:
contagious:
inheritable:
unpreventable:
uncontrollable:
dirty:
mysterious
:
unfair:
bad:_
punishing
:
unpleasant
:
undeserved
:
a disease that
results in per-
manent bodily —
changes
a disease that
results in per- :
manent personality"
changes
a disease that
requires long
treatment
: painless
:mild
__:not life-threatening
— :not recurring
^predictable
— :not contagious
— :not inheritable
preventable
: controllable
: clean
_: well-understood
_: fair
_:good
rewarding
pleasant
deserved
a disease that
.results in no
- bodily changes
a disease that
.: results in no
personality changes
a disease that
_: requires short
treatment
<P1.... keep goI„g-,„„ Le .L:. LIj^JLuyftf
1) In general, my relationships with doctors have been:
good
:
beneficial
satisfactory:
comfortable
:
friendly
:_
bad
harmful
unsatisfactory
uncomfortable
unfriendly
usually go_
right away" ' • • : : : .usually
'wait
3) In general, do you consult doctors on a re2„l;,r h = , .
emergencies? gula basis or only in
on a regular
basis .only in
emergencies
the most recent time you called the doctor about a physicalsymptom you had noticed. What was the symptom?
Pf^Ysic
''"tpilrh^''l°",?^
questionnaire asks for your opinions about generalhea t and illness issues.
Please use the following scale in responding to each statement below.
6 5 4 3 2 1
strongly
agree
strongly
disagree
Place the number that corresponds to your response in the space
preceding each statement.
_
1. If I get sick, it is my own behavior which determines how soon
I get well again.
No matter what I do, if I am going to get sick, I will get sick.
tor me to
_
A. Most things that affect my health happen to me by accident.
- TrT^lllVJr'' ' "-"^^ ^ -''^-Uy trained
_
6. I am in control of my health.
_
7. My fa^nily has a lot to do with my becoming sick or staying healthy.
_
8. '.Jhen I get sick I am to blame.
"
^'
ITilltlll.^
determining how soon I will recover from
_10. Health professionals control ray health.
_11. My good health is largely a matter of good fortune.
_12. The main thing which affects my health is what I myself do.
_13. If I take care of myself, I can avoid illness.
_1A. When I recover from an illness, it's usually because other people(for example, doctors, nurses, family, friends) have been taking
good care of me.
_15. No matter what I do, I'm likely to get sick.
16. If it's meant to be, I will stay healthy.
17. If I take the right actions, I can stay healthy.
_18. Regarding my health, I can only do what my doctor tells me to do.
t H--This section of the questionnaire asks for your general feelings about
yourself
.
Please use the following scale in responding to each statement below.
A 3 2 1
strongly agree disagree strongly
agree disagree
Place the number that corresponds to your response in the space
preceding each statement.
1- I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis
with others.
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
scrongly agree disagree rtrongly
^S'^^^ disagree
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
:
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
_
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
Background Information
1) What is your marital status?
^Never married
Married
Separated or divorced
Widowed
2) What year were you born?
3) Ethnic background:
White
Black
_Hispanic
Asian
Other:
4) Religion:
Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Other:
None
5) Are you employed? yes
If yes, what is your occupationl
6) What is the last year of school you completed?
8th grade or below
Some high school
Graduated from high school
Some business or trade school
_Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work
_Graduate degree
7) How many people do you live with? people
8) What is your household's annual income?
$10,000 or less
510,001 - 520,000
$20,001 - $30,000
$30,001 - 340,000
$40,001 - $50,000
_$50,001 or more
9) How many people does this income support? people
If you are presently married
,
please answer the following questions.
1) What is the last year of school your husband completed?
3th grade or below
_Some high school
_Graduated from high school
_Some business or trade school
_Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work
_Graduate degree
2) Is your husband employed? yes no
If yes, what is his occupation?
ii

